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When, eight years ago, I sent out introduction emails to potential PhD advisors, Greg 
Dowd responded that he enjoys the “intellectual exchange and mutual learning” that he shares 
with his graduate students. How true this statement turned out to be. The conclusions that I drew 
in this dissertation were the direct result of Greg’s readiness to assess my ideas on their own 
terms and to give me the space I needed to explore them. Later, I sought out mentorship from 
Rebecca Scott, whose insightful suggestions and meticulous revisions often came accompanied 
by afternoon tea and walks through Burns Park. I am grateful to both of my co-chairs for the 
time and attention that they gave to my work. It bears their influence in all of its strongest parts. 
Various other people and units at the University of Michigan made contributions to this 
project. My comparative and interdisciplinary understanding of history was shaped through 
coursework with Sueann Caulfield, Dario Gaggio, Farina Mir, Doug Northrup, Diane Hughes, 
Paulina Alberto, Paul Anderson, and Vince Diaz, and through suggestions from Tiya Miles, Dan 
Nemser, and Claudio Verdesio. Michael Witgen and Scott Lyons were excellent teachers as well 
as perceptive readers of this dissertation; their scholarship has fundamentally shaped my 
approach to indigenous history. The maps of Florida and Yucatán that follow the introduction 
were made with the help of Caitlin Dickinson of the Informational Technology unit of U-M’s 
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. The financial resources made available through the 
Department of History, Rackham Graduate School, and the Eisenberg Institute for Historical 
Studies have made possible the far-flung research that this project required. 
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Other graduate students at U-M read chapters, organized panels, retrieved archival 
documents, and discussed ideas. The graduate community that most influenced my work (and 
was a downright pleasure to hang out with) was the Native American and Indigenous Studies 
Interest Group, especially Michelle Cassidy, Becky Hill, Christie Toth, Frank Kelderman, Will 
Hartmann, Emily MacGillivray, Courtney Cottrell, Lisa Jong, Walker Elliott, Stefan Aune, Joe 
Gaudet, Kat Whitely, Kris Hernandez, Matthew Villeneuve, Mallory Whiteduck, and Elspeth 
Martini. I’m also indebted to fellow Early Americanists, including Andrew Rutledge and Marie 
Stango; Latin Americanists, including Adriana Chira, Ana María Silva, Andres Pletsch, Angela 
Pérez Villa, Marvin Chochotte, and Edgardo Pérez Morales; and other readers, including Emily 
Klancher Merchant, Yanay Israeli, Jeremy Johnson, Cyrus O’Brien, Jaymin Kim, Tiggy 
McLaughlin, and Sarah Mass. Austin McCoy bought me my first bookstand and shared my 
excitement when I came across my opening anecdote on our trip to Mexico City.  
I have also received support from people outside of U-M. While the staff of each of the 
archives that I visited has made their mark on this dissertation, a few people deserve special 
mention. During an early research trip to Florida, I made a day trip to the State Lands Division in 
Tallahassee, where Joe Knetsch’s enthusiastic rendition of “Hail to the Victors” and thick stack 
of articles on Florida history eased my anxiety over whether I would succeed at historical 
research. The staff of the Archivo General del Estado de Yucatán, especially Ernesto Aké and 
Vanessa Fernandez, made Mérida both a productive research site and a home away from home. I 
managed to write a full chapter of my dissertation from single week of research at the Belize 
Archives and Records Service only because of generous and diligent assistance by Mary 
Alpuche. 
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Scholars from outside of U-M commented on papers, agreed to coffees, and offered 
suggestions on my research. These included Mark Lentz, Dalia Muller, Ada Ferrer, Lara Putnam, 
Christina Snyder, Patricia Marroquin Norby, Cameron Strang, Alejandra Dubcovsky, and Philip 
Round. Jason Herbert and Adrienne Kates have become dear friends and my go-to authorities on 
the histories of Florida and Yucatán. I would never have found my way to a PhD program if it 
hadn’t been for the mentorship I received during my Master’s degree at University of Tennessee-
Knoxville, where Lynn Sacco, Jeff Norrell, and Bob Morrissey championed my work, helped me 
brainstorm PhD programs, and most importantly, taught me to write. During the first years of my 
PhD program, I received support from the Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts. 
Patrick Byrne, Susan Van Zanten, Joe Creech, and Mel Piehl remain valuable mentors.  
 Friends and family (my brother Matthias, my Yaya “sisters” Alison and Kate, Julie, Josh 
and Sally, and Danielle) supported me from near and far as I inched toward this goal, while 
housemates (Ashley Hajski, Rachel Miller, Kyera Singleton, and Will Runyan) endured close 
quarters when I was not always at my best. Jacqueline Larios never failed to provide needed 
perspective about what really matters (most often, cats and gifs). One year out from the finish 
line, I discovered that “having it all” means finishing your daily word count while a bearded 
engineer brews your coffee and mixes your cocktails. Matt fueled the home stretch—and 
maintained interest in my research even though I often avoided answering his questions. 
My life and scholarship have been made richer by (in alphabetical order) Aaron Seaman, 
Brady G’sell, Kate Silbert, Matthew Woodbury, Nora Krinitsky, and Tapsi Mathur— the most 
perceptive readers, the most dependable colleagues, and the dearest friends. Where else would I 
find a squad (yes, intentional) who would hunt through archives for me, would revise multiple 
chapters of my dissertation, and would call the doctor for me when I was on a research trip and 
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too shy and sick to do it myself? Thank you, friends, for throwing the birthday parties and 
organizing the potlucks that made this dissertation the #best possible. 
 The final note of thanks goes to my parents, Jacki Betsworth and George Hunt, who took 
their history loving daughter on countless trips to Gibbs Farm; who introduced me to Laura 
Ingalls, Anne Shirley, and Jo March; and who reminisced fondly about how their own college 
classes changed their outlook on the world. Thank you for encouraging me to pursue a PhD, and 
for always answering the panicked phone calls when completing it proved harder than I’d 
expected. As stated in a story “published” in the Betsworth/ Hunt household circa 1988, “All 
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 During the age of revolutions, the United States and Mexico declared their independence 
and attempted to define and consolidate their borders in the context of the political, social, and 
economic worlds of their shared sea, the Gulf of Mexico. A space of interconnection and 
exchange since before the arrival of Europeans, the Gulf had, from the late sixteenth to mid 
eighteenth centuries, been claimed almost entirely by Spain. Between 1763 and 1861, it took on 
qualities common to places that historians term “borderlands.” With multiple European empires 
and nation-states vying to control the Gulf, it became a space where power was contested and 
authority undefined. The island of Cuba remained a Spanish colony, British American 
adventurers and merchants continued to sail the Gulf waters, and indigenous peoples retained 
possession of many of the shores and rivers connecting this bustling region to interior zones. 
 Europeans’ and Euro-Americans’ contests over the Gulf involved not only the territory 
around it but also the lines of exchange that stretched across it and connected it to the Atlantic 
Ocean and Caribbean Sea. Officials sought, in hopes of controlling traffic into and out of the 
Gulf, to establish or maintain control over parts of Florida and Yucatán, the peninsulas that 
formed its entrance. The harsh environment of these peninsular territories made them more 
conducive to such illegal activities as smuggling and privateering than to imperial or national 
force. In the same way that “rogue colonialism” has been shown to have kept European empires 
alive in the Gulf during an earlier period, the United States and Mexico’s efforts to establish 
control over Florida and Yucatán involved the private and illicit trade relationships that they 
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maintained with other Gulf societies. This was evident in the strategies that each country used in 
the Seminole Wars and Caste War. 
 The enduring power of “rogues” in the Gulf also offered political strategies to indigenous 
peoples. Great Britain gave up many of its official claims to mainland North America south of 
the St. Lawrence River during this period, but British American adventurers, merchants, and 
even colonial officials continued to exert military and commercial power in the Gulf. Through 
these rogue agents, the indigenous peoples of Florida (“dissident Creeks,” who at different times 
included Lower Creeks, Mikasukis, Seminoles, and Red Sticks) and of Yucatán (Mayas, who 
had been partially incorporated into Spanish, and then Mexican society) found their own direct 
connections to Gulf trade partners. Abandoned by empires, they were befriended by rogues, who 






 In November 1865, two years into the French occupation of Mexico known as the Second 
Empire, a political official in Mérida named Pedro de Regil y Peón wrote a letter to Emperor 
Maximilian I bemoaning the devastation caused by the conflict known as the Caste War. This 
period of violence between residents of the departments of Yucatán and Campeche and groups of 
Maya revolutionaries living independently near Mexico’s border with British Honduras was then 
in its eighteenth year. Regil informed his superior that access to dense forests surrounding the 
major sites of war encouraged soldiers to desert, creating a need for reinforcements that had left 
fields untended and people restless. Insisting that departmental conscription laws would be futile, 
he urged the emperor to send centralized troops. Perhaps unexpectedly, he justified this plea by 
comparing Yucatán’s struggle to a series of Indian wars that had recently ended in a country 
seven hundred miles away. “That Yucatán alone hasn’t been able, and still isn’t able, to end this 
fight should not be surprising,” he wrote, “if you remember the number of years and the millions 
[of dollars] that the United States of America, despite the immensity of its resources, spent in 
dominating the Indian tribes of Florida.”1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Que Yucatán por si solo no haya podido, ni pueda concluir la lucha, no debe estrañarse, si se 
recuerda el número de años y los millones que los E. Unidos de America, a pesar de la 
inmensidad de sus recursos, gastaron para dominar los tribus indias de la Florida, que sin la 
organización de las nuestras, eran mucho menos terribles.” Pedro Regil y Peon to [Emperor 
Maximilian I?], November 10, 1865, Exp. 14, Caja 46, Sec. Segundo Imperio, Fondo Gobierno, 
Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Mexico City. 
2 “Lieutenant McDonald,” Daily Delta, November 22, 1848. 
3 "Don Guillermo Palomino ha manifestado a esta Secretaria la necesidad que tiene de consultar 
publicaciones en que se trate científicamente el modo de hacer guerra a pueblos bárbaros que 
habiten paises boscosos y lugares de dificil acceso." Miguel Ruelas to Manuel María de 
 2 
 Regil was referring to the Seminole Wars, a series of early nineteenth-century conflicts in 
which state, national, and private U.S. militias had battled Lower Creeks, Red Sticks, Seminoles, 
and the Seminoles’ African-descended allies in the territory then claimed as Spanish East 
Florida. With U.S. forces periodically occupying Spanish cities and forts, the United States had 
demanded Spanish East Florida, taking official possession of it as a territory in 1821. During the 
decades that followed, U.S. government officials, settlers, and soldiers had then sought to 
eliminate Florida’s indigenous peoples and to enslave their black allies. Through death and 
coerced migration, most of these people, by then known collectively as “Seminoles,” had been 
forced out of possession of Florida by the end of these wars in 1858.  
 Regil’s letter comparing the Caste War to the Seminole Wars was not the only such 
mention. As early as 1848, the second year of the Caste War, the New Orleans Daily Delta had 
linked the Yucatecan conflict to the Indian wars in Florida, which at that point appeared to have 
ended. In an article praising the hundreds of men who were then departing the United States to 
fight as mercenary soldiers in Yucatán, the Delta editors had called the selection of a lieutenant 
named John McDonald “a judicious one.” McDonald, they explained, had “learned his first 
lessons in Indian fighting among the everglades of Florida.”2 Three decades later, in 1879, the 
Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, Miguel Ruelas, would write to a Mexican diplomat in 
Washington, DC, with a request for information relevant to the war in Yucatán. Ruelas would 
request, in particular, a publication “dealing scientifically with how to wage war against 
barbarous peoples who inhabit forested countries and hard to access places.” He would add that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Lieutenant McDonald,” Daily Delta, November 22, 1848. 
 3 
this resource should offer a detailed account of the United States’ campaign against the 
Seminoles.3  
 Across three decades, U.S. and Mexican writers advanced the notion that U.S. violence 
against Seminoles in Florida bore lessons for Mexican attempts to defeat Maya revolutionaries in 
Yucatán. These writers likened these conflicts to one another in part out of a belief rooted in 
concepts of civilization and racial difference that Indian fighting in one location resembled wars 
against “barbarous peoples” elsewhere. Yet their comparisons also centered on other, more 
genuine similarities: the harsh environment of the seats of war in Florida and Yucatán, the high 
human and financial costs of these conflicts, and the extended periods through which Seminoles 
and Mayas withstood state and national military advances.  
 Like U.S. and Mexican campaigns against Comanches, Apaches, and Kiowas, which 
shaped the location and character of these countries’ land border along the Río Grande, the 
Seminole Wars and the Caste War both formed crucial events in the long struggle to extend 
European imperial claims into the sovereign territory of indigenous peoples.4 Florida and 
Yucatán together held a shared position in this struggle, one so commonplace in Euro-American 
thought that Regil, Ruelas, and the editors of the Delta seem to have taken it for granted. Jutting 
out from North America into the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, these peninsulas marked the 
outer boundaries of the Gulf of Mexico, an interconnected region that European empires had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 "Don Guillermo Palomino ha manifestado a esta Secretaria la necesidad que tiene de consultar 
publicaciones en que se trate científicamente el modo de hacer guerra a pueblos bárbaros que 
habiten paises boscosos y lugares de dificil acceso." Miguel Ruelas to Manuel María de 
Zamacona, May 6, 1879, Exp. 243, Leg. 67, Archivo de la Embajada de Mexico en los Estados 
Unidos Americanos, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City. 
4 For analyses of Indian war along the United States and Mexico’s land border, see Brian DeLay, 
War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008). 
 4 
never fully possessed. Their similar environments and geographic locations in relation to the 
Gulf likened Florida and Yucatán to one another, drawing them into a deep history of exchange 
that had endured the rise and fall of empires.  
 For much of the imperial era, Spain had held international claims to the lands 
surrounding the Gulf of Mexico. At strategic posts near its entrances—along the straits between 
Florida, Yucatán, and the island of Cuba—imperial officials had controlled official access 
between this body of water and the Atlantic World. Yet this empire had never possessed the Gulf 
in its entirety. Privateers, smugglers, and independent Indians had controlled many of its shores 
and secondary ports. Between the Seven Years’ War and the American Civil War, Atlantic 
independence movements brought an additional layer of contestation to the Gulf. No longer a 
Spanish sea, the Gulf came under the international title of multiple competing powers, none of 
which could establish complete authority over it. Long after the United States and Mexico had 
declared their independence, the island of Cuba remained a Spanish colony, British American 
adventurers and merchants continued to sail the Gulf waters, and indigenous peoples retained 
possession of many of the shores and rivers connecting this bustling water region to interior 
zones. 
 The endurance of Atlantic empires and independent Indians in the Gulf between 1763 
and 1861 shaped U.S. and Mexican efforts to secure their independence and to define and 
consolidate their borders. Tying these young nation-states to one another and to Cuba, the Gulf 
also afforded the indigenous peoples of Florida and Yucatán—Lower Creeks, Seminoles, and 
Mayas—direct connections to their own trade partners. While private merchants and militias 
furthered the cause of U.S. and Mexican conquest in the Gulf, unofficial agents of empire 
provided indigenous peoples with the weapons and diplomatic resources to assert their own place 
 5 
in this new world order. This shared history made Florida a likely comparison for nineteenth-
century Yucatecans. It also offers historians a glimpse into patterns of conquest and indigenous 
power often overlooked in historiographies written from national or land-based perspectives. 
 
The Seminole Wars and the Caste War 
 Major differences exist in Seminole and Maya histories, including differences in their 
deeper past, their experiences with European colonizers, and their places within the colonial 
structures of the nineteenth-century United States and Mexico. Such distinctions have led the 
historiography on the Seminole Wars and the Caste War to develop in different directions, 
preventing scholars from perceiving these conflicts as part of a shared story. Regil ended his own 
reference to the Seminole Wars by distinguishing Seminoles from Mayas, insisting that Florida 
Indians, “without the organization of our own, were much less terrible.”5 Despite the 
ethnocentric assumptions inherent in this observation, nineteenth-century Seminoles and Mayas 
did, in fact, vary greatly in terms of their social, cultural, political, and economic situations.  
 Seminoles represented what Spanish officials had once termed indios bárbaros or indios 
no sometidos—“wild” Indians who remained unconquered by agents of the Spanish Crown.6 
While, in fact, they were neither wild nor disorganized, their political and economic systems 
often diverged from European categories of civilization. Seminoles had themselves migrated into 
Florida in the late-eighteenth century after British-allied warriors from the Creek confederacy, to 
which they had belonged, had cleared the territory of Timucuas and Apalaches, and of Spanish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Pedro Regil y Peon to [Emperor Maximilian I?], November 10, 1865, Exp. 14, Caja 46, Sec. 
Segundo Imperio, Fondo Gobierno, AGN. 
6 For a discussion of these terms, including an argument for translating various eighteenth-
century Spanish terms—bárbaros, salvajes, bravos—as “savage,” see David J. Weber, 
Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005), 12-15. 
 6 
missionaries and ranchers. Hundreds of years before Europeans’ arrival, large, hierarchical 
chiefdoms had dominated the landscape of southeastern North America. “Shattered” by the 
warfare, diseases, and slave raids that had accompanied European colonialism, these peoples had 
coalesced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries into confederations of diverse, autonomous 
villages, held together through practices of ritual and kinship. The Creeks bartered and 
intermarried with British traders. A small number of them had begun to raise cattle, to plant 
cotton, and even to hold African-descended people as slaves. Most Creeks, however, continued 
to focus their diplomacy at the village level, and continued to devote a large share of their 
economy to hunting, subsistence agriculture, and trade. Most importantly, the Creeks owed no 
tribute or labor to European colonizers. Instead, they signed treaties with Britain—and, in the 
late-eighteenth century, with Spain.7 
 Mayas, by contrast, fell under the classification of indios sometidos, reducidos, 
tributados, or domésticos: those who, having submitted to Spanish rule, had become internal to 
the Spanish Empire.8 Spanish colonialism had taken a milder form in Yucatán than in such 
centers of power as Mexico City. The Mayas’ numerical superiority to Spaniards and access to 
independent indigenous polities in the Guatamalan Petén gave them opportunities to evade 
colonialism, while Yucatán’s lack of agricultural and mineral resources had stalled the 
development of haciendas and wage labor, which had intensified Spanish colonialism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See, among others, Steven C. Hahn, Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: 
University Nebraska Press, 2004), 13-26; Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians 
and their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Ethridge, ed., Mapping 
the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the 
American South (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009). 
8 Weber, Bárbaros, 12-15. 
 7 
elsewhere.9 Still, the men who led the Caste War movement—village leaders, sometimes aided 
by Hispanic generals—represented a population that had once been integrated into the Spanish 
Empire. Through the policy of reducción, which Spaniards had also used (with less success) 
among Timucuas and Apalaches in Florida, Mayas had been consolidated into villages with 
tribute obligations to Hispanic centers. Despite receiving Mexican citizenship upon the country’s 
independence, they still bore responsibility for state and religious taxes that were specific to their 
status as indígenas.  
 While both Florida and Yucatán were peripheral to the Spanish Empire, in other words, 
colonizers in Yucatán had gained more ground. Amy Turner Bushnell describes Yucatán as an 
“internal periphery” and Florida as an “external periphery” during the colonial period. Relatively 
close to such cores as Veracruz and Havana, Yucatán manifested “a high level of central control, 
coupled with a high level of exploitation of natural resources and high demands on the subject 
population in the form of taxes and tributary labor.” By contrast, Florida and other external 
peripheries remained “relatively distant and loosely connected to the cores that bear 
administrative responsibility for them—responsibility that is not sought and may well be divided 
among several cores.” Agents of the Spanish Crown maintained fortified presidios in Florida at 
St. Augustine, St. Marks, and Pensacola at great expense in order to protect the empire’s 
maritime interests along the Florida Straits. As late as the eighteenth century, however, much of 
Florida was not a Spanish possession at all but what Bushnell terms a “claim”: the “vast 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Nancy M. Farriss, Maya Society Under Colonial Rule: The Collective Enterprise of Survival 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 39-57. 
 8 
cartographic expanse to which an early modern monarch held title under European international 
law.”10 
 These differences in the status of the indigenous peoples of Florida and Yucatán within 
the Spanish empire mirrored differences in the colonial models that the United States and 
Mexico each inherited upon their independence. Historians have long observed that Spaniards in 
Mexico and their descendants sought to bring indigenous people into their empire through 
military conquest and mission work in order to extract their labor and tribute. By contrast, British 
and Anglo-American colonizers in North America tended to remain separate from indigenous 
peoples, forming diplomatic and trade alliances and warring for control over land. This 
distinction had blurred by the late-eighteenth century. With millions of bárbaros still controlling 
the majority of the territory claimed as Spanish America, Spanish administrators began taking 
cues from their British and French rivals. In places as distant as New Mexico and the Gran 
Chaco region of South America, Bourbon reformers experimented with treaties and commerce as 
a way to manage relations with independent Indians.11 Still, the parallel emphases of Anglo-
American historiography on treaty-based sovereignty and reservations and of Latin American 
historiography on indigenous peoples under Spanish rule has tended to reinforce the fault lines of 
U.S. and Mexican ethnohistories rather than to promote the exploration of their commonalities.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Amy Turner Bushnell “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries: The Field of Frontier Latin America” 
in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, edited by Christine 
Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (Routledge: New York & London, 2002), 18-19; Bushnell, 
Situado y Sabana: Spain’s Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 210-211. 
11 Weber, Bárbaros, 205-214. 
12 This divide has only been intensified by the recent emphasis on settler colonial theory in 
Native American and Indigenous Studies. While Latin American scholars have their own 
tradition of scholarship on settler versus non-settler communities, and while a recent handbook in 
settler colonial studies includes chapters on New Spain and postcolonial Latin America, scholars 
in this relatively new field tend to posit firm distinctions between colonies where settlers sought 
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 Historiography on the Caste War and Seminole Wars has, likewise, taken disparate paths. 
In the mid-twentieth century, historians may have seen similarities in these conflicts, each of 
which, while no longer understood in the overtly racial terms that they had been in the nineteenth 
century, still appeared as products of an inevitable clash of European and indigenous cultures.13 
In later decades, historians of the Caste War divided loosely between those who, using the 
insights of peasant studies, painted the conflict as an agrarian revolt, and those who used 
anthropology to investigate the syncretic religious cult that developed to sustain the movement 
after the initial years of war.14 One of these scholars has more recently termed the Caste War a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to eliminate indigenous peoples and those in which colonial officials sought to extract their 
labor. Foundational worlds include Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical 
Overview (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the 
Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event (London: 
Cassell, 1999); Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, The Routledge Handbook of the 
History of Settler Colonialism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). For older conversations about 
settler societies in Latin America, see Franklin W. Knight, The African Dimension in Latin 
American Societies (New York: Macmillian, 1974). 
13 Compare, for example, John Mahon’s claims that the Seminoles were “on the threshold of 
barbaric prosperity” and that the United States “could not coexist peaceably with Indians,” to the 
following statement by Nelson Reed about agricultural change in Yucatán: “The Maya of 
Yucatán, finding resistance possible, took up arms in defense of his world.” Mahon, History of 
the Second Seminole War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1967), 18-19; Reed, The 
Caste War of Yucatán (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 56. 
14 The foundational work on the agricultural origins of the Caste War is Howard Francis Cline, 
“Regionalism and Society in Yucatan, 1825-1847: A Study of ‘Progressivism’ and the Origins of 
the Caste War” (PhD diss. Harvard, 1947). For a summary of the consensus around this 
interpretation that had developed by the 1980s, see Gilbert M. Joseph, “From Caste War to Class 
War: The Historiography of Modern Yucatán (c. 1750-1940),” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 65, no. 1 (February 1985): 111-134. Anthropological writing includes Paul 
Sullivan, Unfinished Conversations: Mayas and Foreigners Between Two Wars (New York: 
Knopf, 1989); Victoria Bricker, The Indian Christ, the Indian King: The Historical Substrate of 
Maya Myth and Ritual (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981). Works by Terry Rugeley and 
Don Dumond brought these insights together in the 1990s, using both ethnohistorical and 
socioeconomic considerations to interrogate, respectively, the mindset of Caste War leaders and 
the internal politics of the rebellion. Despite their differences, Rugeley and Dumond demonstrate 
a shared search for a multifaceted account. Terry Rugeley, Yucatan’s Maya Peasantry and the 
Origins of the Caste War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996); Don E. Dumond, The 
Machete and the Cross: Campesino Rebellion in Yucatan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
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period of violencia similar to those in late-twentieth-century Colombia or Guatemala: long 
episodes of fragmented, sporadic assaults in places with weak state control, where combatants 
“disagree over what the state should be, who should govern, and how.”15 By contrast, scholars of 
the Seminole Wars have used the abundant military and government records of these more 
centralized conflicts to write military and political histories focusing on the personalities of 
major Anglo-American and Seminole actors and to tie these conflicts to such national policies as 
slavery extension and Indian Removal.16 Scholars investigating Seminole society more broadly 
have analyzed the late genesis of this breakaway group, whose alliances with African Americans 
made them unique among southeastern peoples.17  
 Rather than comparing these wars, this project seeks to understand their place in the 
shared world in which they began, a world that provided the context for nineteenth-century 
comparisons. By crossing the borders (both intellectual and territorial) of present-day nations, we 
can see the Seminole Wars and Caste War how Regil and Ruelas saw them: as products of a time 
and place where power between nations, empires, and indigenous peoples operated in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press, 1997); Rugeley, Rebellion Now and Forever: Mayas, Hispanics, and Caste War Violence 
in Yucatán, 1800-1880 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 5, 358 n5. 
15 Rugeley, Rebellion Now and Forever, 7. 
16 Classic works of this type include James W. Covington, The Seminoles of Florida 
(Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1993); J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Creeks and Seminoles: 
The Destruction and Regeneration of the Muscogulgee People (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1986); and Canter Brown, Jr., Florida’s Peace River Frontier (Orlando: University of 
Central Florida Press, 1991). A compact synthesis of these books appears in Joe Knetsch, 
Florida’s Seminole Wars: 1817-1858 (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2003). 
17 Wright, Creeks and Seminoles; Brent Weisman, Unconquered People: Florida’s Seminole and 
Miccosukee Indians (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1999); Christina Snyder, Slavery 
in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2010). Works on Black Seminoles include Kenneth Wiggins Porter, 
The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-seeking People (Gainesville: University Presses of 
Florida, 1996); Betty Mae Tiger Jumper and Patsy West, A Seminole Legend: The Life of Betty 
Mae Tiger Jumper (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 2001); Jane Landers, Black 
Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Landers, Atlantic 
Creoles in the Age of Revolutions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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unexpected ways. These particularities made room for interpretations of Florida and Yucatán as 
similarly important to their respective nation-states, and as similarly vulnerable to Indian war. 
 
Borderlands of the Gulf World 
 Florida and Yucatán both lay at the outer edge of the Gulf of Mexico, a bay that had 
hosted travel, migration, trade, and cultural exchange since before the arrival of Europeans. A 
“borderland” in terms of its longstanding networks of exchange, it also became, in the 1760s, a 
space in which the political contestation and lack of clear authority common to many borderlands 
were especially apparent. By connecting the riches of North America to Atlantic networks, the 
straits between Florida and Yucatán and the island of Cuba promised power to any state or 
empire that could bring them under its control. European empires and North American states 
vied to control these peninsulas in order to possess the Gulf as a whole. 
 Located between the Mississippi River, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea, the 
Gulf of Mexico has, since before the arrival of Europeans, witnessed the passage of goods and 
ideas from the Great Lakes all the way to the Caribbean coast of South America. Scholars have 
described the Gulf in various ways—part, for example, of the Greater Caribbean, of the Gulf-
Caribbean Complex (complejo Golfo-Caribe), and of the Mississippi-Caribbean World—in order 
to highlight its interaction with larger systems.18 The people of the Gulf, however, have 
maintained the most frequent and sustained interactions with one another. Dalia Antonia Muller 
terms this region the “Gulf World,” a “space unto itself that sustains intimate connections with 
the Caribbean.” From the journeys of Mayas, Arawaks, Caribs, and indigenous Floridians before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Laura Muñoz Mata, “El Caribe, La diplomacia y la política Mexicana” in Muñoz Mata, 
México y el Caribe vínculos, intereses, region (Mexico City: Instituto Mora, 2002); Shannon Lee 
Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 102. 
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the time of European contact to the diasporas and transnational diplomatic visions of late 
nineteenth-century Cuban revolutionaries, the Gulf has remained a “uniquely connected region 
sutured together by centuries of circulation.”19  
 Like Europeans, indigenous peoples traveled the Gulf even after Europeans’ arrival. In 
the recently published monograph Indigenous Passages to Cuba, Jason Yaremko examines case 
studies of the journeys of indigenous people to Cuba from other parts of the Gulf from the 
sixteenth through nineteenth centuries—journeys, in particular, across what he terms the 
“Florida-Cuba-Mexico Nexus.” These cases included indigenous delegations from Florida in the 
sixteenth through eighteenth centuries and the forced and voluntary migration of Yucatec Mayas, 
along with other indigenous Mexicans, to labor in Cuba during the same period. Yaremko 
describes these movements as an “Amerindian diaspora from the North American continent to 
the Caribbean region.”20 The Lower Creek delegations that traveled to Cuba between 1760 and 
1780, according to James L. Hill, initiated longstanding social and cultural connections between 
these Creeks and Cuban fishermen. A “maritime borderland,” Florida’s Gulf coast represented “a 
location in which two networks connected with one another, one Atlantic, even global, in scope, 
and the other centered on Creek country.”21 
 Yaremko and Hill each root their studies of indigenous mobility across the Gulf in 
borderlands historiography. To Yaremko, indigenous diasporas to Cuba highlight “indigenous 
peoples’ great propensity for struggle and adaptation based on both their own ancient traditions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Dalia Antonia Muller, Cuban Emigrés and Independence in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf 
World (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 8, 16-17 
20 Yaremko does not explicitly define this nexus, but it figures prominently in his book. He also 
writes of a “Florida-Cuba nexus” and a “Creek-Havana nexus.” Jason M. Yaremko, Indigenous 
Passages to Cuba, 1515-1900 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2016), 2, 10, 14, 48. 
21 James L. Hill, “‘Bring them what they lack’: Spanish-Creek Exchange and Alliance Making in 
a Maritime Borderland, 1763-1783, Early American Studies (Winter 2014): 43. 
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and those of the foreign colonizers,” an insight that he describes as commonplace in borderlands 
historiography but lacking in some Caribbean scholarship.22 While Yaremko represents 
borderlands as existing somewhere in this nexus of diaspora, Hill locates the borderland in 
fishing villages on Florida’s coast.23 Drawing on global comparisons, he defines this space as “a 
site of prolonged interaction at the periphery of two societies,” a typical borderland that just so 
happens “to be located in large bodies of water and along their coastal areas.”24  
 Both of these works suggest how attention to the Gulf of Mexico can help to bridge the 
divide between scholarship on Early American borderlands, which tends to focus on negotiations 
between empires and Indians, and that on modern subjects, which tends to deal with 
transnational networks and migration. They also respond to calls to move borderland scholarship 
beyond “spatially adjacent, land-based relations.”25 Meanwhile, these studies explore the still 
nebulous connections that historians have begun to uncover between indigenous America and the 
Atlantic and Caribbean worlds.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Yaremko, Indigenous Passages to Cuba, 7. 
23 He borrows this term from Southeast Asian studies and from Aims McGuinness’s book on 
Panama and the California Gold Rush. See, for example, Noboru Ishikawa, Between Frontiers: 
Nation and Identity in a Southeast Asian Borderland (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 15-
16; David Rosenberg, “The Maritime Borderlands: Terrorism, Piracy, Pollution, and Poaching in 
the South China Sea,” in James Clad, Sean M. McDonald, and Bruce Vaughn, eds., The 
Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University Press, 2011): 107-26; Aims McGuinness, Path of Empire: Panama 
and the California Gold Rush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 5. Hill also notes that the 
following Native American history textbook uses “maritime borderlands” in the title for a 
chapter on sixteenth-century Florida: Kenneth W. Townsend and Mark Nicholas, eds., First 
Americans: A History of Native Peoples, combined vol. (New York: Pearson, 2013). 
24 Hill, “Bring them what they lack,” 38. 
25 These calls for future scholarship appear in Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, “On 
Borderlands,” The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (September 2011), 351-353. 
26 Other examples include Jace Weaver, The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making 
of the Modern World, 1000-1927 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017); 
Andrew Lipman, The Saltwater Frontier: Indians and the Contest for the American Coast (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native 
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 For empires, nation-states, and indigenous peoples, the Gulf was not only a region of 
circulation and migration, but also of political contestation. This “forgotten sea,” writes the U.S. 
historian Jack E. Davis, represented “not only a panorama of flourishing aboriginal cultures” but 
also “a dynamic enabler in European imperial wealth, and a critical component in the geographic 
expansion and economic rise of the United States.”27 Muller agrees, writing, “A body of water 
bordered by the United States, Mexico, and the Spanish colony of Cuba, the Gulf of Mexico 
became a theater for competition between states and peoples who saw the space as both 
vulnerable borderlands and a profitable frontier zone.”28 As on many borderlands, the possibility 
that diverse groups of people might partner and communicate in new ways was often 
underpinned by fraught diplomatic relationships in which authority was contested by multiple 
powers. As Richard White recently noted in his reflections on his book The Middle Ground, a 
foundational text in borderlands history, the opportunities for negotiation between Europeans and 
indigenous peoples in the Great Lakes grew from a context of “confrontation between imperial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 
1-21, 215-222; Witgen, “Rethinking Colonial History as Continental History,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly 69, no. 3 (July 2012): 527-530. 
27 Jack E. Davis, The Gulf: The Making of an American Sea (New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation, 2017), 6-7. A large and growing body of work analyzes the United States’ 
expansion into the Gulf, including their struggle for the Spanish- and French-claimed territories 
of East and West Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, and southern slaveholders’ dreams of building 
outward from the Gulf to form a Caribbean empire. Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives 
on the Edge of the American Revolution (New York: Random House, 2016); David Weber, The 
Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Richard F. 
Brown, ed., Coastal Encounters: The Transformation of the Gulf South in the Eighteenth 
Century (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007); Frank Lawrence Owsley, Jr., Struggle 
for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans (Gainesville: University 
Presses of Florida, 1981); Matthew Karp, The Vast Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm 
of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016); Walter 
Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2013); Matthew J. Clavin, Aiming for Pensacola: Fugitive Slaves on 
the Atlantic and Southern Frontiers Kingdom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2015). 
28 Muller, Cuban Emigrés, 4. 
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or state regimes and non-state forms of social organization, a rough balance of power, a mutual 
need or a desire for what the other possesses, and an inability of one side to commandeer enough 
force to compel the other to do what it desired.”29 
 In the case of the Gulf World, imperial and state rivalries centered on the aspiration to 
make the Gulf of Mexico a closed sea. This possibility caused European empires and Euro-
American nation-states to envision the Gulf as the potential “wide frontier of a country,” whose 
waters they might possess in practice if not in law.30 While eighteenth-century Europeans often 
operated on the assumption that oceans were accessible to all people, they also acknowledged 
that sovereigns might control certain corridors of movement because privateers and their prey 
carried the laws of their empires on their ships. Likewise, through prize courts, sovereigns might 
assert jurisdiction over maritime encounters in certain regions. Not simply a “conduit for 
exchange” or a “backdrop for movement,” oceans acted in practice as “variegated spaces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815, Twentieth Anniversary Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), xii-xiii. Imperial rivalries were also important to Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron’s 
“From Borderlands to Borders.” Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, 
Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History,” The American Historical 
Review 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814-841; Hämäläinen and Truett, “On Borderlands.” 
30 “Ello representa una frontera muy amplia de un país, que difícilmente puede ser negada, pues 
en la práctica se ejercen derechos y acciones que la ratifican y que también se expresan en 
nuevas formas de relación-interdependencia.” Alfredo César Dachary and Stella Maris Arnaiz 
Burne, El Caribe mexicano: una frontera olvidada (Chetumal, Quintana Roo: Universidad de 
Quintana Roo, 1998), 18-21. The term “frontier” has lost popularity among scholars of the 
United States because of its associations with Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis, which 
defined the frontier as a line between civilization and savagery. The word has a different 
significance in Latin American history, where it, like borderlands history, tends to be grounded 
in work by Herbert Eugene Bolton. As Amy Turner Bushnell explains, the “frontier” constitutes 
“a geographic area contested by two or more nations, each of which is engaged in a process of 
polity formation in which control is tenuous and continuously negotiated, and each of which tries 
to extend its negotiating mechanism to include the others.” Bushnell, “Gates, Patterns, and 
Peripheries,” 18. 
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transected by law,” part of what Lauren Benton calls “lumpy sovereignty.”31 Possessing Florida, 
Cuba, and Yucatán, resembled, from a naval perspective, creating checkpoints along a border. It 
promised to make this space internal to a single empire or nation-state, even if this polity did not 
control the land, people, or governments that lay past that line.  
 Closing the Gulf, of course, was never truly possible. Still, for much of its history after 
the early 1500s, a single power dominated its connections to the Atlantic world. From the 
sixteenth century until 1763, when the treaty ending the Seven Years’ War ceded the Spanish 
Floridas to Great Britain, Spain claimed possession of the entire Gulf World, calling it the Seno 
Mexicano—the breast, or heart of their North American empire. After 1860, the independent 
United States would dominate the political and economic life of the Gulf, nearly fulfilling 
dreams of making this region an “American Mediterranean.”32 In the century between these 
moments, however, political claims to the Gulf were less certain, in part because of the 
overwhelming presence there of the British navy, in part because of contests among empires, 
nation-states, and indigenous peoples on the Gulf coast, and in part because Florida and Yucatán, 
which bordered the entrance to the Gulf, were only intermittently claimed by the same power. As 
contested borders framing a contested North American region, these peninsulas were 
strategically important. They were also especially difficult to control. 
 
Weak Empires and Rogue States 
 European contests over American territory and their claims to have established colonial 
control over American people did not always reflect life on the ground. Beyond the core regions 
of imperial influence, indigenous peoples retained control of territory and remained autonomous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-
1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 104-161, see 104. 
32 Muller, Cuban Emigrés, 18-20. 
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from colonial systems. In other places, new, seditious networks of European power emerged. 
These other sites of political power—the worlds created by indigenous peoples and the Atlantic 
underworld—together created a fraught and tenuous counterforce to imperial rivalries, which 
would endure into the national period. Understanding the Gulf of Mexico in the age of 
revolutions means understanding the convergence these two worlds beyond imperial control. 
 Europeans imagined that they had discovered North America, that they had conquered its 
vast territories, and that they could therefore transfer this territory among themselves, but these 
fantasies did not always materialize on the ground. While Spain had conquered central Mexico, 
scholars estimate that in the late-eighteenth century, roughly half of the territory claimed as 
Spanish America remained beyond European control.33 Likewise, while Britain had displaced 
Indians along North America’s eastern seaboard to establish their own settler colonies, most of 
the continent remained beyond their control. In the Upper Great Lakes, the Great Plains, and the 
Arkansas River Valley, indigenous peoples and indigenous systems of diplomacy dominated the 
eighteenth- and even early-nineteenth-century landscapes. Making their “illusions of empire” 
into realities of conquest often required greater effort than European and Euro-American 
narratives suggest. Many parts of interior of North America were not borderlands, in other 
words, but the “Native Ground” or the “Native New World”: places that indigenous peoples, 
while trading with Atlantic colonists, created and ruled for themselves.34  
 In coastal landscapes, including the low, marshy shores of the Gulf of Mexico, imperial 
plans faltered in another way. At such portages as New Orleans, near the muddy delta of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Weber, Bárbaros, 12. 
34 Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations, 1-21, 215-222. Witgen’s study and other recent works 
that he cites build on Richard White’s The Middle Ground, now a foundational work in 
comparative borderlands history. See, among others, Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire; 
Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
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Mississippi River, the local environment posed complications for imperial designs, offering 
neither the deep waters for ocean-going ships nor the dry land for a European-style city.35 
Mosquitos exacerbated these problems in most parts of the Gulf, carrying yellow fever and 
malaria, which could devastate a population that had not developed resistance to these diseases.36 
New Orleans survived its early years as a French colony not through imperial designs but 
through what Shannon Dawdy calls “rogue colonialism”: the elements of colonialism managed 
by local military and political administrators, freebooters, privateers, smugglers, and the diverse 
members of the city’s underclass, who together created a colony that that eighteenth-century 
Europeans often described as disorderly or “devilish.”  
 Dawdy uses the word “rogue” not in a romantic or derogatory sense but in order to 
highlight the flexibility of the line “between banditry and statehood” in colonial projects.37 The 
“rogues” of New Orleans included a diverse range of actors, from elite creoles, who supported 
the city’s smuggling economy in order to gain political power, to the sailors, smugglers, and 
slaves of the city’s underclass, whose participation in “circuits of seditious power and contraband 
flow” radiating out of New Orleans often constituted an “ideological resistance to the imperial 
impositions of mercantilism and chattel slavery.”38 These rogues often acted out of self-interest, 
but they played an essential role in maintaining this French colony. 
 While rogues found a home in New Orleans, they also traveled the Gulf of Mexico and 
Caribbean Sea, holding the Gulf World together in ways that defied imperial plans. Their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Christopher Morris, The Big Muddy: An Environmental History of the Mississippi and Its 
Peoples from Hernando de Soto to Hurricane Katrina (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire, 12. 
36 J.R. McNeill, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2-5, see 2. 
37 Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire, 5. 
38 Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire, 4, 137. 
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destinations included other secondary ports (for example, Yucatán’s port of Campeche) but they 
also included rivers and shores under the control of indigenous peoples or of pirates, privateers, 
or maroons. Rogues also traveled from New Orleans up the Mississippi River toward the Great 
Lakes, where indigenous peoples—aided, as in the Gulf, by marshy waterways and mosquitos—
still controlled diplomacy. About seven percent of recorded intercoastal ships passing through 
New Orleans or its nearby transfer point, La Balize, during the second third of the eighteenth 
century traveled between that city and Florida or Yucatán.39 These peninsulas, with their 
extensive coastlines, challenging environments, and small European populations were connected 
more closely to the Gulf underworld than to the world of Atlantic empires. 
 The rogue networks that crossed the Gulf and that, along rivers, extended into the 
continent’s interior also confirmed Europeans’ longstanding belief that such waterways were 
places that tested the limits of imperial power. Stretching inland toward the riches that might lie 
at the heart of a continent, rivers had long taken European explorers to places where they were 
dependent on indigenous guides and beyond the reach of imperial officials. Even when officials 
had commissioned these expeditions, they had feared that the expedition leaders would strike out 
on their own to establish “rogue polities” that would allow them keep the continents’ riches for 
themselves.40 Such intrigues took place on rivers flowing into the Gulf in the late-eighteenth 
century, when adventurers, indigenous leaders, and U.S. settlers all competed to control the 
rivers connecting interior zones to the coast.41 Later nation-states would inherit these challenges 
of empire. Even after the United States and Mexico had declared their independence, Mexican 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Table 1 in Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire, 120. 
40 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 40-86, see 40. For indigenous markers of territorial 
sovereignty, see Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the 
‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 1 (January 
2011): 5-46. 
41 Narret, Adventurism and Empire, 3. 
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officials would attempt to reinforce their “extensive, low, sandy, and unpopulated” Gulf border 
simply by monitoring ports and other major points of connection. The rest of the coastline would 
remain beyond their control.42  
 When the United States came into conflict with Seminoles and Lower Creeks, and when 
Mexico entered war with rebel Mayas, these nation-states and indigenous peoples would all draw 
on the Gulf World as part of their strategy. Just as French colonial New Orleans had survived 
and prospered on account of rogue agents, U.S. and Mexican efforts to possess Florida and 
Yucatán often involved private and illicit networks of exchange that stretched across the Gulf of 
Mexico. At the same time, Indian war and rogue agents also affected these countries’ 
relationship with one another, serving as justification for the United States’ insistent 
interventions into Mexican affairs. 
 Rogue networks also gave power to Seminoles, Lower Creeks, and Mayas, offering them 
independent access to trade and military aid. In an official sense, the nineteenth century saw the 
departure of European empires, which weakened the political power of many independent 
indigenous groups, who had previously used imperial rivalries to their advanced.43 In both 
Florida and Yucatán, however, British American adventurers, merchants, and even rogue 
colonial officials replaced official imperial agents, continuing to exert military and commercial 
power in the Gulf. Abandoned by empires, the indigenous peoples of the Gulf peninsulas were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Muñoz, “El Golfo-Caribe, de límite a frontera de México,” Historia Mexicana 57, no. 2 
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“liquid landscapes” of Florida, where the small farming that marked the American ideal could 
rarely succeed. Michele Currie Navakas, “Liquid Landscape: Possession and Floridian 
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(Spring 2013), 246. 
43 This argument appears most clearly in Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders.” 
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befriended by a new era of rogues, who furnished ways for the adventurous among them to seek 
their own paths through the age of revolutions. 
 
A Sprawling Archive 
  Research for this thesis has required travel across and beyond the Gulf of Mexico. 
Sources have emerged in archives in the Gulf peninsulas (Gainesville, Tallahassee, and Mérida), 
in national capitals (Washington, DC and Mexico City), in imperial centers (Madrid and Seville) 
and in places connected to the Gulf peninsulas by trade (New Orleans and Belize). In these 
locations, I have consulted government and military correspondence, consular records, maps, 
published memoirs, and newspapers in both English and Spanish. I have also recruited 
colleagues to obtain photographs of sources from London, a center of empire whose “rogue” 
place in this story emerged late in my research. A sprawling archive, these sources have proven 
as diverse and interconnected as the Gulf itself. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated. 
 
Chapter Summaries  
 The chapters, while thematic, move roughly in chronological order. The thesis begins 
with an exploration of the Gulf of Mexico in the decade preceding the American Revolution, 
focusing on how Spanish and British imperial agents imagined Florida and Yucatán as the 
potential borders of a closed sea. After the cession of Florida from Spain to Britain in the Treaty 
of Paris of 1763, writers from both empires suggested that Spain risked losing the Seno 
Mexicano to Great Britain. Yet the claims about imperial possession made by the Spanish 
deputies Juan Antonio Valera and Francisco Javier de Corres and by the London publisher 
Malachy Postlethwayt contradict other parts of their description of Gulf. A sea that they knew to 
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be dominated by privateers and smugglers, it connected diverse parts of a continent that was 
largely controlled by indigenous peoples. 
 Chapters Two and Three demonstrate how the dynamics of the Gulf borderlands fostered 
a particular type of indigenous power in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Florida 
and 1840s Yucatán. From 1788 to 1821 (before, during, and immediately after the conflict 
recognized as the First Seminole War), groups to whom I refer broadly as “dissident Creeks” 
held control over Spanish East Florida’s Gulf coast between the Apalachicola River and Tampa 
Bay, a location that allowed them to remain independent from both the expanding United States 
and the newly-formed Creek Nation. This control continued, though muted, even after the 
Spanish cession of East Florida to the United States, only disintegrating in the 1840s after the 
Second Seminole War. In this decade, across the Gulf, Maya leaders in Yucatán occupied the 
southeastern presidio of Bacalar, later establishing the village of Chan Santa Cruz just inland 
from Ascension Bay near the Straits of Yucatán. Unlike the case of Florida, this de facto state 
endured into the twentieth century, long after this particular era in the Gulf had otherwise come 
to its close.  
 These episodes were possible because of these peoples’ partnerships with rogue British 
agents who wished to establish footholds in this part of the Gulf. This shared dynamic can help 
conceptualize indigenous power in this part of North America. The relationships that these 
Creeks and Mayas formed with unofficial British agents extended beyond mere trade 
partnerships, including initiating indigenous delegations to England, acquiescing to plans for 
British settlement, and suggesting that these states might, upon receiving British recognition, be 
somehow incorporated into the British Empire. The retrospective knowledge that such 
incorporation, if successful, would likely have worked to Creeks’ and Mayas’ detriment need not 
 23 
imply that these leaders were duplicitous or naive. Rather, the tense partnerships that they 
formed with these rogue agents offer a previously unexplored version of what Scott Lyons calls 
an x-mark: “a contaminated and coerced sign of consent made under conditions that are not of 
one’s making.”44 Like Native American leaders who chose to accommodate the United States 
government in the hope (though not the certainty) that such an x-mark might result in something 
good, the Seminoles, Lower Creeks, and Mayas who partnered with these self-interested Britons 
may have seen these concessions as their best option given the constraints of their time.45  
 The final two chapters of the dissertation depart from indigenous politics to consider the 
Gulf’s transnational connections’ consequences for how the United States and Mexico defined 
their nineteenth-century borders—and in the case of the United States, how they extended them 
into foreign territories. Chapter Four takes up two infamous episodes from the Second Seminole 
War and Caste War: the United States Army commanders’ decision in 1840 to support the 
purchase of thirty-three bloodhounds trained to hunt people fleeing slavery on Cuban sugar 
plantations in order to use them against Seminoles, and the government-sponsored trafficking of 
hundreds of Maya prisoners of war to work as coerced laborers in Cuban sugar provinces 
between 1848 and the 1870s. The scales of these two war tactics varied considerably, but both 
demonstrate how attempts to subjugate and eliminate the indigenous peoples of Florida and 
Yucatán drew strength from the ideological and material resources of Cuban slavery.  
 Cuba added complications. Its markets were alluring. Its slaveholding repelled anti-
slavery Mexico yet attracted pro-slavery advocates in the United States. All this gave merchants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Scott Richard Lyons, X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 2. 
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 24 
and smugglers an important role in these Indian wars. Traveling across the Gulf, these private 
individuals appropriated tools developed for managing slave revolts, converting them into 
strategies for fighting Indian wars. They likewise made people who in one location were treated 
as Indian servants appear elsewhere as free white laborers. These translations call attention to 
how flexible borderland identities, often seen as the basis of cross-cultural negotiation and 
understanding, also furthered the violent maintenance of social hierarchies. Private economic 
actors participated in conquering peoples who were deemed internal to these new nation-states. 
 Chapter Five looks at conquest and the Gulf underworld from another angle, 
demonstrating how non-regular soldiers—volunteers, mercenaries, and adventurers—furthered 
the United States’ imperial expansion into the territories of indigenous peoples, the Spanish 
Empire, and the independent nations of Latin America. Taking as its starting point the night 
attack of December 23, 1814, when planters on the banks of the Mississippi River south of New 
Orleans had rallied to defend their property from invading British, black, and Indian forces, this 
chapter follows white New Orleans residents’ celebration of this event in later military 
expeditions out of this city. New Orleans grew in the nineteenth century from an isolated outpost 
into the primary point of access to the United States’ Cotton Kingdom. Between 1836 and 1849, 
volunteers from this port proudly sailed to fight Seminoles in Florida, Mexican troops in Texas 
and Veracruz, and revolutionary Mayas in Yucatán. They framed their participation in all of 
these conflicts as continuing the defense of independence and the civilization for which their city 
was known.  
 In Yucatán, the mercenary service of soldiers out of New Orleans turned into a failed 
filibustering expedition, a precursor to better-documented pro-slavery designs on and expeditions 
to Cuba and Nicaragua of the 1850s. In highlighting the connections between the Second 
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Seminole War, the Texas Revolution, the U.S.-Mexican War, and the filibustering expeditions of 
the 1850s, this chapter shows how the “rogue” forms of power that had long shaped life in New 
Orleans supported the various ways that the United States exerted imperial power in the 
nineteenth century.  
*  *  * 
 Regil and Ruelas did not, in their letters, draw attention to the Gulf of Mexico itself. It 
served, nonetheless, as their implied point of reference. Regil, who had once acted as British 
consul to Mérida and its port of Sisal, knew the Gulf world well. Ruelas, as Secretary of Foreign 
Relations, would have found it equally familiar. Even though the time when these peninsulas had 
enclosed a sea under the jurisdiction of the Spanish empire had long passed, the intimate 
connections that bound Yucatán to other Gulf ports made Florida a natural choice for 
comparison. They did not mention Yucatán’s peninsular location or its corresponding access to 
the Gulf underworld, but they did mention qualities associated with it: the power displayed by its 
indigenous people, its forested landscape, and the great cost and manpower it would take to end 
the Caste War. To hope that the United States’ conquest of its own Gulf peninsula had yielded 
some lesson about Indian war that it might impart to Mexico was, of course, to ignore the other 
layer of power at work in this region. Subjecting Indians to national rule also required controlling 
Gulf networks, which were increasingly falling under the power of the United States.  
 Taking account of how the Gulf World shaped both conquest and indigenous power in 
late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century North America offers a lens into disputes over 
claims and possession that remained unsettled when the continent’s new nation-states declared 
their independence from Europe. For both states and empires, claiming the land surrounding the 
Gulf did not necessarily mean possessing these territories or the waters between them. Nor did 
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the formal departure of empires place the nail in the coffin of indigenous autonomy. Quite the 
contrary: the enduring presence of rogues with loose ties to empires allowed indigenous peoples 
to assert their own claims to government and jurisdiction. Warfare against Indians, against 
empires, and against one another punctuated the United States and Mexico’s formative decades 
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Figure 2: The Straits of Yucatán, 1760s-1840s 
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Prologue: The Strategic Gulf Peninsulas in the Late-Eighteenth Century  
 
 In a 1766 report to José de Gálvez, visitador general to New Spain, the sub-deputies Juan 
Antonio Valera and Francisco Javier de Corres claimed that during their journey to the provinces 
of the Yucatán peninsula, they had heard British subjects laughing about a troubling report 
apparently circulating in London. This rumor suggested that Britain had taken “Spanish North 
America by its two horns: as master of Florida and possessor of the Yucatán coast, it would be in 
a state to place between these peninsulas two squadrons, which, crossing the Seno Mexicano, 
would obstruct the flight of birds toward the interior of these domains.”46 Valera and Corres were 
referring to the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which, ending the Seven Years’ War, had ceded Spanish 
Florida to Great Britain in exchange for the renewal of Spanish sovereignty over Havana, which 
British troops had occupied during the war. It had also granted official permission for British 
subjects to cut, load, and carry logwood from the Bay of Honduras, which stretched, by some 
estimation, to the northeastern tip of Yucatán.47 By “Seno Mexicano,” Valera and Corres meant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 “La soberbia de Londres nos dice en sus panegíricos que tiene cogida a la América 
Septentrional Española por sus dos cuernos: porque dueño el inglés de la península de la Florida 
y poseedor de la costa de Yucatán, estaría en estado de poner de una a otra península dos 
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estos dominios.” Enrique Florescano y Isabel Gil Sanchez, eds., Descripciones económicas 
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February, 1763” in Lewis Hertslet, A Complete collection of the treaties and conventions . . . 
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the Gulf of Mexico, known to Spaniards as the seno—the breast, or heart—of their North 
American empire. Having claimed Florida and having establishing settlements in Yucatán, this 
rival empire now seemed poised to close off the straits between these peninsulas and the island 
of Cuba, preventing the “flight” from Havana and Veracruz of Spanish fleets carrying North 
American riches to the Atlantic World.  
 Indeed, over the next century, Spain would see its hold on its North American territories 
diminish, but so too would Great Britain. More significantly, the idea that imperial officials in 
London might possess the Gulf of Mexico demonstrated a misunderstanding of possession in the 
late-eighteenth-century Gulf World. While depicted on maps as part of European empires, this 
region included large stretches of territory that were contested or controlled by indigenous 
peoples. Even the ports of the Gulf depended on the activities of smugglers and other free agents, 
who crossed the Gulf World with little regard for imperial policies. Florida and Yucatán, the 
peninsulas that bordered the Gulf, drew attention as strategic sites of imperial power, but 
European empires only loosely controlled them. Their geographic location and environments 
offered better ground for rogue partnerships than for imperial control.  
 
Dreams of Gulf Possession 
If Britons in Yucatán were, indeed, laughing about taking Spanish North America by its 
horns, they were drawing on ideas that also influenced Malachy Postlethwayt’s Universal 
Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, published in London in its third edition the same year as 
Valera and Corres’s report. Overall, the Universal Dictionary did not provide the same image as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subsisting between Great Britain and foreign powers . . . (London: H. Butterworth, 1835) 2:233-
244; Malachy Postlethwayt, The universal dictionary of trade and commerce…: every thing 
essential that is contained in Savary’s dictionary: also, all the material laws of trade and 
navigation, 3d ed. London: Printed for H. Woodfall, etc., 1766) , 2 vols. 
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Valera and Corres did of the Gulf of Mexico as a unified region. The maps of North America 
that accompanied its volumes were divided into four plates, which severed the port of Veracruz, 
in Plate 3, from the rest of the Gulf shoreline, in Plate 4 [Figure 3].48 This segmenting of North 
America allowed Britain’s previous possessions to appear together in Plate 2, framed by the 
waterways for which it had now obtained access. As Postlethwayt explained in the dictionary, 
the Treaty of Paris had granted to Great Britain not only Florida, whose ports extended west to 
Mobile, but also freedom of navigation on the Mississippi and St. Lawrence rivers. “We may be 
said, at present,” he wrote, “to enjoy a Maritime Barrier to all our ancient continental colonies on 
the North, East, West, and South . . .; Whereby we shall be able to protect them in their inland, as 
well as their extensive maritime ports, and cultivate an internal as well as maritime commerce 
with the whole within the British boundaries.”49 
 In the entries “America” and “Mexico,” however, Postlethwayt praised the wealth of 
Spanish America: its gold and silver, precious stones, and “vast number of other commodities,” 
including sugar, cotton, and various kinds of logwood. He described Veracruz as “one of the 
most considerable places, perhaps, in the world” and “the natural center of the American 
treasure.” He spent numerous paragraphs explaining the Spanish flota system, by which the 
Spanish made sure that “the lawful commerce between this part and Europe is in their hands.” At 
the end of the Mexico entry, he added these remarks about Florida and the recent Treaty of Paris: 
“Must not every Englishman rejoice, that now he is intitled to a situation in the Bay of Mexico at 
all; a situation, though not at present in a very wealthy condition; yet from its proximity to 
millions of Mexican treasures, may prove lucky enough to become instrumental in some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Solomon Bolton, North America. 1763, Map, 83 x 87 cm on 4 sheets. Library of Congress 
Geography and Map Division. Available at Library of Congress, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/75693503/ 
49 Postlethwayt, The universal dictionary of trade and commerce, Vol. 1, s.v. “America.” 
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measure, to put Britons one day in possession of those very treasures, which have excited Spain 
to treat this kingdom so ill for many years past.”50  
 
 
Figure 3: Solomon Bolton, "North America" (1763) 
 
  
The acquisition of Florida had played, in Postlethwayt’s mind, a double role in promoting 
British power in North America. While on one hand preventing Spanish incursions into British 
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territory by land, it would also succeed in “enabling us to annoy them upon occasion, by cruizing 
on their homeward-bound ships coming from the Gulph of Florida, and the Streights of the 
Bahama.” In the case of another war, he added, British forces could retake control of Havana, 
which he described as the “key of the Spanish Indies,” It was in this imagined scenario that 
Postlethwayt made the very claims that so troubled Valera and Corres. He compared Havana 
explicitly to Gibraltar, the island at the entrance to the Mediterranean, which Britain had taken 
from Spain in 1713. If Britain were to reoccupy Havana, he added, “we could then repossess 
ourselves of the bay of Campeachy,” a stretch of coastline in northwestern Yucatán where 
British subjects had previously cut logwood. Having possessed this territory “on the one side of 
the gulph, as we are possessed of the Floridas on the other; . . . what hope could Spain have to 
dispossess us?”51 
Postlethwayt seemed to know little about Florida apart from the area surrounding the 
Atlantic port of St. Augustine. His description of Florida’s climate as “pure” and “temperate” 
and the misshapen form of its peninsula on the accompanying map suffice to show his lack of 
information on the territory. The entry on Florida in the Universal Dictionary meanders into 
other parts of North America: comments on the Iroqouis, on buffalo and wild cotton, and, at 
length, on the Mississippi River.52 The entry affirms, however, that Britons, like Spaniards, saw 
Florida as a boon to their maritime power. Offering a line of defense for their existing colonies, it 
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Postlethwayt wrote falsely when he claimed that apart from two Atlantic ports, Spaniards 
had never “made any settlement on this part of the continent.”53 In fact, a mission system and an 
accompanying ranching economy had been expanding across Florida until earlier that century, 
when attacks from the Gulf by French buccaneers and from the North by British-allied Creeks 
had send Spaniards and Indians fleeing to Cuba. Postlethwayt’s statement held a grain of truth, 
however, insofar as it suggested the lack of control that any Europeans had gained in Florida. 
Held strategically for naval purposes, the territory otherwise presented more challenges than 
resources. As Amy Turner Bushnell has written about Florida’s early centuries as a Spanish 
periphery: “Had Spain not been concerned about the return route of the silver galleons, Florida, 
with its semi-sedentary, demanding Indians, its poor soils and piney woods, and its modest 
maritime resources, would undoubtedly have been left to itself.”54  
 As much as they rivaled among one another over possessing the Gulf of Mexico and North 
America, the agents of European empires knew that Indians controlled much of the continent. 
Postlethwayt minced no words about the centrality of Indian relations to Britain’s security. The 
ports of the Gulf and the freedom of navigation on the Mississippi River, he wrote, “seem to 
promise a good security to all our southern colonies on the continent; provided we can also gain 
the uninterrupted friendship and alliance of the Indians neighboring thereupon; or if that cannot 
be effectually done, to keep them under due subjection to British power and dominion.” Pushing 
Britain’s border out into the Gulf, as the Treaty of Paris had done, placed it “in a situation to 
surround them,” leading Postlethwayt to predict better Indian relations in the future.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Postlethwayt, The universal dictionary of trade and commerce, Vol. 1, s.v. Florida. 
54 Amy Turner Bushnell, “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries: The Field of Frontier Latin America” 
in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, edited by Christine 
Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (Routledge: New York & London, 2002), 18-22. 
 35 
 He hoped that the same might be true of the Mississippi River. In a best case scenario, 
Indians would “live in perfect friendship and harmony with us” on the eastern side of this river; 
if not, Britain would be forced to “drive them on the western side.” And if France were to “stir 
up the Indians” in the west, Postlethwayt suggested that Britain also take possession of French-
claimed territory so that they will “desist from influencing the savages to our constant 
detriment.”55 As he was writing the second volume of the dictionary, word arrived of the secret 
Treaty of Fountainebleau, in which France had ceded Louisiana to Spain. Postlethwayt received 
this news with excitement, “as the latter have no influence over the Indians, and are by no means 
that enterprising people which the French are.”56 
 A different situation existed in Yucatán, where Valera and Corres found over 50,000 
Indians paying tribute to the Crown.57 Yet Yucatán had also remained peripheral to the Spanish 
Empire. While in other parts of Spanish America, systems of tribute had by the eighteenth 
century given way to coerced labor on haciendas, in Yucatán, a lack of mines, sugar, or other 
labor-intensive riches had left the original tribute system in place.58 While Valera and Corres 
noted the ease with which Indians managed to evade paying tribute by hiding or relocating, they 
underscored that the entire peninsula was poor, with many Indians surviving only on corn, and 
with few trade resources other than cotton and wax.59 
 While the map that accompanied Postlethwayt’s Universal Dictionary labeled much of 
Yucatán “Fine Plains,” the environment was actually challenging for similar reasons to that of 
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Florida. Valera and Corres described the peninsula as “white, marble-like shelf, without rivers or 
springs for abundant farming.”60 Water ran, they observed, not in above-ground rivers but in a 
system of underground passageways, collecting in wells and cenotes, the word used in Yucatán 
for the sinkholes that are characteristic of this limestone terrain. A porous bedrock, limestone 
tends to create a “karst” topography: one in which water, instead of forming above-ground rivers, 
dissolves the bedrock to form underground rivers, caves, and, when caves collapse, sinkholes.61 
The northwestern plain of the peninsula, the most densely settled region before and after Spanish 
conquest, maintained relative aridity and a high position above sea level, bringing a degree of 
cool air to its inhabitants while making them dependent on cenotes and hummocks, small hills 
between which patches of fertile soil collect. The coasts, by contrast, and the low, humid, and 
rainy south, often suffered from an excess of moisture, which the limestone bedrock refused to 
absorb. 
 Born of the same geological formations, Florida also sat atop limestone karst. The 
peninsula hosted a surprising array of plants and animals (today over three thousand species of 
plants grow in Florida, which is also home to some four hundred species of birds) but this 
diversity owed more to its humid, tropical climate than to the quality of the soil.62 Humans had 
long lived in clusters in Florida, as in Yucatán, near highland sinkholes and hummocks, a term 
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that in Florida bears the related name “hammock.”63 In the years that Valera and Corres traveled 
the Gulf, the most popular of these sites, the Alachua Savanna, was controlled by the Seminoles, 
who grazed cattle and horses upon this hammock while living on the breezy hillside to its west.64 
The greater amount of high ground in Yucatán was part of what had made it easier for Spaniards 
to conquer: it had been more attractive to them and had sustained large, settled indigenous 
communities.  
 In eastern and southern Yucatán, however, these high grounds gave way to lowlands and 
forests, more closely resembling those of the northern Gulf peninsula. These landscapes offered 
the destination for flight that Valera and Corres noted. While the similar geographic position of 
Florida and Yucatán made them desirable for empires seeking maritime power, their similar 
environments gave potential power to Indians. 
 
The Underworld of the Gulf Peninsulas 
 In Yucatán, coastal lowlands had also become havens for British subjects, who as in other 
parts of the Greater Caribbean, organized the cutting of logwood there for Atlantic and 
intercolonial trade. As Postlethwayt explained, logwood referred to a particular type of tree that 
grew on the coasts of Central America and the West Indies, whose trunks Europeans used for 
dyes, and their leaves, for medicine. He also referred to this wood as “Campeachy-wood” and 
“Jamaica-wood,” underscoring the extent to which Europeans associated this product with this 
part of the Greater Caribbean. The maps in the Universal Dictionary pinpoint the Belize River, 
in particular, as the place where English subjects had received explicit permission in the Treaty 
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of Paris to engage in logging. At this river, Valera and Corres reported to have observed 31 
frigates, 40 brigantines, 20 sloops, and 50 schooners in operation. These Spanish sub-deputies 
noted with concern that “industrious” British agents had made use of landscapes that Spanish 
colonizers had failed to develop.65 Since the late seventeenth century, British subjects had made 
similar arguments, defending their right to these coasts by observing that Spaniards had not 
erected signs of ownership on them.66  
 Since this time, logwood cutting had remained a point of contention between Britain and 
Spain, less because of what it meant for land-based sovereignty and more because of what it 
meant for trade. Many logwood establishments had been founded by privateers. When British 
ships hauled away their logwood, they often remained close to the coast—according to 
Postlethwayt, because the trade winds required it. But Spanish authorities remained convinced 
that logwood operations also served as covers for smuggling. Conflicts over these operations had 
resulted in the War of Jenkin’s Ear in the 1840s, and had not yet been resolved by the Seven 
Years’ War. While Postlethwayt was pleased with the concessions of the Treaty of Paris in this 
regard, he seemed to doubt that it would bring peace. He justified his statements about taking 
Cuba from Spain by naming it a reimbursement for Britain’s war debts. He likewise dismissed 
British misbehavior as a result of “the ineffectuality both of divine and human laws, that no 
trading nation can absolutely prevent the smuggling and contraband trade.”67 
 In exchange for formal permission to haul logwood in the Bay of Honduras, the Treaty of 
Paris required British loggers to destroy all of their fortifications in Spanish territory and to give 
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up their logging operations on the Laguna de Términos near Campeche. Britons interpreted the 
Bay of Honduras to extend up the Caribbean coast of Yucatán, but the commandant of the 
Spanish garrison of Bacalar on Yucatán’s Río Hondo expressed surprise and concern in 1764 at 
seeing British loggers that far north.68 British loggers—or at least British smugglers—also 
remained at the Laguna de Términos. When Valera and Corres arrived to the Gulf in the summer 
of 1765, their first mission was to investigate cases of English and French smuggling.69 Shallow 
coasts and small Hispanic populations had made Campeche and other regions of the southern 
Gulf unpopular to the merchants of the Spanish flotas, leaving smugglers as the mostly likely 
source of European goods and the sole exporters of the logwood that they produced.70 
 Postlethwayt claimed incorrectly that a river flowing through the interior of the peninsula 
connected the Belize River to the Laguna de Términos. Traveling “through morass and 
impassible land,” this imaginary river would not have provided a means of transportation 
between these sites. Rather, its presence would have offered another justification for Britons’ 
right to cut logwood in both places. British settlers in the Bay of Honduras had formed an 
alliance with the Miskito people, who, according to Postlethwayt, were “the original natives of 
this place, and of the lands hereabouts, and [have] never been conquered by the Spaniards, nor 
submitted to their dominion.”  
 Britain had no special tendency to recognize the sovereignty of Indians. In fact, during the 
Seven Years War, colonial officials had ultimately decided that the Indians in the territory west 
of Britain’s North American colonies were neither sovereigns nor British subjects. The Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, issued by King George III, had declared that these people existed under 
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the British Crown’s “protection” while still insisting on their separation from British colonists.71 
Now Postlethwayt suggested that British subjects’ friendship with once sovereign Indians in the 
Bay of Honduras gave them certain rights to this Spanish-claimed territory. During the War of 
Jenkin’s Ear, he explained, the Miskitos had submitted “to the sovereignty of the crown of 
England, and that crown’s acceptance of such their submission, put themselves and all their lands 
and territories under the dominion of the British government.”72 His insistence on Miskitos’ 
independence from Spain, in other words, served to justify their supposed submission to Britain. 
 As this British writer was using his empire’s relationship with the Miskitos to argue for the 
legitimacy of other British subjects’ rogue activities, Spaniards were likewise engaging in trade 
and diplomacy with Creeks in the territory now claimed as British East Florida. Hoping to regain 
this strategic part of their empire, Spanish officials welcomed Creek delegates traveling to 
Havana on the ships of Spanish fishermen.73 While from the perspective of Spain, these journeys 
served imperial goals, they also gave Creeks power, allowing them to continue the “triple-nation 
diplomacy” that had underpinned their power for decades by crossing the maritime barrier that 
Postlethwayt believed Britain had erected in order to court Spanish friendship and gifts.74  
 Strategic points for entering and exiting the Gulf, the “horns” of Spanish North America 
were under the power of neither the Spanish nor the British Crown. Rather, these contested 
peninsulas were places where indigenous peoples and Gulf rogues held power—a power made 
even greater at points where these worlds connected. Indians and rogues would continue to find 
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common ground into the revolutionary era. After thirteen of Britain’s North American colonies 
won their independence, Spain would regain control of Florida. Having also regained Louisiana 
in 1768, it would become, along with the young United States, one of two powers retaining 
European-recognized claims south of the Great Lakes. Some Creeks would respond by bypassing 
both of these powers in order to retain their autonomy. Instead, they welcomed the friendship of 
British American loyalists, who for their own purposes supplied them with tools of revolution. 
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Chapter 1: Rogue Alliances on Creek Country’s Gulf Coast 
 
 In September 1799, a team of U.S. and Spanish surveyors traveled from the Gulf of 
Mexico up the Apalachicola River to mark the stretch of international border that ran between 
the U.S. state of Georgia and Spanish East Florida. Searching for two days for the river’s 
entrance—dropping anchor in the Gulf’s still waters to haul the vessel along the marshy 
shoreline—the men then ascended by canoe, following the Apalachicola to the place where the 
Flint and Chattahoochee rivers merged to form it.1 From here, they planned to travel eastward by 
land, tracing their two nations’ border through the Okefonokee Swamp to the mouth of the St. 
Mary’s River, along which they would paddle to the Atlantic Ocean. While the Native American 
people these surveyors met along the Apalachicola professed feelings of friendship, the party 
also suffered threats and raids to their camps. Warriors whom they later learned were from the 
Creek towns of Mikasuki and Tallassee stole their horses, cattle, and surveying equipment. The 
war parties even captured their schooner, which they found stripped bare, as further testified by a 
naked shipmaster and passengers. Defeated, the surveyors returned to the Gulf, sailing around 
the Florida peninsula in order to trace the boundary from its eastern edge. A journal published in 
1803 by the head surveyor, Andrew Ellicott, could provide only an estimate of this untraveled 
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stretch of his country’s border, depicting it as nothing more than a straight dotted line (Figure 
4).2 
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That an attempt to survey this part of the East Florida-Georgia border had met Native 
resistance would have surprised neither government. In the months leading up to the expedition, 
Efau Hadjo, the speaker of the governing body known as the Creek National Council, had 
written to the Spanish governor of West Florida that he feared that “mischief” would befall the 
surveying party. He had likewise sent a letter to be read in villages across Creek country warning 
against such violence.3 But the decentralized and ethnically diverse confederation of peoples that 
had become known during the preceding centuries as Creeks—in Spanish, Criques or 
Talapuches—were in the midst of their own political fractures, which left Efau Hadjo’s words 
unheeded. From the Upper Creek towns of the Tallapoosa, Coosa, and upper Alabama rivers to 
Lower Creek settlements on the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers to Mikasukis and Seminoles in 
the northern highlands of the Florida peninsula, this sprawling social formation found itself 
divided by rifts as significant as those between Patriots and Tories. And, in fact, these rifts 
involved Patriots and Tories, although in indirect and unexpected ways. 
The 1795 agreement that had given rise to this surveying expedition and had set the 
course of this line had sought to secure friendship between the United States and Spain by 
reducing Indians’ ability to negotiate with multiple imperial powers simultaneously, a strategy 
which had strengthened Creek diplomacy in previous decades.4 Officially named the Treaty of 
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Friendship, Limits, and Navigation Between Spain and the United States, it was commonly 
called either the Treaty of San Lorenzo, for the place in Madrid where it was signed, or 
Pinckney’s Treaty, for the US diplomat who signed it. The border that it set marked the division 
between the “reserved” Indian lands that each empire had been allocated at the end of the 
American Revolution. Running directly through the lower towns of Creek country, this line 
placed the Lower Creek villages along the Flint and Chattahoochee rivers within the boundaries 
of the United States, separating them from Seminole and Mikasuki settlements in East Florida, 
from Spanish officials, and from the Gulf of Mexico.5 In the fifth article of the treaty, both 
powers promised “to restrain by force all hostilities on the part of the Indian Nations living 
within their boundaries,” adding that “in future no treaty of alliance or other whatever (except 
treaties of Peace) shall be made by either Party with the Indians living within the boundary of the 
other.”6  
The remainder of the Treaty of San Lorenzo suggests what motivated this attempt to 
place Creek country more clearly within U.S. and Spanish borders and why such a goal could not 
be fully accomplished. The seventeen articles that follow those on borders and Indians deal with 
maritime interests. These promises include protecting and defending one another’s vessels, 
prohibiting Spanish subjects and U.S. citizens from engaging in privateering expeditions against 
the other power, and allowing these subjects and citizens to trade freely at one another’s ports 
with the exception of contraband. The treaty excludes from “contraband” cloth and other 
manufactured materials, precious metals, grains “and in general all provisions which serve for 
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Chattahoochee River. Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the 
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the sustenance of life.” Instead, it defines the term as 
arms, great guns, bombs, with the fuses, and other things belonging to them, cannon ball, 
gun powder, match, pikes, swords, lances, spears, halberds, mortars, petards, grenades, 
saltpeter, muskets, musket ball bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of mail, and the like 
kind of arms proper for arming soldiers, musket rests, belts, horses with their furniture 
and all other warlike instruments whatever.7  
 
These governments were most concerned, in other words, with the importation of weapons and 
ammunition. Yet these items flowed into Creek country with or without the involvement of 
Spanish and U.S. officials. 
In particular, the warriors of Mikasuki and Tallassee received arms from British loyalists, 
whose continued presence in East Florida—as banditti, adventurers, soldiers, and merchants—
had, since the end of the American Revolution, enabled rogue alliances between Creek country 
and the British West Indies. These partnerships almost never received sanction by officials in 
London, but they sometimes bore the clandestine support of officials in the British West Indies. 
More often, they were carried out privately, by merchants and soldiers who arrived to the Gulf-
bound waterways of Apalache Bay and the Florida peninsula carrying weapons and diplomatic 
aid. These men hoped through friendship with Indians to regain a foothold in North America for 
themselves and, sometimes, for the British Empire. They fought beside Creeks and insisted on 
Creek sovereignty, in part out of humanitarian impulses and in part to justify plans for formal 
trade and settlement.  
Seeking these alliances, peoples from across Creek country congregated near the Gulf 
between 1788 and 1821, along the same lands and waterways that Ellicott’s surveying party had 
traveled. These groups included, at different times, Upper and Lower Creeks, Seminoles (Creek 
peoples who had migrated into North Central Florida in the 1760s), Mikasukis (a village just 
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inland from the fortress of San Marcos de Apalache, formed by the 1790s), and Red Sticks 
(adherents of a nativist resistance movement among the Creeks in the 1810s). People of African 
descent also joined these partnerships, arriving to the villages of Lower Creeks, Mikasukis, and 
Seminoles from the Gulf of Mexico and from plantations in Georgia, East Florida, and Creek and 
Cherokee country.8 The presence of all of these peoples in East Florida often caused U.S. and 
Spanish writers to describe them indiscriminately as Seminoles, whom they understood to claim 
this territory. While descendants of these groups would number among the “Seminoles” removed 
from Florida in the 1840s, many of them remained distinct from the Seminoles of the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. 
 Partnering with rogue British agents and African Americans allowed these Creek peoples 
to launch opposition to the Creek National Council, a centralized governing body with close ties 
to the United States. The Council was originally established by Alexander McGillivray, a Creek 
leader born of a British father. It aimed—like the US Congress—to unify Creek peoples 
nationally by assuming some of the power that their leaders had previously held locally. By the 
time of Andrew Ellicott’s surveying expedition, the Council had permitted the counsel of the 
U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins, whose “civilizing mission” included the creation of a 
force known as the “warriors of the nation,” who had begun enforcing Creek unity through 
violence.9 While the National Council departed from traditional forms of Creek leadership, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Florida had provided a formal sanctuary from slavery since 1693, when the Spanish Crown had 
issued a decree offering freedom to slaves who converted to Catholicism. After Spain revoked 
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shelter among Indians. Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of 
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9 After the attacks on Ellicott’s surveying expedition, this force attacked the homes, livestock, 
and persons who were believed to be responsible. Hawkins to Folch, Oct. 9, 1799, Exp. 216B, 
PC, AGI; Saunt, A New Order of Things, 180-183. 
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while it ultimately failed to represent the interests of all Creeks, its initial formation by 
McGillivray has recently been interpreted as a sophisticated if contentious response to the 
pressures exerted on Creeks by the expanding United States.10 In this way, it stands as one of 
many x-marks that indigenous peoples made in this tumultuous period. An “assent to the new,” 
the decision to nationalize the Creek confederacy represents a chance taken on an unknown 
future in a hard situation.11  
The dissident Creeks who opposed the Creek National Council demonstrated their own 
“assent to the new” by creating fraught and shifting alliances that swept them into the current of 
Atlantic revolutions. Operating on behalf of their village, and sometime professing to speak for 
all Creeks, they used the swamps and pine barren forests of Florida’s Gulf coast to form sites of 
connection between Creek country and the Gulf underworld. They erected buildings, brought in 
weapons and soldiers, and waged warfare that allowed them to remain separate from Spain, from 
the United States, and from the Creek Nation. The concessions that these Creek leaders offered 
to their rogue British allies—occasionally in the form of sovereignty and land—would prove as 
contentious as the accommodations that the Creek National Council made to the U.S. 
government. Yet together with these Atlantic partners, dissident Creeks carried out independence 
movements of their own. 
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Former Loyalists in the Creek-Georgia War: 
 In the years following the American Revolution, Creek country splintered along many lines 
as a generation of young leaders struggled to navigate the new political and economic orders 
taking hold in North America. Seeking to maintain their sovereignty and their control over their 
lands in the face of threats from US settlers and their government, Creek leaders created new 
methods of diplomacy fit for what was now, to a large extent, a “world without the British.”12 
For some Creeks, the solution to these challenges came in the form of the Creek National 
Council, centered in Creek country’s upper towns, which asserted itself as an Indian peer of the 
US Congress and a potential ally of the Spanish Crown. Another center of Creek power emerged 
near the Gulf coast, where British traders and soldiers maintained an active, if illicit, presence. 
By partnering with these rogue British agents through trade and diplomacy, other Creek 
opponents of the Creek National Council found ways to assert independence in the changing 
Atlantic world. 
 Already in the decades preceding the American Revolution, some Creek headmen had led 
their people southward toward the Gulf, establishing new centers of alliance, which, while still 
part of Creek country, increasingly acted apart from it. Those called Seminoles had established 
ranching and planting sites on the highlands near the Alachua Savannah and the Suwannee River 
in north-central Florida in the 1760s, trading with British subjects whose sugar, rice, and indigo 
plantations dotted East Florida’s Atlantic seaboard. Other Creeks migrated toward the 
Tallahassee Hills above Apalache Bay and the bluffs of the Apalachicola River, hitching rides on 
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fishing vessels out of Cuba in order to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with Spain.13 
While these migrants preferred the high hammocks and hills, the lowlands of this coastal region 
provided sources of fishing and grazing, and havens for white, black, and Indian renegades.14 
While Seminoles and the Lower Creeks who had settled near Apalache Bay still attended 
councils with other Creeks, they increasingly came to be seen—and to see themselves—as 
distinct groups within the larger Creek network. These reorganizations would grow in later 
decades into major divisions, which would follow ethnic lines as well as conflicting stances on 
the adoption of chattel slavery.15   
 In the 1780s, however, Creek leaders clashed most severely over how best to position 
themselves in the world of independent nations and free trade that was unfolding across the 
Atlantic. After the United States achieved its independence from Britain in 1783, settlers from 
Georgia began squatting on Creek lands. Their newly-constituted state government joined with 
two Creek leaders to sign questionable treaties, which professed to cede large sections of Creek 
territory to Georgia.16 The signers of these agreements included headmen who had previously 
been responsible for maintaining peace between the Creeks and the patriots of Georgia and the 
Carolinas. Hoboithle Miko (Tallassee King or Tame King) led the Upper Creek village of Great 
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14 Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and their World (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2003), 46. 
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Tallassee, which would later become involved in the attacks on Andrew Ellicott’s 1799 
surveying expedition. Neha Miko (Fat King) led the Lower Creek town of Cusseta, another 
village that would later become affiliated with rogue British agents. Many other Creeks protested 
these cessions, denying the authority of Hoboithle Miko and Neha Miko to sign agreements with 
Georgia without the consent of other Creek leaders. By 1786, the Creeks were divided internally 
and were once again at war with Georgia.17  
 On one side of this divide was Alexander McGillivray, a young Creek planter from the 
Upper Creek village of Little Tallassee. Born of a French-Creek woman of the influential Wind 
clan and a Scottish loyalist merchant, he had worked as an apprentice at his father’s trading 
house in Savannah in his youth and had attended school in Charleston.18 Along with Efau Hadjo 
(Mad Dog), the Upper Creek leader who would later warn U.S. agents about the attacks on 
Andrew Ellicott’s surveying party, McGillivray objected to Hoboithle Miko and Neha Miko’s 
questionable treaties. McGillivray and Efau Hadjo had behind them the support of the National 
Council, a meeting of primarily Upper Creek leaders that had previously united Creeks during 
moments of crisis.19 The pressures placed on Creek sovereignty during this period led 
McGillivray to attempt to transform this Council into a regular body that more closely resembled 
European nation—one in which a central government would represent Creek foreign relations. 
Persuading Spanish officials to supply the Creeks with weapons, McGillivray urged the U.S. 
Congress, then undergoing its own nationalizing struggles, to join him in opposing the treaties 
made by Georgia.20 
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McGillivray’s overtures to the U.S. government may have also reflected his belief that 
Britain, with whom he had fought in the American Revolution, now retained little presence in 
Creek country.21 While he was at work on his nationalizing project, however, a ship arrived from 
the Bahamas under the command of the British-descended loyalist William Augustus Bowles, 
who brought the opportunity to form a different sort of foreign alliance. In April 1788, the armed 
vessel landed at the mouth of the Indian River on the East Florida’s southern Atlantic coast. 
According to a ship captain who had recently sailed from St. Augustine, near that coast, to 
Pensacola, the armed vessel had arrived at the request of a group of Indians who had traveled 
from Florida to New Providence, Bahamas, to request aid earlier that year.22 Another ship 
arrived at the same place in July. Traders living near Pensacola reported that the ship had carried 
between two and six hundred soldiers as well as arms, ammunition, and other gifts.23 At the head 
of this expedition was Bowles. Born in Maryland, he had resided in the Lower Creek town of 
Cusseta after being dismissed from the Maryland Loyalist Corps in the American Revolution for 
unclear reasons.24  
Returning to Cusseta, Bowles reunited with elite Creek men who, like McGillivray, were 
born of British fathers: Tom Perryman, one of the town’s leaders, and John Galphin, the son of 
George Galphin, a trader who had overseen Southern Indian affairs for the colonies in rebellion 
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during the American Revolution.25 The three men called a council, the details of which became 
muddled in the rumors that crossed Creek country about it.26 Some claimed that Bowles planned 
to establish a port on the Atlantic coast near the St. Mary’s River, or to stage a revolution with 
disaffected white settlers in present-day Tennessee.27 Some said that he had lied to Creek leaders, 
claiming to be commissioned by the British king. Others reported that he planned to attack 
Spanish forts and cities, either of his own accord or on behalf of the British Crown. All sources 
agreed that the expedition was supplied by the merchant John Miller, previously of West Florida 
and by then of Nassau.  
The governor of the Bahamas, Lord Dunmore, quietly supported the expedition, which 
resembled an earlier plan that he had devised in which loyalists, Indians, and slaves would 
conquer Spanish West Florida. Bowles claimed that his force would likewise consist of loyalists 
scattered across the British West Indies, who would support Creeks in their war against Georgia. 
Such warfare, of course, also promised plunder and conquest.28 Opposition to the United States 
and the desire for personal gain had thus joined diverse parties in common cause. After this 
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meeting, Galphin and another Creek leader traveled to New Providence, Bahamas, where they 
dined and hunted with the governor, and recruited soldiers for another expedition.29  
In early October, Bowles and his force returned to Florida, where it was said that they 
planned to attack the stores of William Panton, a commercial rival of Miller, who had with the 
help of Alexander McGillivray recently gained official control of the Indian trade in the Spanish 
Floridas. They landed at the Indian River on two armed ships with about forty adventurers, most 
of whom were Britons otherwise employed as sailors.30 Under the command of Bowles and John 
Galphin, the men proceeded toward the Seminole town at Alachua, where they hoped to gain 
further support. After gathering weapons and provisions at Panton’s store, they planned to 
continue on to Georgia.31 Although McGillivray had attended the earlier council with Bowles, he 
had now distanced himself from the expedition. Holding greater confidence in the friendship of 
Spain and William Panton, he cleared himself of having taken part in this business, also 
promising to prevent any other English ships from landing in Creek territory.32 
In the short term, little came of this rogue alliance between the Creek leaders Tom 
Perryman and John Galphin and the British adventurer William Augustus Bowles. Receiving 
little more than a gift of corn from the Seminoles at Alachua, Bowles’s adventurers began to 
desert, declining an offer from Galphin to proceed to Creek country under his own command. 
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Instead, twenty-six men made their way to St. Augustine, where the Spanish governor took 
statements and returned them to their ports of origin.33 Creeks’ interest in partnering with British 
adventurers also seemed, from the perspective of Spanish officials, to have disappeared. By 
December, four hundred Creek headmen and warriors had come before the Spanish commandant 
at Pensacola to pledge their opposition to Bowles and their loyalty to Spain. When by January 
1789 Bowles had not returned to Creek country, McGillivray and Spanish officials speculated 
that he had moved on to other adventures, and that his Creek allies would soon do the same.34 
 In fact, the partnership that had developed between British American adventurers and 
some lower Creek towns was growing from a temporary wartime alliance into a political 
movement serious enough to warrant a journey to England. In the spring of 1789, Bowles, 
another British officer, and four Indian delegates departed the Gulf of Mexico for London, where 
they sought recognition for a state that Bowles called the United Nation of Creeks and 
Cherokees.35 The delegates consisted mainly of Creeks and Britons but also included some 
Chickamaugas, a militant faction of Cherokees who during this period enabled Creeks and other 
southern Indians to maintain alliances with indigenous peoples farther north.36 In London, 
Bowles inflated his ranks extravagantly, professing to speak on behalf of all Creeks and 
Cherokees and, as Spanish officials had feared, on behalf of six thousand disgruntled American 
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Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., “English Policy Toward America in 1790-1791,” The American 
Historical Review 7, no. 4 (July 1902): 706-735. Jane Landers notes that the Venezuelan 
revolutionary Francisco Miranda was in London at the same time as Bowles’s delegation, but 
whether these parties met is unknown. Landers, Atlantic Creoles, 101. 
36 DuVal, Independence Lost, 330; Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 91. 
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settlers living near the Cumberland River.37 This sort of intrigue was a common political strategy 
in the Spanish American borderlands, and would continue to shape the claims made by and about 
dissident Creeks.38 
The delegation’s main goal was the establishment of formal trade connections between 
the ports of the Bahamas and Apalache Bay. If recognized as a sovereign state, this proposed 
nation might be able to trade officially with Nassau through an act of Parliament similar to the 
Free Port Act, which allowed trade between Nassau and ports in the Americas that were under 
the control of other European powers.39 Bowles also suggested that the establishment of the 
United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees might serve as a launching place for British attacks on 
the Floridas, Louisiana, and even Mexico. While they received no official recognition from the 
British government, Bowles’s delegates did receive the promise that ships flying the flag of the 
United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees would be allowed to trade in the West Indies. Returning 
to Florida by way of the Bahamas, the delegates stopped first at Indian River and then continued 
around the peninsula to the Apalachicola River, where they transferred to a flat-bottomed skiff to 
travel upriver to Cusseta.40  
Upon their arrival, they learned of the signing of the Treaty of New York, a controversial 
step in Alexander McGillivray’s state-building project. In 1790, McGillivray had gathered 
delegates to sign this agreement, which ceded a large portion of Creek land while confirming the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 William A. Bowles to Lord Grenville, Jan. 13, 1791, in Turner, “English Policy,” 728-733. 
38 David Narrett argues that intrigue—“policy based on stratagem, covert maneuver, rumor or 
conspiracy, and ruse or deception”—provided the source of international conflict in the Spanish 
American borderlands. Narrett, Adventurism and Empire, 7. 
39 Bowles to Lord Grenville, Jan. 3, 1791 in Turner, “English Policy Toward America,” 730; 
DuVal, Independence Lost, 330; Narrett, Adventurism and Empire, 1-7. 
40 J. Leitch Wright, Jr., William Augustus Bowles: Director General of the Creek Nation (Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 1967), 50-57; Gilbert C. Din, War on the Gulf Coast: The 
Spanish Fight against William Augustus Bowles (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 
39-40. 
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status of the Creeks as a sovereign nation under US protection. This status meant that the Creeks 
would be able to sign treaties only with the US federal government, freeing them from future 
treaties between rogue headmen and the State of Georgia.41 McGillivray also believed—although 
the document failed to state as much—that the treaty confined US sovereignty to “such parts of 
the Creek Nation as shall fall within the limits of the same.”42 This was a distinctly ambiguous 
concession, given that those “limits” remained undefined. A threat to Lower Creek territory and 
sovereignty, the Treaty of New York had also been signed by a delegation consisting primarily 
of elites from Creek country’s upper towns.43 
 The Treaty of New York added urgency for the United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees to 
enact their claims over Creek country’s Gulf coast, increasing William Augustus Bowles’s 
visibility in this movement and leading to another attack on one of William Panton’s stores. 
According to Bowles, the headmen partnering with him chose in their council to name him their 
director general, tasking him with raising a force of 10,000 men to defend the borders of their 
nation. In January 1792, Bowles and some number of men—witnesses’ estimates ranged from 
seventy-five to two hundred—from the towns of Coweta, Tlocorcau, Chehaw, and Ooseoochee 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The text reads: “The undersigned kings, chiefs, and warriors, for themselves, and all parts of 
the Creek nation within the limits of the United States, do acknowledge themselves, and the said 
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other sovereign whosoever; and they also stipulate, that the said Creek nation will not hold any 
treaty with an individual State, or with individuals of any State.” Treaty of New York, American 
State Papers: Indian Affairs (ASPIA) 1: 81-2. 
42 McGillivray to Miró, Feb. 26, 1791, as transcribed in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of 
the Creeks (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938), 288-290; emphasis original. 
43 Opponents of the treaty would later complain that the delegates had represented no villages 
southeast of Broken Arrow, a name that the U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins translated as 
Tlocorcau. Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 140; Benjamin Hawkins to Maj. Freeman, Agent for 
the Department of War, Jan. 8, 1797, in Hawkins, The Collected Works of Benjamin Hawkins, 
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overtook the Panton, Leslie and Company store at San Marcos de Apalache.44 From this port and 
the low, hidden mouths of the Apalachicola and Ochlockonee rivers, the adventurers and 
warriors of the United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees now commanded an unbroken stretch of 
coastline on the East Florida panhandle, ports that connected the lower towns of Creek country to 
the Atlantic world.  
 Writing on behalf of the United Creeks and Cherokees from the town of Coweta in the 
weeks before the occupation of the Panton, Leslie and Company store, Bowles framed this action 
to Spanish officials as a renewal by force of the “free navigation of the sea that bathes the coasts 
of their native land.”45 Creeks’ natural right to unmediated access to these waterways, he 
claimed, justified their violent occupation of them. Taking them by force, they would 
commission ships to enter and exit freely under their own flag. While entertaining no language of 
receiving protection by a foreign power, Bowles promised Spanish officials that his nation would 
open their ports to all vessels at peace with them, explaining that the geographic position of the 
United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees made it a natural ally to Spain. A useless stretch of 
isthmus land, he wrote of the East Florida panhandle, it meant little to Spain but formed a major 
trade route for the ranchers, planters, and hunters of Creek country’s lower towns. If Spanish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Bowles’s claim to have raised a force of ten thousand men and a description of the takeover of 
the Panton, Leslie & Company store at San Marcos de Apalache are found in a Spanish language 
transcript of his trial proceedings entitled “Documents regarding the litigation of Bowles from 
the Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid” in “Transcripts of selected documents from various 
archives in Spain,” Ayer MS 1236, Newberry Library, Chicago. I did not locate the original 
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“Documents regarding the litigation of Bowles.” For this citation, see the following letters in 
Pieza 1:  El Conde del Campo de Alange to Conde de Aranda, May 4, 1792; and Luis de las 
Casas to Conde de Floridablanca, April 21, 1792. 
45 Bowles to Carondelet, Dec. 4, 1791, in Carondelet to Floridablanca, Pieza 2, “Documents 
regarding the litigation of Bowles.” Narrett writes that both Euro-American adventurers and 
Native headmen sought to establish influence over interior areas with riverine access to the coast, 
clamoring in kind for “free navigation” and other trade relations in which they retained power to 
negotiate. Narrett, Adventurism and Empire, 3. 
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officials would recognize the sovereignty of the United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees over 
these ports, his people would provide them a geographical buffer against the expansionist United 
States. If not, they would be forced to go to war to defend their independence. 46 
 Bowles was no straightforward champion of Indian sovereignty or equality, but the 
partnership he organized between Creek country and the Bahamas posed a serious threat to 
Spanish claims over Creek country’s Gulf coast. Despite the fact that his Creek collaborator John 
Galphin could read and write in English, Bowles drafted all communications sent out by the 
United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees of his own accord, never naming any Creek headmen as 
the authors of his letters.47 He described the United Nation of Creeks and Cherokees as an Indian 
nation that aimed to civilize its inhabitants while applying the “life and vigor” of Indian military 
tactics to Atlantic nations.48 Such statements suggest an assumption that Britons and Indians 
would play different, and hierarchical, roles in this revolutionary project. Yet Spanish officials 
saw the radical implications of Bowles’s claims about sovereign territory. They objected to his 
description of Gulf waterways as “ours” and to his insistence that unmediated Creek access to 
the Gulf was a condition of peace.49 
 Barely a month after Creek warriors and British adventurers took over the Panton, Leslie 
and Company store, Spanish officials promised Bowles a meeting with the governor of Louisiana 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Bowles to Guessy, January 4, 1792, in Las Casas to Alarge, March 1, 1792, Pieza 1, and 
Bowles to Floridablanca, June 18, 1792, Pieza 3, “Documents regarding the litigation of 
Bowles.” 
47 See, for example, Galphin to Tallassee King and Galphin to Bowles, both undated, Fos. 335 
and 338, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI; O’Neill to Miró, July 21, in Miró to Espeleta, July 28, 1788, Exp. 
2, Leg. 1394, PC, AGI. 
48 Memorial of William Augustus Bowles to His Catholic Majesty, Dec. 4, 1791, Pieza 4, 
“Documents regarding the litigation of Bowles,” Newberry Library. 
49 Las Casas to Floridablanca, April 21, 1792, Pieza 1, “Documents regarding the litigation of 
Bowles.” 
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in New Orleans.50 Here, these officials arrested him in fulfillment of a royal order from two years 
earlier. In addition to Bowles’s smuggling, warfare, and “insulting” claims about Creek 
sovereignty over the Gulf coast, these officials objected to what they believed was a certain 
conspiracy by the British to maintain their trade with southern Indians.51 Imprisoned first in 
Cuba’s Morro Castle, he was later taken to Spain and the Philippines. In 1797, he escaped.52  
 
The State of Muskogee:   
 In 1798, William Augustus Bowles was in London, settling accounts and making 
preparations for his return to Creek country. With his escape from prison reported in British 
newspapers, he had many friends in the country—ship captains, a member of Parliament, and 
even a naturalist requesting information about the “languages of the inhabitants of the Nations of 
the back settlements” of North America.53 In February 1799, he boarded a ship bound for 
Barbados, carrying three types of writing paper, pens, pencils, and erasers, gifts of satin, beads, 
and ribbon, and two saddles with cloths and holsters.54 Eight months later, he arrived at Apalache 
Bay. He proceeded to Creek country’s Gulf coast with two subordinate officers and a letter from 
a Barbados sugar planter instructing British ships that Bowles was employed by him “to support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Bowles to Hevia, Feb. 22, 1792 in Diary of Josef Hevia, Pieza 1, and Bowles to Creeks, Feb. 
29, 1792 in Carondelet to Floridablanca, Pieza 2, “Documents regarding the litigation of 
Bowles.” 
51 Luis de las Casas to Conde de Floridablanca, April 21, 1792, Pieza 1, “Documents regarding 
the litigation of Bowles.” 
52 Lawrence Kinnaird and Lucia B. Kinnaird, “War Comes to San Marcos,” The Florida 
Historical Quarterly 62, no. 1 (July 1983), 26. 
53 Letters to Bowles, many of them unsigned and undated, Fos. 222-302, 216B, PC, AGI; 
“London, November 11,” Northampton Mercury (Northampton, England), Nov. 15, 1794. 
54 “Inventory in this Book” and account from Philip Barton, Sadler and Harness Maker, Jan. 20, 
1799, and Driftwood to Bowles, Undated, Fos. 247, 297, and 302, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI. 
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an open communication with the commanders in chief of His Majesty’s Colonies in the West 
Indies.”55 
 Many changes had unfolded in Creek country while Bowles was away. Alexander 
McGillivray had died in 1793, leaving Efau Hadjo at the head of the Creek National Council, 
which had increasingly permitted the U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins to intervene in its 
affairs.56 The United States and Spain had signed the Treaty of San Lorenzo and, with promises 
of protection from the National Council, had begun making plans for surveying the East Florida-
Georgia border. Meanwhile, dissident Creek control over the rivers of the East Florida panhandle 
had brought wealth to a handful of elite families, who had expanded their planting and ranching 
domains throughout East Florida. The headman Kinache established the village of Mikasuki at a 
site above San Marcos de Apalache, while the mestizo rancher Jack Kinnaird established three 
new villages in the same area.57 The number of maroon communities in East Florida had also 
expanded, with new African American settlements appearing along the marshy banks of the 
Apalachicola and Suwannee rivers.58 British supporters of Bowles and of trade between the 
Bahamas and the Spanish Floridas also continued to live in Creek country, maintaining the rogue 
connections between Creek country and the British American colonies that had existed since the 
American Revolution.59  
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57 Fos. 244 and 253, Leg. 225B, PC, AGI. 
58 Landers, Atlantic Creoles, 96-97. 
59 For example, the adventurer Sarles Lewis, who caught the attention of the captain general of 
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 From 1799 until 1803, these diverse peoples would use the resources provided by Bowles 
to control Apalache Bay and the Gulf coast of the Florida peninsula, altering the struggles of the 
United States, Spain, and the Creek Nation to define their own national borders. Upon his arrival 
in Florida, Bowles went to the village of his old friend Tom Perryman, where he penned 
declarations of independence for an Indian state called the State of Muskogee. Calling a council 
of his supporters, he was by his own account re-elected Director General. Bowles described this 
election to a British subordinate officer as follows: “The other Councils are now dissolved and I 
am once more left with the sovereign power.” Describing a model of government more 
reminiscent of Britain than of the United States—one in which sovereignty resides with the 
King-in-Parliament rather than with the people—Bowles justified this concentration of power as 
the saving grace of a nation “torn to pieces by the Intrigues of the Americans and Spaniards.” He 
described the people of the State of Muskogee as both “white and red.”60 
 As before, one of Bowles’s first orders of business as Director General was to issue 
declarations: the re-establishment of a free port at Apalachicola, complete with duties on 
spirituous liquors and foreign merchandise, and an order for all people “holding any unlawful 
commission under the United States or His Catholic Majesty” to leave Creek territory 
immediately.61 Bowles established a headquarters and port called Wekiwa on the Ochlockonee 
River, sending his old friend John Galphin with several ships out to the island where his 
subordinate officers waited to collect the rest of his goods, especially “a table to write on.” He 
had enough support among nearby towns that he could immediately stock the headquarters with 
rice, corn, and “other trifles” such as fowls, potatoes, and peas, then cattle, hogs, and venison. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bowles to Wooldridge, Oct. 28, 1799, Fo. 353, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI. 
61 Decree from Nov. 26, 1799, and from Oct. 31, 1799 in Bowles to Little Prince, Nov. 30, 1799, 
Leg. 216B, PC, AGI. These are also cited in Kinnaird and Kinnaird, “War Comes to San 
Marcos,” 28. 
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also informed his officers that men would soon arrive to build a road from this new port to the 
nearby towns.62 Bowles and his allies would also establish another port, Achackwheethlee, on 
the Apalachicola River. From there, Bowles sent letters to England, New Providence, and 
Jamaica. He reported on this correspondence in a November letter to the Creek headman Little 
Prince, confirming the broad network of relations that he organized from that town.63 
 If these letters to British Americans in the West Indies and the Bahamas resemble the copy 
of a proclamation that Bowles later forwarded to the U.S. surveyor Andrew Ellicott, his public 
portrayal of the State of Muskogee involved more ambiguity about where the state’s sovereignty 
would reside. Although he had previously described himself as holding “sovereign power” over 
the State of Muskogee, this proclamation suggested a republican form of government with direct 
benefits to settlers. “Whereas it ever has been & is still our intention,” he wrote,  
to better the estimation of all our beloved people and to protect and advance the interest 
and dignity of Muskugee & to introduce arts, manufacture, and a well regulated commerce 
. . . knowing that at this time there are a number of worthy families who for their principles 
have been forced from their countries and possessions and have no fixed place of security 
and protection and having a large tract of territory unoccupied we do freely offer and invite 
all such persons so situated to the Peaceable enjoyment of the Rights of Citizens of 
Muskugee.64 
 
 Bowles never used the word “republic” to describe this state, but his references to “rights” 
and “citizens” resemble the revolutionary forms of government expanding in across the Atlantic 
world. By “worthy families who for their principles have been forced from their countries and 
possessions,” he likely referred to British loyalists. In 1784, the now-deceased founder of the 
Creek National Council, the Little Tallassee headman Alexander McGillivray, had also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Letters from Bowles to Wooldridge from Oct. 23, 28, and Nov. 5,1799 (Fos. 351, 353, and 
356), Leg. 216B, PC, AGI.  
63 Bowles to Little Prince, Nov. 30, 1799, Fo. 330, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI. 
64 Untitled proclamation enclosed in Draft of Bowles to [Ellicott?], Undated, Fo. 328, Leg. 216B, 
PC, AGI. 
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suggested that loyalists—and loyalists only—be invited to live in East Florida under Creek 
sovereignty.65 Bowles went on to detail other aspects of this offer to these settlers: the 
availability of one hundred acres of land within thirty miles of the Gulf of Mexico for anyone 
who would come and claim the protection of the State of Muskogee. The land in question 
extended all the way from the Apalachicola River to the Florida peninsula’s far southern coast.  
 Such a polity, if successful, would likely have been disastrous to Creeks, but at least one of 
Bowles’s Indian allies seemed to believe that it was a promising option. In a letter to the 
headman of the village of Tallassee, Bowles’ old friend John Galphin explained that Bowles was 
working “for the Good of our nation” by “openning a free port” in Creek country. Their “Old 
friend the Inglish,” he added, “want the lands from you” in order “to protect our lands and 
ennable us to Defend our Country.” Galphin accused the Spanish of making “slaves of nations” 
and the United States of “dividing our Country between them.” In a complaint common among 
the Creek who opposed accommodation of the U.S. government, he charged the U.S. Indian 
Agent Benjamin Hawkins with bribing his supporters, including the interpreter Alexander 
Cornells.66 “Perhaps, cornels may say that I have no authority for giving anything,” Galphin 
wrote, “but you no my Father to be a great beloved man and who Ever was your Friends in the 
Midst of Danger, and that I am not the Son of a pidling trader that would Sell my Country for a 
few Dollars.” Using the honorific term “beloved man” (in Muskogee, isti atcagagi) to describe 
his deceased British father, George, John Galphin insisted that a partnership with Bowles would 
allow the Creeks “to convince the world that we are a free and Independent nation.”67  
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66 For the common complaint that annuity payments were a form of bribery, see Dowd, A 
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Ethridge, Creek Country, 18, 261 n40; Wright, Creeks and Seminoles, 29; Hawkins, The 
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 Others in Creek country seemed to agree, or at least they were interested in courting 
Bowles’s alliance in order to obtain trade. The Lower Creek trader James Burges, chosen by the 
United States and Spain as the interpreter during the surveying expedition of the East Florida-
Georgia border, wrote to Bowles a week after his arrival to Florida expressing his support. He 
added that of “two Indians” wished to communicate “their want of your friendship in letting 
them have powder and ball.”68 Bowles and his partners also received word from another trader 
that many people in Perryman’s village of Cusseta “never can forget the British but wish to take 
them by the hand and hold them safe & fast.”69 
 Spanish officials responded swiftly, placing a bounty on Bowles’s head and sending troops 
to destroy the State of Muskogee town on the Ochlockonee River in February 1800.70 Bowles 
responded by declaring war on Spain that April, rallying over three hundred warriors to capture 
the fort of San Marcos de Apalache, which they held from mid-May until late June.71 War 
continued after Spanish forces retook the fort, with State of Muskogee forces headquartered at 
the village of Mikasuki. Those fighting on behalf of this revolutionary state included white, 
black, and Indian warriors.72 By attacking Spanish plantations across East Florida, Mikasukis, 
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Little Prince, he referenced a decision that he had made “for the sake of our beloved red people.” 
Fos. 328 and 330, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI. 
68 James Burges to Bowles, Nov. 5, 1799, Fo. 558, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI.  
69 Richard Thomas to Bowles, Jan. 29, 1800, Fo. 361, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI. 
70 Richard Thomas to Bowles, Jan. 29, 1800, Fo. 361, Leg. 216B, PC, AGI; Corbitt and Lanning, 
“A Letter of Marque”; Kinnaird, “War Comes to San Marcos,” 28-29.  
A newspaper account from 1799 locates Bowles’s headquarters at the confluence of the Flint and 
Chattahoochee rivers, which is above the Florida-Georgia border. See Commercial Advertiser 
(New York, NY), April 22, 1800. 
71 Kinnaird, “War Comes to San Marcos,” 29-30. 
72 Jane Landers observes that Bowles incorporated more people of African descent into his army 
after 1790. In general, Landers’ interpretation of Bowles corresponds to mine. She writes that 
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allied African Americans, and British adventurers made off with about seventy captives, most of 
whom were enslaved African Americans. After the war, Spanish officials would ransom many of 
these men, women, and children in exchange for cattle and specie.73  
 As the war progressed, Tom Perryman and headmen from various other Creek villages had 
visited the commander of San Marcos de Apalache to express their desire for peace with Spain.74 
In January 1802, the State of Muskogee launched another attack on San Marcos de Apalache, 
which Spanish forces more quickly crushed.75 Later that year, the Seminole leader Payne, 
various traders, and headmen from across Creek country ended the war between Spain and the 
Mikasukis, negotiating for the release of a Mikasuki headman, Macloggy, who had been 
captured by Spain.76 The leaders of many more Creek towns came to San Marcos de Apalache to 
return captives and to offer peace.77  
 The United States and other southeastern Indians also played a role in ending this 
conflict—or, put more accurately, in scheming to remove Bowles from Creek country. In May 
1803, an assembly of southern Indians, including Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, 
and Seminoles, assisted the U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin Hawkins and John Forbes, who had 
taken ownership of the former Panton, Leslie and Company, to apprehend Bowles, who would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
while “many contemporary observers, and indeed many later historians, saw Bowles as a self-
interested scoundrel,” for his black and Indian allies, “he must have spoken to their dreams or 
represented their perceived best hope for a free life in the face of certain Anglo domination of the 
Southeast.” Landers, Atlantic Creoles, 101, 103. 
73 Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 138-139. 
74 Diego de Vegas to Enrique White, Aug. 26, 1800 and Commandant to Vicente Folch, Fos. 237 
and 261, Leg. 225B, PC, AGI. These villages are listed as Fumuluachana, Chifolotica, Seunde 
Okmulgee, and Chisquetalofa. 
75 Kinnaird, “War Comes to San Marcos,” 38-43. 
76 Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country, 139. 
77 These peace parties also returned captives, including two free black men from Campeche, 
Yucatán, who had been imprisoned by Bowles at Tampa Bay. Commandant to Folch, Oct. 28, 
1802, Fo. 298, Leg. 225B, PC, AGI. 
 67 
die imprisoned in Cuba’s Morro Castle in 1805. As late as the assembly that led to Bowles’s 
arrest, some southeastern Indians still claimed to be at war with Spain.78 Even for those like the 
Mikasuki headman Kinache, who had made peace, good feelings toward Spain and the United 
States were short lived. For a short time, Kinache made regular visits to San Marcos de 
Apalache, frustrating the commander with his large, costly delegations and demands that the 
commander purchase his cattle in order to secure his friendship.79 By October 1804, he was 
again addressing the commander of San Marcos de Apalache with disgust, making reference to 
conflicts with John Forbes and Company.80  
 During the assembly at which Bowles had been arrested, the merchant John Forbes and 
Bowles’s one-time friend, the Cusseta leader Tom Perryman, had schemed about a land cession 
to pay off debts that the Creeks owed to this trading house. The territory in question: a million 
and a half acres between the Apalachicola and St. Marks rivers, territory that had formed the 
heart of the State of Muskogee.81 When the John Forbes and Company member James Innerarity 
met with Creek leaders to negotiate the cession in September 1804, Kinache, the Creek leader 
Jack Kinnaird, and the Seminole leader Semothly were his main opponents. In addition to 
disagreeing over the boundaries of the cession, they objected to rumors from the Lower Creek 
headman Tustanagee Hopoi (Little Prince) that Forbes planned to “engage all the vagabond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For the apprehension of Bowles, see John Forbes to unknown, May 31, 1803, Box 1, Marie 
Taylor Greenslade Papers (hereafter MTG), P.K. Yonge Library (hereafter PKY), Gainesville, 
FL. For the death of William Panton, see Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 235. 
79 Commandant to Folch, May 30, 1804 (Fo. 309) and June 7, 1804 (Fo. 313), Leg. 225B, PC, 
AGI. 
80 Commandant to Folch, Oct. 9, 1804, Leg. 225B, PC, AGI. 
81 John Forbes to Unknown, May 31, 1803, Box 1, MTG, PKY; Ethridge, Creek Country, 29, 55; 
William S. Coker and Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Borderlands: 
Panton, Leslie & Company and John Forbes & Company, 1783-1847 (Pensacola: University of 
West Florida Press, 1986), 182-202, 243-244. 
 68 
Americans he could” to settle upon it.82 Innerarity only managed to secure the land cession by 
promising “that none but good people should be permitted to come upon it—that we intended to 
Settle it with Englishmen from Providence (whom they were very desirous of seeing) or with 
Frenchmen or Spaniards.”83  
 Removing Bowles from Creek Country, it seemed, had failed to quell the interest among 
dissident Creeks in forming an alliance with British Americans, which included allowing them to 
settle near the Gulf. For the time being, John Forbes and Company kept Innerarity’s promise to 
restrict settlement by Americans. Their representatives established a trading post at the former 
site of Achackwheethlee, where they cleared thirty acres of land to build “a storehouse, dwelling 
house, skin house, negro houses, granary, and other necessary buildings.”84 Slave owners and 
slave traders, the company’s members likely brought these enslaved people from their other Gulf 
and Caribbean properties.85 The company made little progress, however, on selling or settling the 
lands at Achackwheethlee, which they called Prospect Bluff. These rivers remained under Creek 
control for another decade. When war returned to the region, many of the peoples who had 
partnered with Bowles became friends of British American subjects. 
 
New Alliances after the Creek Civil War:  
 Between 1812 and 1815, the Creek Civil War and the War of 1812 brought another brief 
alliance between the British government and some Creek leaders. In Creek country, a civil war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Innerarity to Simpson, September 24, 1804, Box 1, MTG, PKY. 
83 Innerarity to Simpson, September 24, 1804, Box 1, MTG, PKY. 
84 See tracts designated for Edmund Doyle, William Hambly, and James Innerarity on the 
Hatfield map. For the immediate renaming of Estifanulgie, see Innerarity to Simpson, September 
24, 1804, Box 1, MTG, PKY. For land use, see “Deposition of Edmund Doyle,” June 6, 1829, in 
Colin Mitchell, Record in the case of Colin Mitchel and others versus the United States 
(Washington: D. Green, 1831), 619-620. 
85 See, among other sources, the following letters in MTG, PKY: Phillip R. Young to John 
Leslie, Oct. 21, 1802; Edmond Doyle to John Forbes, Sept. 1, 1811; James Innerarity to John 
Innerarity, March 28, 1819. 
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began in 1812 as a struggle between supporters of the Creek National Council and several 
thousand nativist opponents of this body, who became known as Red Sticks. The United States 
joined the war on the side of the National Council, while the Seminoles professed their support 
of the Red Sticks. In 1814, after the Red Sticks had been almost defeated, British forced arrived, 
offering support from a fort on the Apalachicola River and merging this war with the War of 
1812. As they had after the American Revolution, however, British officials in London reneged 
on this alliance almost as soon as their own war had concluded, leaving the Red Sticks, along 
with Mikasukis, Lower Creeks, Seminoles, and African Americans, to rebuild their communities 
on their own.86  
 British officers remaining in the Gulf, however, would maintain friendships with some 
Creek leaders, continuing for strategic and ideological reasons to trade with them and to issue 
written communications on their behalf. Later, Spanish American revolutionaries would join 
them. As the Atlantic world entered the second phase of its age of revolutions, Creeks living near 
East Florida’s Gulf waterways would find once again that alliance with rogue agents of empire 
empowered them to persist in the face of an expanding United States. 
 The Apalachicola River remained central to these assertions of independence because it 
was home to the structure remembered in U.S. history as the Negro Fort. Building and 
maintaining this structure in 1814 only yards away from the John Forbes and Company 
warehouses, Captain George Woodbine of the West India Regiment and General Edward Nicolls 
of the British Royal Marines had secured the friendship of an estimated eight hundred Red Stick 
men, women, and children; one thousand Seminoles, Black Seminoles, and Mikasukis; and 
seventeen villages pertaining to Lower Creeks and African Americans along the waters flowing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Dowd, A Spirited Resistance, 157, 170-172, 188-190. 
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toward it, most of them on the Apalachicola River and one on the Flint.87 Meanwhile, Upper and 
Lower Creek warriors affiliated with the Creek National Council fought beside the United States, 
their ally against the Red Sticks during the Creek Civil War.  
 In August 1814, with the War of 1812 still ongoing, Creeks under duress signed a peace 
treaty with the United States at Fort Jackson on behalf of the Creek Nation, ceding nearly 22 
million acres of land to the United States. For the peoples congregating at the Apalachicola 
River, however, peace did not come until eight months later, when Article Nine of the Treaty of 
Ghent promised to restore all “possessions, rights, and privileges” to what they had been in 
metropolitan eyes before wars began. A copy of this second document was later signed by 
Edward Nicolls and three “Chiefs of the Muscogee Nation”—Hepoaeth Mico, Cappachimico, 
and Hopoie Mico—all of whom maintained that the Treaty of Fort Jackson had been made 
without their consent. A month later, the Creeks at Apalachicola wrote through Nicolls to 
Benjamin Hawkins the complaint that parties of US citizens continued to enter their land, 
plundering their homes and ranches and killing innocent people. In this letter, they demanded a 
complete end to all communication, direct or indirect, with the US government and its citizens.88  
 That August, the Red Stick leader Hillis Hadjo sailed for London along with his son, a 
servant, an interpreter, and General Edward Nicolls, to seek ongoing ties with the British 
government against the United States. Like Bowles and other agents in the Gulf borderlands, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Nicolls estimated the number of warriors “that can be depended on for defense of Bluff” to be 
3551, adding that the number of women and children were “supposed to be double the number of 
warriors.” By his record, the villages along the Apalachicola River included: Yawole, Ochese, 
Tamathla, Euchee, Tolohuilely, Attapalga, Ockekochne, Fowltown, Savocolo, Talwathlaco, 
Wakahoole, Conchale, Amasey, Conhalway, and Perrymans. He believed that he could also 
count on the alliance of the Chehaws on the Flint River. Copy of “Return of Muscogee or Creek 
Indians under the Command of Lieut. Col. Nicolls” in Cochrane to Earl Bathurst, March 12, 
1816, WO 1/144, BNA. All citations of BNA records appearing in this chapter refer to 
photographs taken at my request by Matthew Woodbury. 
88 Copy of Nicolls to Hawkins, April 28, 1815, WO 1/143, BNA. 
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Hillis Hadjo inflated his support among southeastern Indians and played to British hopes of 
imperial expansion. Expecting that the British Empire might someday regain control of the Gulf 
coast or at least benefit from the continued alliance of Red Sticks and other Creeks, Nicolls 
provided the pen by which the illiterate Hillis Hadjo made a case for his people’s independence 
and their desire for British friendship and supplies.  
 Nicolls hosted Hillis Hadjo’s party in his home at Eltham, England for over a year, while 
sending letters to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Henry Bathurst, on their 
behalf. In these letters, Hillis Hadjo made requests primarily on behalf of his own people, the 
Red Sticks, while professing also to represent all Creeks and “the King of the four Nations and 
his Chiefs.”89 Describing the destruction the Red Sticks had experienced during the recent wars, 
he requested financial support and official trade with Britain so that his people could maintain 
autonomy from their enemy, the United States. Writing that the Red Sticks had been the Indian 
allies “who first attacked the Americans,” he expressed his hope “that men who have fought and 
bled in the cause of Great Britain will not be forsaken by her in Peace.” British merchants would 
“find good account” with the Muscogee Nation at the Apalachicola River, he noted, making a 
request reminiscent of Bowles and Galphin for official commerce between this river and Nassau; 
he added that he would permit the governor of the Bahamas to visit twice a year. To these 
arguments Nicolls appended his own approval of Hillis Hadjo’s conduct in war, emphasizing that 
he and the Red Stick leader Peter McQueen both had British fathers.”90  
 These requests, like those of William Augustus Bowles’s delegation sixteen years earlier, 
received no official support from Bathurst, who believed that the United States had already made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Copy of Nicolls to P. Morier, Sept. 25, 1815, FO 5/140, BNA. Neither Hillis Hadjo nor Nicolls 
explained the meaning of “four nations.” 
90 Copy of Nicolls to P. Morier, Sept. 25, 1815, FO 5/140, BNA. 
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peace with all of the Creeks in the Treaty of Fort Jackson. He therefore refused to treat with 
Hillis Hadjo. Bathurst recommended that the Red Stick leader restore “friendly intercourse” with 
his countrymen and offered to pay his return journey home as soon as possible.91 London 
merchants expressed strong interest in trading with the Creeks, however, and vice versa.92 When 
the Red Stick leader and his party returned to Florida in June 1816, they would find that their 
journey to England, and the clothing and gifts that they received at the visit’s end, strengthened 
these efforts, giving the impression that some sort of agreement had been reached.93 
 They also found British American officers and merchants continuing to partner with Red 
Sticks, Mikasukis, and Seminoles in their ongoing war against the United States and the Creek 
Nation. The presence of these people from the Bahamas and West Indies—some but not all of 
them exiled loyalists from the original thirteen colonies— occurred once again at Creeks’ 
request. The John Forbes and Company agent at the Apalachicola River had taken sides with the 
United States in this warfare, helping them destroy the former British fort in on this Spanish-
claimed river in July 1816. Bowles’s old friend Kinache and other headmen then sent a letter to 
the governor of the Bahamas requesting aid. That October, Captain George Woodbine returned 
to the Apalachicola River in an attempt to overtake the Forbes and Company warehouse. He 
landed again in Florida in December, proceeding from the Ochlockonee River to Seminole 
country to hold a council with Kinache, the Seminole Boleck, and the Red Stick Peter 
McQueen.94  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Bathurst to the Chief of the Muscogee Tribe, Sept. 21, 1815, FO 5/140, BNA. 
92 Nicolls to Goulburn, Jan. 15, 1816, WO 1/144, BNA. 
93 See, for example, Francisco Caso y Luengo to José Masot, June 29, 1817, Leg. 1928, PC, AGI. 
94 Francisco Caso y Luengo to José Masot, Dec. 11, 1816, and March 16, 1817, Leg. 1928, PC, 
AGI. 
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 George Woodbine, a native of Jamaica, sailed on the schooner of the father-son pair 
Alexander and John Arbuthnot, Bahamas merchants who were in process of establishing trade 
with dissident Creeks on the Ochlockonee and Suwannee Rivers.95 The Arbuthnots also shuttled 
Creek headmen between these rivers and the Bahamas, including Hillis Hadjo during his return 
journey from England in the summer of 1817.96 Upon his arrival, Hillis Hadjo visited the 
commandant of the fort at San Marcos de Apalache along with Kinache, Peter McQueen, and 
other leaders, carrying a letter from the Bahamas governor certifying that the he had traveled 
there under British protection and requesting that Arbuthnot be allowed to formally establish a 
store in the territory.97 
 Like the adventurer William Augustus Bowles, the merchant Alexander Arbuthnot and the 
captain George Woodbine had their own personal motives for partnering with Red Sticks, 
Mikasukis, and Seminoles. True to his time, Arbuthnot’s personal writing about the Creeks 
contains paternalistic tropes, describing these people as “children of nature” and lamenting that 
Nicolls had left “no person to guide them” upon his return to London.98 A letter that he wrote to 
the governor of the Bahamas on behalf of Cappachimicco and Boleck implied that Arbuthnot 
could be this person for them, requesting “an officer or person to lead us right, and to apportion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 They had established trade on the Suwannee River by November 1816, and on the 
Ochlockonee by March 1817. Frank Owsley, Jr., “Ambrister and Arbuthnot: Adventurers or 
Martyrs for British Honor?” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Autumn 1985), 293; 
Alexander Arbuthnot to Francisco Caso y Luengo, March 3, 1817, Leg. 1928, PC, AGI. 
96 Arbuthnot to Caso y Luengo, March 1817, Leg. 1928, PC, AGI. 
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Arbuthnot to Col. Edward Nicholls, Aug. 26, 1817, in American State Papers: Military Affairs 
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98 Alexander Arbuthnot’s Journal, November 8, 1817, quoted in Owsley, “Ambrister and 
Arbuthnot,” 294. The original is in “Papers relative to Arbuthnot and Ambrister communicated 
by R. W. Rush, January 12, 1819,” FO 5/146, BNA. 
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the supply you may be pleased to send us agreeably to our proper wants.”99 Woodbine, who 
would later claim to have received 40,000 acres of land from the Creeks during the war, was also 
said to have skimmed from the diplomatic gifts awarded to Hillis Hadjo when the Red Stick 
headman stayed with him at Nassau on his return journey from London; his guest departed the 
island with nothing more than eighty dollars, “a barrel of sugar, a bag of coffee, and a small keg 
of rum.”100  
 Yet these men offered material and diplomatic support to Creek leaders who sought to 
combat US aggression in the region, delivering arms to defend themselves against intrusions, 
writing international appeals for aid, and contesting agreements like John Forbes and Company’s 
1804 land purchase and the peace treaty signed at Fort Jackson, both of which limited control 
over their own territory. In March 1817, Kinache responded to questions from the commander of 
San Marcos de Apalache about the purpose of Woodbine’s expeditions to Florida by informing 
him that the ship carrying the officer had come to monitor the movements of the Americans, with 
the goal of learning whether they were abiding by the Treaty of Ghent. The Mikasuki headman 
also informed the commander that at their December council with Woodbine, he and the other 
headmen had moved to annul the Forbes Purchase because the company planned to allow 
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Americans to settle it, a complaint that had remained nearly constant since the moment they had 
signed the agreement.101  
 These Creek leaders would later repeat their objections to the Forbes Purchase through 
Arbuthnot. Drafts of letters confiscated from Arbuthnot’s ship suggest that they wrote to José 
Cienfuegos, the colonial governor of Cuba, stating that John Forbes and Company had broken 
“the faithful promise given us that they would get English people to settle it, and live among us.” 
In order to encourage the Spanish to go on the offense against US activities on the Apalachicola 
River, they made a halfhearted acceptance of the Treaty of San Lorenzo: “This river is far within 
that line marked out by your Excellency’s Government and the Americans (though that line was 
unknown to us until very lately, and we never gave our sanction, nor, in fact, knew of any sale of 
our lands made to the Americans).”102  
 Unlike the declarations that Bowles had written as “director general” of the United Nation 
of Creeks and Cherokees and the State of Muskogee, Arbuthnot’s letters on behalf of Creek 
headmen made clear that Creeks had authorized or co-authored them, mentioning specific 
headmen in the text of the letters or affixing their x-marks at the end. Twelve men, for 
example,—Boleck, Kinache, Inhemothlo, Opauney, Peter McQueen, and other headmen from 
Atlapaga, Pallatchocoley, and Chehaw—signed their x-mark to a Power of Attorney statement 
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that Arbuthnot enclosed in a letter to the governor of Cuba.103 Other letters attributed full 
authorship to Boleck, Cappachimicco, or Kinache.104 In other cases, Arbuthnot wrote and signed 
the letters but included in-text requests from particular leaders.105 While in England, Hillis Hadjo 
had requested to leave his son with Nicolls “for the purpose of learning to read and write, that in 
future they may not be deceived, . . . not having any person to read or explain its Contents to 
them.”106 Now Arbuthnot filled a similar need, standing in as someone to “attend to our talks, 
and put them in writing for us.”107 
 Another adventurer, the Scotsman Gregor McGregor, offered a final opportunity for 
Seminoles, Red Sticks, and Mikasukis to receive aid in their efforts against US invasion. On June 
29, 1817, a one- to two-hundred man expedition of adventurers out of Charleston led by 
McGregor invaded Amelia Island, a Spanish territory offshore from St. Augustine. There they 
proclaimed the “Republic of the Two Floridas,” a state that they claimed would stretch along the 
Gulf coast all the way to the Mississippi River.108 These men were later joined by adventurers 
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from other ports on the US Atlantic seaboard as well as by soldiers under the revolutionaries 
Pedro Gual and Louis-Michel Aury, whom McGregor had met during his time as a privateer for 
the short-lived State of Cartagena. An ethnically eclectic group—Anglo-Americans, Frenchmen, 
Haitians, and South Americans—the adventurers who congregated at Amelia Island had 
contrasting political visions for their declared state, with some seeking the expansion of US 
slavery, others a launching place for Spanish American revolutions with radical visions of racial 
equality. They shared a desire for booty, money, and land, intercepting Spanish ships traveling 
between Havana and Cádiz to capture goods and captives, and receiving promises from 
McGregor that their service would be rewarded with East Florida land.109 
 In November 1817, Captain George Woodbine sailed from New Providence to Amelia 
Island to request a commission from McGregor, aiming to unite the Republic of the Two 
Floridas with his project among the Creeks. Aware that the United States was planning its own 
invasion of Amelia Island, the adventurers determined to forfeit this post and attack St. 
Augustine from land, having a force under Woodbine march from Tampa through Seminole 
country to claim the Spanish city.110 Sailing with McGregor back to New Providence and then 
Jamaica, Woodbine began recruiting soldiers to the cause, including British American and 
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African American veterans of the War of 1812.111 He then returned to Creek country, supposedly 
securing the alliance of 1500 Creek warriors.112Arbuthnot and others criticized Woodbine for 
reportedly lying to his Indian allies, professing to act as an official representative of the British 
government, whose army he promised would help them protect their lands.113  
 Yet Woodbine’s offer to McGregor also seemed to benefit the Creeks. He wrote that he 
“could find friends and funds in New Providence, and that a British regiment had lately been 
disbanded there, that they would pick up as many of the soldiers as possible, and with what 
negroes and others they could gather, would make a tolerable force.”114 Such an offer likely 
would have appealed to dissident Creeks living in East Florida. Concerned by the presence of 
adventurers at Amelia Island, near their border with Spain, US troops took Amelia Island in late 
1817. In March of the following year, they arrived at the Apalachicola River, where they began a 
siege on Seminole, Mikasuki, and Red Stick towns that would lead to their victory in the event 
remembered as the First Seminole War. The United States justified this invasion by accusing 
these Creeks of attacking US property, and of refusing to hand over the African American people 
who lived among them, some of whom US citizens claimed as slaves. Before the invasion, the 
US General Edmund Pendleton Gaines had written an ominous letter to Kinache ordering him to 
give up these families and to sever ties with the “bird with a forked tongue” in the Gulf.115  
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 Ignoring these threats, the Lower Creek headman Kinache and others continued to appeal 
to the British governor at New Providence and the Spanish governor at Havana, writing to them 
through the merchant Alexander Arbuthnot and through adventurers arriving in East Florida with 
Captain George Woodbine. With their extensive Gulf connections, perhaps they knew that as of 
September 1817, Spain had consented to join Britain in abolishing the slave trade.116 In late 
March 1818, Woodbine arrived at Tampa Bay with twenty-four black soldiers. He was also 
accompanied by Robert Christie Ambrister, a veteran of the War of 1812, whose father, James, 
had been exiled from South Carolina after the American Revolution.117 These men may have 
understood themselves to be working in alliance with McGregor and Aury, who had abandoned 
Amelia Island but who were already recruiting men and outfitting ships for future revolutionary 
activity.118 Regardless of how they understood their service, their actions also benefited 
Seminoles, Lower Creeks, and Red Sticks. 
 The dissident Creeks used their connections with these rogue allies as it suited them, 
demonstrating no clear faithfulness to one over the other. While Woodbine returned to the West 
Indies for supplies, the rest of his force captured the Arbuthnots’ schooner, proceeding to St. 
Marks and the Suwannee River to meet the Creeks there and gather arms.119 Their first order of 
business was to join the dissident Creeks in blocking U.S. advances. Ambrister and “a body of 
negroes” broke into the Arbuthnots’ store at Suwannee, distributing the goods and arms among 
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them.120 While there, he was enlisted by Hillis Hadjo, the Red Stick leader who had journeyed 
with Nicolls to England, and “all our Indian chiefs” to write again to the governor of the 
Bahamas demanding weapons. Hillis Hadjo again made strategic use of his journey to London, 
claiming that the Prince Regent had promised to supply him with such goods upon request.121  
 The force then marched toward San Marcos de Apalache to obtain more weapons, but was 
stopped on the way by people from the village of Mikasuki, who were fleeing the advancing US 
troops.122 Establishing their own forts at the Apalachicola River and San Marcos de Apalache, 
thousands of troops under General Andrew Jackson traveled by land and water across Apalache 
Bay all the way to the Suwannee River, taking captives and leaving death and destruction in their 
wake. By early May, the Americans had captured San Marcos de Apalache and Pensacola, 
executing Arbuthnot, Ambrister, Hillis Hadjo, and Homathlemico, the former pair after 
controversial military trials and the latter pair with no trial at all.123   
 In 1819, representatives of the United States and Spain concluded their Treaty of Amity, 
Settlement, and Limits—the Adams-Onís Treaty—in which the Spanish king ceded “in full 
property and sovereignty, all the territories which belong to him, situated to the eastward of the 
Mississippi, known by the name of East and West Florida.”124 With the confirmation of this 
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treaty in 1821, the contested international border established in the Treaty of the San Lorenzo 
became a domestic border between the State of Georgia and Florida Territory, a change that 
aided its enforcement among Indians. With the entire stretch of North America coastline from 
the Florida peninsula to western Louisiana now claimed by the United States, a nation whose 
military had demonstrated the extreme lengths it would go to control Gulf populations, British 
American adventurers and merchants lost the legal justification—and the nerve—to continue 
their open alliance with Creeks. 
 
Conclusion: 
 While the cession of East Florida to the United States ended overt partnerships between 
Gulf adventurers and dissident Creeks, it did not put an immediate end to adventurous trade or 
settlement along the territory’s Gulf of Mexico rivers. Even as leaders such as Boleck, Hillis 
Hadjo, Peter McQueen, and Opauney moved their people away from the Gulf to evade US 
forces, Alexander Arbuthnot was instructing his son to move their schooner, skins, account 
books, and other effects to a hiding place near Cedar Key, off the Gulf coast just south of the 
Suwannee River.125 Six months later, Red Sticks and allied African Americans had established 
new homes in the south of the peninsula, along the Peace River just south of Tampa Bay, where 
they were seen trading with British merchants.126 By 1822, Opauney had constructed a two-story 
home there, as well as “a dairy house, corn house, stables, sheds,” to support “an extensive peach 
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orchard, & a considerable crop of Corn, Potatoes, etc. etc.”127 After Jackson invaded this region 
in 1821, many of its inhabitants returned northward toward Apalache Bay. By 1823, at least eight 
Creek villages dotted the territory between the Suwannee River and the Aucilla River, just east 
of San Marcos de Apalache, which had become the U.S. town of St. Marks.128 
 During the decade and a half separating the Adams-Onís Treaty from the Second Seminole 
War, the enduring presence of armed Indians on the rivers surrounding Apalache Bay was a 
constant complaint of US citizens and officials attempting to settle in this region. An 1823 treaty 
professed to remove all Florida Indians to a southern reservation fifteen miles from any coast, 
but few of the leaders living between the Aucilla and Suwannee rivers signed or abided by this 
agreement.129 In the late 1820s, conflicts between these Mikasukis, Red Sticks, and African 
Americans and the US citizens attempting to establish cotton plantations near them escalated 
again into warfare, seemingly foreshadowing the Second Seminole War in its brutality and the 
individual players involved.130 During the Second Seminole War, the Native American and 
African American peoples who were at war with the United States once again used the Gulf 
rivers of Apalache Bay to their advantage, seeking shelter on the islands off shore from the 
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Apalachicola River.131 Yet these later methods of survival bore none of the explicit claims to 
international alliance and state-building of their predecessors; indeed, foreign adventurers and 
merchants as explicit and present partners had disappeared. 
 In other parts of the Gulf of Mexico, however, possibilities remained for partnerships 
between Indigenous peoples and British merchants that were strong enough to support 
declarations of sovereign statehood. Throughout the entire Caste War, the leaders of Chan Santa 
Cruz and other autonomous communities in southern and eastern Yucatán would gain arms 
through the trade networks of this double borderland between Mexico, British Honduras, and the 
Caribbean Sea. For a brief period, beginning in 1848, British merchants, Maya rebels, and even 
the superintendent of British Honduras would imagine eastern Yucatán as sovereign Maya 
territory. 
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Chapter 2: Maya-British Dreams of Territory in the Yucatecan Monte 
 
 In the second year of the series of civil conflicts that became known as the Caste War of 
Yucatán, leaders of the rebel forces added something new to their list of conditions for peace. 
These rebels—described as Indians by contemporaries but including people of Maya and Spanish 
descent from across the Yucatán peninsula—had begun their warfare in 1847 with diverse and 
sometimes contradictory objectives. At different times, their leaders had demanded an end to 
oppressive civil and religious taxes, sought protection over their communal lands, and advocated 
the forgiveness of debts tying workers to estates. In April 1848, however, after the rebel army 
took the southern outpost of Bacalar, near Mexico’s border with British Honduras, the leaders of 
this movement began to demand a division of territory that would grant them independent 
control over eastern Yucatán. Writing in February 1849 to the Baptist missionary Rev. John 
Kingdon, to Edward L. Rhys, and to other British merchants who had established residence in 
Bacalar, Jacinto Pat stated that what his people desired most was “freedom, and not oppression” 
from excessive contributions and fees, a goal that might most likely be achieved if Mexico would 
agree to “divide the territory of Yucatán as you suggest.”206 
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 When Kingdon forwarded this letter to the superintendent of British Honduras, Charles 
St. John Fancourt, he described the division of territory as Pat’s idea, adding that a “complete 
separation from the Spaniards”—indeed, “the re-conquest of the whole Peninsula of Yucatan”—
had numbered among the rebels’ goals from the beginning.207 This claim was likely exaggerated, 
given that Pat’s February 1849 letter treated this demand as a suggestion from Reverend 
Kingdon. Yet delegations from Bacalar had visited Belize almost as soon as the rebels had taken 
the city, seeking British trade and alliance and, some said, offering the territory they had 
occupied, along with their allegiance, to the British Crown.208 However the idea for a division of 
territory had originated, and whatever role Britons had in it, by early 1849 it had gained wide and 
long-lasting support across the factions of rebel leadership. At a moment of internal tension and 
of stalemate with Yucatecan forces, the promise of independently controlled territory seemed to 
unify rebel leaders. Kingdon added that Venancio Pec and Cecilio Chi, leaders of the eastern 
rebel faction and rivals of Pat, had also voiced support for the measure.  
 Shortly after Reverend Kingdon sent his letters, Chi, Pec, and a man named José 
Atanacio Espadas sent their own correspondence to Superintendent Fancourt, stating their desire 
to divide Yucatán, “as the supreme government of Belize says,” in order to end the war.209 By 
November 1849, Pec and others of his faction had assassinated Pat; Chi had also died at the 
hands of a rival.210 That month, Pec and others declared to Superintendent Fancourt that “no 
arrangement would be satisfactory that did not secure to them an independent Government, that 
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they desired to have a portion of the Country relinquished to them, a line drawn northward from 
Bacalar to the Gulf of Mexico.”211 Such a border, if enforced, would have officially severed the 
coastal lowlands of eastern Yucatán from the Hispanic-dominated centers of the west. 
The conviction that such a division was possible, one historian has suggested, may have 
served as a motivation for the rebel leadership to establish the capital for which they eventually 
became famous—Chan Santa Cruz, just inland from Ascension Bay. Mention of Chan Santa 
Cruz first appears in records in the months following Pec’s meeting with Fancourt, and at the site 
would appear a miraculous talking cross, urging its followers to continue fighting.212 The rebel 
leaders who, along with peasant followers, congregated at Chan Santa Cruz would continue to 
demand and control this territory for the rest of the war.213  
 This demand for independent territory and autonomous governance, coming from people 
who had long been integrated—albeit loosely—into the colonial structures of the Spanish Empire 
and of independent Mexico, is at once striking and suspect. As with interpretations of British 
involvement with dissident Creeks in early-nineteenth-century Florida, historians have struggled 
to interpret this chapter of British-Maya relations. Nineteenth-century Yucatecans paid 
considerable attention to Britons’ roles in the Caste War, insisting that officials in Belize had 
convinced some Mayas to rebel as part of a plot to acquire Yucatecan territory.214 More recently, 
these grandiose accusations have been easily contradicted with evidence that Britain’s Colonial 
Office “had neither the intention nor desire to add rebel-controlled eastern Yucatan to a 
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worldwide empire that was already too big and too expensive to handle.”215 Rebels’ demands for 
territory, furthermore, which arose only after the war had begun, offer little to the origins debates 
that have long occupied Caste War historians. Instead, the demand for territorial sovereignty 
remains in established accounts as an explanation for the “notions of grandeur” that arose among 
rebel leaders, and as manipulations by the merchants whose smuggled weapons sustained them 
but with little backing from the British government officials, who were committed primarily to 
free trade.216 
 Sources show, however, that British support for Maya rebels extended beyond rogue 
merchants to Superintendent Fancourt himself, who had motivation and precedent for the hope—
made explicit in letters to the governor of Jamaica—that eastern Yucatán might come to bear an 
official connection to the British Crown. At the time that the Caste War began, British 
Hondurans were feuding internally over the mission and the administration of their settlement, 
which occupied an ambiguous position with relation to Mexico and the United States. 
Superintendent Fancourt and Reverend Kingdon found themselves on the same side in these 
battles. Despite the ethnocentrism and self-interest that their position entailed, they apparently 
shared a sincere commitment to joining forces in some way with the Indians whom Venancio 
Pec professed to command. The presence of these three men along Mexico’s border with British 
Honduras did not outlast the first years of the war; ultimately, the lines of illicit smuggling that 
had long characterized the borderlands of Belize and Yucatán would bear more importance to 
rebels than government-to-government relations. Yet this brief moment of semi-official 
collaboration deserves notice. Considered alongside the case of British-Creek alliance in Florida, 
it illustrates an understudied pattern of indigenous power in the nineteenth-century Gulf. 
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 More importantly, acknowledging the extent of British interest in Yucatán reveals the 
role that territory played in the revolutionary Mayas’ own strategizing about their place in the 
Atlantic world. No mere dupes of British merchants, who could not have followed through on 
promises of alliance or protection, Venancio Pec and his contemporaries acted on reliable 
information from British authorities, making the fraught decisions that indigenous leaders often 
made as they envisioned their peoples’ future in the face of European empires and states. As 
weapons moved across the borderland that the rebels had occupied between British Honduras 
and Mexico, Britons and Maya rebels together schemed about what the recognition of Indian 
sovereignty on this borderland might mean.  
 
The Monte: A Borderland Region 
By the time rebel forces took the outpost of Bacalar in 1848, Spaniards and their 
descendants had claimed dominion over Yucatán for three centuries. Their conquest of this 
peninsula, however, still remained incomplete. While Spaniards had conquered the northwestern 
provinces of the peninsula fairly early, establishing the settlements of Campeche, Mérida, and 
Valladolid on the ruins of vanquished Maya cities, the regions stretching along the eastern coast 
of the peninsula, across Yucatán’s present-day border with Belize, and inland toward Lake Petén, 
remained at the periphery of their control. Described by Spaniards simply as el monte—the 
countryside or the wilderness—this space has been named by one historian the “region of 
emancipation,”217 a space where Mayas succeeded in escaping or evading the structures of 
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colonialism. Once vital hubs in the Pre-Columbian trade economy, the towns, forests, and 
waterways of el monte had become a borderland space, where contested political claims could 
empower non-imperial actors, and where foreign goods and people infused traditional practices 
with new forms of survival. 
 In the sixteenth-century, el monte of the southeastern Yucatán peninsula lay in the 
borderlands between the Spanish empire, the Itza confederacy, and emerging illicit networks of 
commerce. Spaniards then struggled for one hundred fifty years to make lasting inroads into the 
south. The Itza confederacy, their biggest and most well-known challenge, lay near Lake Petén 
in present-day Guatemala and provided a source of trade and raiding—as well as an escape 
destination—for Mayas incorporated into the colonial system in the northeast. In a different way, 
the eastern provinces also remained at the periphery of the Spanish empire. These low, coastal 
lands were less desirable to Spaniards than the more arid northwest, a closer match to the climate 
of Spain and free from the diseases associated with lowland climates. More importantly, the 
lowlands were vulnerable in the seventeenth century to attacks by French, Dutch, and English 
pirates, endangering any people—Spaniard or Maya—who ventured to settle there. With the 
climate exacerbating the spread of Old World diseases, leading to significant population loss, as 
late as 1600 the eastern coast bore no powerful Maya or Spanish settlements.218 
 One of the only successful Spanish settlements on the eastern coast was Salamanca de 
Bacalar (or put simply, Bacalar) an uncomfortable presidio located on a narrow lake ten miles 
inland from the Bay of Chetumal. The town’s hot, humid climate was matched by its 
inconvenient location, which required residents seeking Atlantic trade to follow a series of 
streams now known as Chac Creek to the Río Hondo in order to paddle downriver or to go by 
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foot to the coastal site of Tamalcab.219 Founded, unlike other eastern sites, through violent 
campaigns to force submission, the town’s small population of poor, uneducated Spaniards and 
their meager way of life depended on imperial patronage and on tribute from the local Mayas.220 
The neighboring Maya had been brought into the orbit of Bacalar through reducción, a practice 
used across the Spanish Empire to relocate dispersed Indians into large settlements where they 
might be more easily indoctrinated and controlled.221 Resettled into these villages, they paid 
tribute to their respective encomenderos and received visits from priests, but they were known to 
desert whenever they found the Spaniards’ demands unbearable.  
 In distant missions like Tipu, “located far upstream, beyond miles of treacherous rapids, in 
a small fertile valley in the foothills of the Maya Mountains,” they found independent 
communities hardly visited by the Spaniards, who perceived this region as “a fragile buffer 
between Christian civilization and the vast Petén pagan heartland.”222 The connection between 
the southeastern settlements like Tipu and the Petén generated a  “culture of resistance” in which 
prophecy based on the book of Chilam Balam, a collection of historical and sacred texts written 
by Mayas after conquest, preceded and infused major rebellions. Indigenous rebellions and pirate 
attacks so often punctuated the life of the presidio of Bacalar that its residents were frequently 
forced to relocate. While military forces from Mérida eventually used Bacalar in their campaigns 
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to conquer the Itza confederacy in the 1680s and 1690s, the site lay abandoned for the most part 
until 1729. By this point, Spanish dreams of establishing an encomienda-based system of tribute 
and labor there had been entirely dashed.223 
 Spaniards nursed a fear throughout the colonial period that the independent Mayas still 
controlling the Petén and agents of rival empires might together or separately aid colonized 
Indians in rebellion. During a 1761 revolt led in the north by Jacinto Canek, for example, rumors 
circulated that the Maya revolutionaries under Canek’s leadership believed that “thousands” of 
Englishmen would soon come to their aid.224 These claims, as Nancy Farriss writes, likely 
demonstrate “more of Spanish fears than Maya hopes,” but the British did maintain an active 
presence near Bacalar.225 Beginning in the seventeenth century, British subjects established 
rough settlements in the Bay of Honduras and at Laguna de Términos near Campeche, as well as 
along the Belize River and the Río Hondo, near Bacalar. From these places—all territories under 
Spanish sovereignty—these British subjects exported logwood, used for dyes and medicines, to 
their countrymen in Jamaica and New England. Spanish officials believed that these logwood 
cutters, many of whom had previously operated as privateers, used these establishments for 
smuggling. 
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 Conflicts between Spain and Britain over these logwood establishments lay at the heart of 
the War of Jenkin’s Ear in 1739. After the Seven Years’ War, from 1756 to 1763, the Treaty of 
Paris gave British subjects formal permission to cut, load, and carry away logwood in the Bay of 
Honduras, and to build and occupy dwellings and storehouses for these purposes. In exchange, 
Britons were ordered to give up their operations at the Laguna de Términos and to destroy 
fortifications that they had built in any settlement. Whether this promise applied to the logging 
operations near Bacalar remained ambiguous, but British subjects claimed that it did: they tended 
to see these settlements, near the Río Hondo and Belize River, as part of the Bay of Honduras. 
British loggers therefore increased their operations at the town of Belize at the mouth of the 
Belize River.226 
 From a British perspective, the settlements in the Bay of Honduras—a part of Central 
America that they called the Mosquito Coast—were legitimate not only because of agreements 
between empires but also because of Britain’s relationship with the Miskito people, an 
indigenous group that also included people of African descent.227 This friendship transformed 
over time from an alliance of equals to a relationship in which Britons believed that they held the 
upper hand. During the War of Jenkin’s Ear, the “Mosquito King” and other Miskito delegates 
signed a treaty with a lieutenant selected by Edward Trelawny, the Governor of Jamaica, in 
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which they professed to cede the territory they inhabited to the British Crown. The agreement 
had declared the Miskitos British subjects “to be governed by the same Laws as the English who 
shall settle amongst them.” They had promised to fight, with British assistance, to reclaim the 
“Countries of their Fathers,” and to aid “all Indian Nations who are now in subjection to the 
Spanish Yoke.” Despite the shortcomings of this agreement from the Miskitos’ perspective, it 
afforded them powers often denied them by Spain, whose Consejo de Indias had balked at their 
1739 suggestion that they negotiate with them through treaties of peace and commerce.228 With 
British-obtained weapons, the Miskitos would continue to engage in warfare against Spain into 
the decades of the American Revolution.  
 As part of the peace agreements that followed the Revolution, Britain and Spain 
established the settlement of British Honduras in the Spanish territories surrounding Belize. The 
Anglo-Spanish Convention of 1786 declared this settlement to stretch from the Río Hondo 
southward past Belize to the Sibún River. The territory was to remain under Spanish sovereignty; 
British subjects were to use it only for trade and logging. In a move similar to the formal 
relocation of British loggers from Laguna de Términos to the Mosquito Shore two decades 
earlier, the British Crown now ordered the evacuation from the Mosquito Shore settlements of its 
subjects, including loyalist refugees from its former North American colonies.229 Many people 
from the Bay of Honduras relocated with African Americans they claimed as slaves to such 
colonies as Jamaica, Grand Cayman, and the Bahamas, but some moved northward, settling at 
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sites designated for them just north of Belize. Here they were permitted to gather the “produce of 
the earth, purely natural and uncultivated” but could not establish plantations or build any non-
logwood related industrial works.230 His Catholic Majesty promised not to “exercise any act of 
severity against the Mosquitos” in the evacuated territories, while His Britannic Majesty 
promised to “strictly prohibit all His subjects from furnishing arms, or warlike stores, to the 
Indians in general, situated upon the frontiers of the Spanish possessions.”231  
 Now hemmed in between the Spanish empire and the British Caribbean, el monte retained 
its indigenous and borderland character. Mayas gathered in multiethnic bands to hide out for 
decades at a time, perceived by Spaniards as indios bárbaros and, despite their diversity, 
communicating with each other in Yucatec Maya. Some of them remained unconquered and 
others had become apostate from the religion of their former colonizers. Many practiced non-
Catholic rituals. A “melting pot of fugitives” in the words of one scholar, el monte also became 
an interracial region, with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people of African descent fleeing 
from British Honduras toward Yucatán and Petén, where, as in Florida, they were promised 
sanctuary if they converted to Catholicism. Passing through the no-man’s land of el monte, they 
sometimes met and mixed with fugitive Mayas. In at least one instance, a group of “independent 
Indians” attacking a nearby British settlement included two women whose descriptor “Xbox,” a 
rough translation of “black woman,” suggests that these people were of African descent.232  
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 Yucatán’s independence from Spain in 1821 altered the way of life of Mayas in villages 
and towns across the Yucatán peninsula, but the area around Bacalar retained its borderland 
character until rebels occupied it during the Caste War. The liberal politicians who came to 
power in Yucatán—part of the Mexican Empire, and soon after, a state within the Mexican 
Republic—worked to reduce the influence of cofradias and the republica de indios, institutions 
through which Maya villagers had fostered autonomy and mutual support. These politicians also 
supported agricultural reform, leading to the expansion of haciendas and the alienation of those 
who had previous used these public lands. Meanwhile, conservative hacienda owners and rural 
clergy used what power they had to maintain tribute payments, using the privatization of land to 
control unruly laborers.233 Having received promises during the early years of Mexico’s 
independence struggle that tribute, personal service, and corporal punishment would be 
abolished, many Maya Yucatecans experienced the rising of expectations and the dashing of 
hopes that tend to intensify old grievances.234 The Caste War movement gained strength 
particularly in the east, where Maya Yucatecans, now Mexican citizens, had seen more 
possibilities for their advancement. Some of the heads of this movement were village leaders, 
called batabs; a few were sugar planters. 
 Many had fought as conscripted soldiers alongside mestizo forces. The decades between 
independence and the Caste War in Yucatán saw bitter conflicts between factions in the 
peninsula’s major cities, Mérida and Campeche. Many of these revolved around Yucatán’s 
relationship to Mexico. Some also related to other events in the Gulf.  In 1836, for example, 
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demands from Mexico City for the recruitment of battalions to fight revolutionaries in Texas sent 
Yucatecans northward to an uncertain fate, leaving the countryside vacant from conscription or 
flight. The elite provincial men tasked with heading these militias, and the common people, 
including Mayas, who filled their ranks carried out their own federalist revolt later that year, 
which in 1840 grew into a factional war for Yucatán’s independence from Mexico. In 1846, the 
United States’ invasion of Mexico unleashed more civil warfare in Yucatán, as elite factions 
mobilized Maya militias across the countryside to support an armed dispute over whether to 
attempt to preserve U.S. trade by again declaring their independence from Mexico.235  
 Independent not through ties to ancient kingdoms but through citizenship and market 
forces, elite Mayas and a handful of mestizo military generals used British arms to take violent 
control of the peninsula’s eastern cities in the summer of 1847, extending their sphere of 
influence nearly to the walls of Mérida and Campeche. By April 1848, they had occupied 
Bacalar. Gaining a port to the Atlantic World near to their British trade partners, they were also 
situated at the edge of el monte, a region that for centuries had remained beyond Spanish control. 
 
Partnership with Merchants 
By late summer of 1848, rumors circulated in Yucatán and Mexico City that Belizean 
merchants were supplying rebel forces with arms and ammunition in direct violation of the 
Anglo-Spanish Convention—assuming, as Mexican officials did, that this agreement had 
transferred to their nation upon its independence.236 Indeed, emissaries from British Honduras 
had been trading with rebels even before their occupation of Bacalar. Shortly after they took 
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control of this outpost, British merchants established residence in the city, forming relationships 
that defied both the letter of the Convention and the heart of its prohibitions. By December 1848, 
both Yucatecan and British officials would believe that the merchant Edward Rhys and other 
British agents were not only trading with the rebel leadership but also influencing their 
strategy.237 No mere case of smuggling, however, this partnership suggested a deeper alliance. 
 During the early months of the Caste War, British businessmen in Belize had expressed 
fear of the Indians at their border. Some had claimed, drawing from common tropes about 
Indians, that their teams of woodcutters on New River and Spanish Creek had been attacked by 
“Indians armed with bows and arrows.”238 Superintendent Fancourt had shared these concerns. 
Receiving reports from Hispanic officials at Bacalar that Indians were killing “all other classes” 
led him to request assistance from the First West India Regiment from Jamaica, which arrived in 
May 1848 to protect the British settlement.239 By that time, however, letters from the rebel 
leadership had convinced Fancourt that these men were “anxious to be on friendly terms with 
us.”240 As a British merchant at Bacalar, Austin Cox, explained, the Indians wished “to carry on 
their intercourse with the Inhabitants of British Honduras in the same footing as the Spaniards 
have always done.”241 Venancio Pec, Cecilio Chi, and others wrote to Fancourt on behalf of the 
“Peninsula de Yucatán Libertadora,” extending a formal offer of peace, union, and free entry at 
Ascension Bay, 150 miles northward as the crow flies from the port city of Belize.242  
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 Superintendent Fancourt received these acts of official correspondence with relative favor. 
Already in May, he had written to José María Tzuc, whom he addressed as the town’s Principal 
Magistrate, that people affiliated with the rebel army would receive the same protection in 
British Honduras as that extended to the “subjects of other nations.”243 The “Indian chiefs,” he 
remarked the following month to the Governor of Jamaica, Sir Charles Grey, were demonstrating 
“great moderation” at Bacalar. While he retained suspicions that this “systematic” behavior was 
a result of outside influence, he determined nonetheless “that the movement of the Indian 
generally has been purely a political movement,” not the act of savage violence that he had once 
imagined.244 No longer convinced of the rebels’ inferiority in relation to Hispanic Yucatecans, 
Fancourt determined to treat both sides equally. By July, the US consul at Belize could announce 
that Fancourt had recommended the appointment of a commercial agent at Bacalar.245  
 These changes in Fancourt’s attitude toward the rebels were influenced by reports from 
other British Hondurans who had begun traveling to Bacalar, both of their own accord and at his 
request. In late June, a rebel attack on the British side of the Río Hondo led to the death of a 
Hispanic Yucatecan, leading Fancourt to send Dr. Thomas Rhys, a retired surgeon who had 
previously served as part of the 3rd West India Regiment, to Bacalar to seek restitution.246 Rhys 
reported back a brutal scene in which officials at Bacalar had brought in suspects from the 
offending party, giving them dozens, even hundreds, of lashes with a cow skin whip until one 
confessed and was put to death. While Rhys expressed disgust at the severity of the punishments 
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he had witnessed, he emphasized to Fancourt “how rapidly these people punish those who offend 
the English or those who live under the protection of their flag.”247  
 The attack in question had happened under the watch of the commandant Juan Pablo 
Cocom, who for some time had been appealing to Fancourt for help taxing the mahogany and 
other products that Hispanic Yucatecans now residing in Belize had taken with them when they 
fled Bacalar.248 Cocom had appointed a British commissioner, one Richard Hill, to make an 
account of these goods. In his effort to collect payment, he had stated clearly to Fancourt his 
wish to maintain peace between rebel-controlled Bacalar and British Honduras, at one point 
ordering the return of mules taken from English territory.249 Fancourt would later state that he 
had trusted Cocom’s ability to promote good relations between Bacalar and Belize.250 Yet 
Cocom’s implication in this attack on British territory provided a rationale for his assassination. 
A month later, the rebel secretary José Victor Reyes wrote to Fancourt on behalf of Francisco 
Cob, Cecilio Chi, Bernardino Poot, and Venancio Pec, with a request for gunpowder and the 
report that Cocom had been put to death because of the lack of dependability that he had shown 
with regard to their “beloved” English.251 By October, Rhys’s son Edward, who had likely 
accompanied him on his journey, was intimate enough with Venancio Pec that Pec 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Rhys to Fancourt, July 4, 1848, 29R65, BARS. 
248 Juan P. Cocom to Fancourt, May 18 and June 21, 1848, 28R166 and 28R167, BARS. 
249 Cocom to Fancourt, Bacalar, June 28, 1848, 29R55, BARS. 
250 Fancourt to Principal Magistrate, Bacalar, July 12, 1848, 22b307, BARS. 
251 “… por que no tiene formalidad con los ingleses amantes. Por ese motio fue matado.” 
Francisco Cob and others to Fancourt, July 8, 1848, 28R168, BARS. Fancourt interpreted this 
phrase to mean that Cocom had “observed no faith with the English,” a claim that he said did not 
match his own observations about Cocom. Fancourt to Principal Magistrate, Bacalar, July 12, 
1848, 22b307, BARS. 
 100 
commissioned Rhys to continue the work begun by Cocom and Hill, collecting taxes from 
refugees in possession of Yucatecan logwood.252  
 Meanwhile, the Baptist missionary John Kingdon also made his way to the Río Hondo, 
where he served as another source for Fancourt on activities along this border. Kingdon had 
arrived to Belize in late 1845 after serving at a mission in Jamaica. Almost immediately upon his 
arrival, he had become embroiled in a series of disputes with the local Baptist pastor, Alexander 
Henderson, revolving around their different visions for the mission. A proponent of extending 
communion to non-members, Kingdon also believed that mission society funds should be 
allocated not to the life of the church in Belize but to the conversion of “heathens” on the borders 
of British Honduras. As Kingdon and Henderson had jockeyed for control of the local Baptist 
church, the faction represented by Henderson had also entered into disputes with the local 
government, including Fancourt. When Kingdon’s small, mixed-communion congregation 
disbanded in March 1848, he had sold this church property to Fancourt for use in building a 
lunatic asylum, a pet project that was intended to bear the name of Fancourt Dispensary.253  
 That June, Kingdon departed Belize City to establish a mission station on the English side 
of the Río Hondo, where he acted as minister, English teacher, and superintendent to a 
community of four to five hundred Caste War refugees. While the majority of these migrants 
were people of Hispanic descent, Maya Yucatecans also seem to have numbered among them. In 
a letter to the Governor Grey, Fancourt explained Kingdon’s appointment to the superintendency 
by referencing his proficiency in both Maya and Spanish. According to an opponent of Kingdon 
writing an account of these events two years later, the missionary society in London disapproved 
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of its agent’s taking on such an official role, particularly because Kingdon departed Belize 
without tying up loose ends with the church in that town.254  
 When confronted directly with charges of breaking the neutrality provisions of the 1786 
Anglo-Spanish Convention, Fancourt replied with appeals to free trade. Prohibiting the sale of 
arms, he wrote to a Yucatecan official in February 1848, would be “an interference to the trade 
of the settlement” and “a great hardship” to the people of British Honduras.255 While he later 
made attempts to influence “respectable” trading houses to end their trade with the rebels, he 
refused to intervene more directly.256 He maintained this policy in his dealings with rebel leaders. 
In response, for example, to the request by authorities at Bacalar that he pressure refugees to 
abide by contracts taxing them on the removal of logwood, Fancourt responded that he had no 
information about such stipulations. He added, “However much I might be disposed to employ 
my influence in satisfying your wishes, I have no power to enforce contracts entered into at 
Bacalar.”257  
 Historian Don E. Dumond has concluded that Britain’s responsibility for the Caste War 
was limited to an “unwillingness to place any real barrier in the way of what London and Belize 
called ‘free trade,’” which in this case included trade that went against the conditions of the 1786 
Anglo-Spanish Convention.258 Yet by appointing a commercial agent at Bacalar and by 
corresponding frequently with rebel leaders, Fancourt appeared less as a neutral proponent of 
free trade and more as the welcoming neighbor to whatever government might take hold at his 
border. As in the case of British merchants’ meddling in the political affairs of Mexico City, 
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Fancourt’s professed non-interventionist policy enabled men acting with his explicit or implied 
blessing to intervene in foreign politics in ways that promised to benefit the British settlement.259 
When military confrontations resumed between rebel and Yucatecan forces, these British agents 
continued to act as friends of the rebels. Fancourt’s own response, at first, was to maintain the 
non-interventionist stance that had so far been his trademark. 
 Early in December 1848, Fancourt had sent another underling, J. H. Faber, to meet with the 
Principal Magistrate of Bacalar in order to arrange passports for trade with Belize.260 Then, 
shortly after Christmas, news arrived that “Spaniards from all parts of the Coast are murdering 
the Indians,” that they had blockaded Chac Creek, and that a number of Britons who had 
established trading houses in the city had been detained.261 One of these letters came from Dr. 
Thomas Rhys, who believed that Yucatecan militias were also in pursuit of his son. Insisting that 
his son “has only been trading, not making war,” Rhys committed to leave immediately for the 
Río Hondo, declaring, “Should Edward Rhys become their victim I shall sacrifice every Spaniard 
I meet.”262 Through his private secretary, Fancourt  informed Rhys that it was too early to send 
British troops and that he could not “be responsible for the consequence which may result from 
your entering a foreign province which has been for many months, as you are aware, unable to 
afford protection even to its own inhabitants.”263  
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 Still, Rhys, along with ten or twenty armed men, departed Belize to aid the rebels in 
defending Bacalar against the armed militias sent by the state of Yucatán.264 Whatever had 
previously characterized the relationship between British subjects and rebel authorities, they 
were now fighting together to protect Bacalar from Yucatecan attack. British Hondurans had also 
known for some time that Governor Miguel Barbachano had recruited hundreds of US soldiers, 
many of them veterans of the recent U.S.-Mexico War, to fight as mercenaries alongside 
Yucatecan forces. Even before these soldiers arrived, Fancourt had used the fear of US 
intervention in the war as a reason to retain the 1st West Indian Regiment in British Honduras. In 
a letter to Grey, he had announced it probable “that the government of the United States on the 
invitation of certain parties in Merida have already occupied a portion of that province, thereby 
departing from their previously expressed determination to abstain from occupying Yucatan so 
long as it should remain neutral in the Mexican contest.”265 
 With the Maya rebels and their British supporters temporarily repelling the Yucatecan 
assault, John Kingdon returned to Bacalar, carrying fifty Spanish bibles for distribution there.266 
It was during this time that he joined Edward Rhys and seven other Belizean merchants in 
writing a letter to Jacinto Pat raising the possibility of the British government mediating a 
“lasting peace” based on “a just division of the country.”267 Kingdon and Rhys signed first, 
followed by one Edward Adolphus, who for at least eight years had maintained a trade in indigo 
and mahogany with companies in Boston and New York.268 Other signers—Henry Smith, John 
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and Charles Catto, George McKay, and John Cross—bore last names shared with other named 
accomplices of the rebel forces, suggesting broader, family-based networks of support. Seventh 
on the list was George Fantesie, also called Yach, a man of African descent who would soon 
gain a reputation as one who both supplied and fought alongside the rebels.  
Kingdon forwarded these letters to Fancourt in March 1849, making his claim that 
territorial separation from Yucatán had numbered among the rebels’ goals from the beginning. 
He insisted that the interest that Pat had shown with regard to a division of territory—an interest 
shared by Pec and Chi—arose of Pat’s own volition, not from fear of Yucatecan troops. “At a 
time,” Kingdon explained, “when the American volunteers, disgusted with Spanish cowardice 
are leaving the Spaniards & the Indians’ affairs are otherwise brightening, it seems to be 
attributable to that unbounded confidence which they entertain for Englishmen.”269 Whether 
because of the American presence at his border, the attacks by Yucatecan militias, or the 
opportunities that Maya sovereignty over Yucatecan territory might offer to his own settlement, 
Fancourt also began to place hope in a special friendship between Englishmen and revolutionary 
Mayas. 
 
Visions of a Maya Protectorate 
 From the beginning of the rebels’ occupation of Bacalar, residents of Belize speculated 
that these Indians might claim sovereignty over Yucatán—and that, in turn, Britain might take 
this territory under its protection. After receiving Jacinto Pat’s correspondence with Kingdon, 
Rhys, and company—perhaps earlier—Fancourt also formed dreams of the positive results that 
British friendship with the rebels might have for his settlement and the empire. 
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On May 26, 1848, the US consul at Belize, the Connecticut merchant Christopher 
Hempstead, had written with alarm to the U.S. State Department, reporting the rumor that “the 
Indians have applied to her majesty’s superintendent at Belize for protection and have desired 
him to take possession of the territory which they now occupy and take them under his protection 
as British subjects.” According to Hempstead, this rumor came from Fancourt, who had 
published a letter in the Central American Times, the official paper of British Honduras, 
announcing his desire to maintain friendly trade relations with the rebels. Even at this early date, 
Hempstead believed that Fancourt supported the idea of making Yucatán a British protectorate 
and that he had communicated this vision to the British government.270 
 Hempstead expressed doubt that Britain would pursue this course of action, but he 
emphasized that such a move would significantly increase Britain’s power in this part of the 
world. “They will then have possession,” he explained, “of the entire coast from Cape ‘Conte’ to 
‘San Juan De Nicaragua.’” In his next dispatch, two months later, Hempstead announced his 
suspicion that Fancourt, while supposedly neglecting Hispanic refugees, had “already pledged 
himself, on behalf of his Government to take them (the Indians) under their protection.” He 
added, “There has been two deputations from the Indians at Backalar to the Government house 
here, and from what I can learn the English flag will soon float over that unhappy town.” 
Fancourt had reportedly promised to arm the rebels if they would agree to British protection.271  
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 Whatever the truth of these rumors, they surely influenced the tone of the interactions 
between Belize and Bacalar during the late summer of 1848: the rebel authorities’ request—and 
Fancourt’s resulting efforts—to establish a British commercial agent at Bacalar, the journey by 
the party led by Dr. Thomas Rhys, the assassination of the tax collector Juan Pablo Cocom, the 
involvement of Richard Hill and Edward Rhys in collecting export taxes, and the private 
fulfillment of the rebels’ nearly constant requests for gunpowder. It surely also influenced John 
Kingdon’s decision to establish himself as a political and religious agent first at the Río Hondo 
and then at Bacalar. And during the Yucatecan attacks on Chac Creek, which Fancourt described 
as an important and legitimate grievance for those who desired the “Indian ascendency,” it surely 
mattered that those Britons who aided and fought beside the rebels could imagine Bacalar—with 
Fancourt’s support—bearing the British flag. 
 After receiving the correspondence that Kingdon and Rhys had made with Jacinto Pat, 
Fancourt made more explicit his efforts at establishing British sovereignty in Yucatán. He first 
linked peace, a division of territory, and the expansion of British influence in a dispatch to 
Governor Grey on May 10, 1849, days after receiving Kingdon’s letter. He wrote, “If the Indians 
could obtain the cession of the Province in which Bacalar is situated, enjoying the protection of 
Great Britain in the same manner as the Mosquito Indians, they would gladly conclude a 
peace.”272  
Fancourt did not give precise details about the character of the protectorate that he 
imagined for eastern Yucatán, but his reference to the “Mosquito Indians” is telling. By the 
1840s, the relationship between Britons and Miskitos had evolved so that British agents, contrary 
to the claims of the Colonial Office, held significant power over Miskito affairs. The Mosquito 
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king, George Augustus, was only a boy and, like his predecessors, had been crowned by British 
authorities. He lived in Bluefields under the British agent’s custody, without the power or the 
desire to manage his people’s affairs. Yet a shared opponent in the form of the independent 
Central American nations still linked the interests of British settlers and Miskitos. In the months 
before the Maya rebels’ occupation of Bacalar, British marines and the Miskito militia had 
launched a joint expedition on Nicaragua’s fort of San Juan. The expedition had been supplied 
by Governor Charles Grey, the superior to whom Fancourt now wrote.273 
Fancourt repeated this claim in another letter to Grey the following month, adding with 
the exaggerated hope that if the rebels could obtain sovereignty over the province of Tekax, they 
“would be very glad to cede the four Provinces of Merida, Vallodolid, Izamal, and Campeche.” 
The rebel leaders, Fancourt misleadingly informed his superior, “have the most perfect 
confidence in the English language,” and would therefore welcome “the advice of the British 
Government” if such an arrangement were to occur.274 These dispatches suggest an interpretation 
of the Maya rebels’ partnership with British Hondurans, and of their corresponding demands for 
territorial sovereignty, that exceeds borderland rumor. While the specifics seem to have differed 
between rebel leaders and Fancourt, visions of establishing official ties between rebel-controlled 
eastern Yucatán and Britain were not mere fabrications by the rebels’ British trade partners. On 
the contrary, this idea had support from the major British authority of the settlement.275 
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 The Anglo-Spanish Convention of 1786 had established British Honduras as a British 
settlement under Spanish sovereignty. Upon the independence of Mexico and Guatemala, 
however, it remained unclear under whose sovereignty British Honduras existed. When Fancourt 
read Kingdon’s report that Pat and the other “Indian Chiefs” had long sought “the re-conquest of 
the whole Peninsula of Yucatan as their natural patrimony which no lapse of time could 
equitably disannul their claim to,” he surely suspected that the question of sovereignty might 
soon be decided in Britain’s favor.276 Just as defending the Miskitos’ ancient claims to the 
Central American coast had served to justify Britain’s rights to the Mosquito Shore, a similar 
move might now enable Fancourt to protect his own settlement. Achieving a rationale for British 
sovereignty in British Honduras would also promote Fancourt’s own standing, as British settlers 
in Belize often used the Spanish claims to the territory to undermine the authority of his 
superintendency. These settlers insisted that power should instead be held in the Public Meeting, 
a bicameral legislature that had existed since the 1760s, and the Magistrates it elected.277 
Furthermore, the limitations that the Convention had placed upon British agriculture and 
industry were becoming more onerous to the settlement as logwood thinned. While permitting 
British subjects to gather dyewood, mahogany and other “produce of the earth, purely natural 
and uncultivated,” this agreement had prohibited them from establishing any sort of plantations 
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or industrial equipment.278 By the 1840s, however, experimentation with sugar production was 
much discussed in Belize. In February 1848, Superintendent Fancourt corresponded with the 
chairman of the Public Meeting about abolishing the duty on molasses in order to encourage the 
local distillation of rum. He told the chairman that he approved of this plan as long as “it could 
be obtained by promoting the growth of sugar cane within our limits” rather than encouraging 
the importation of slave-produced sugar.279 The purchase of sugar from Cuba and Brazil had 
surged in the British Empire after the passing of the Sugar Duties Act of 1846, which had made 
equalized duties on foreign and colonial produce. Because British Honduras maintained close 
ties with Jamaica, whose planters were being undersold by these slaveholding competitors, 
Fancourt seems to have wished to avoid buying from them.280 
 The friendship that developed, therefore, between rebel leaders and officials in British 
Honduras during the Caste War’s early years also reflected changing dynamics in global slavery. 
As Britain, the self-appointed promoter of emancipation, sought ways to compete with sugar 
production in Brazil and Cuba, the officials of these slave societies also sought ways to diversify 
their work force in order to protect their economies from the twin dangers of slave revolt and 
abolition.281 Interested in building this sugar regime, British Hondurans saw Yucatecan lands and 
people as potential partners in this process. At the same time that residents of Belize were 
engaging in discussions at their public meetings about how to encourage the local planting of 
sugar, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people fled across their border from Yucatán. While 
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Mayas and other lower-class Yucatecans also fled to British Honduras, Fancourt noted the 
presence of wealthy families, among them sugar planters.282 By mid-1848, these settlers 
established at Punta Consejos on the British side of the Río Hondo cleared land to plant corn and 
sugar cane.283 By late 1851, these refugees had established two or three sugar plantations, and 
were also cultivating tobacco.284 Their laborers, poor people of Maya and mestizo descent who 
came with them from Yucatán, were subject to brutal conditions, but they were not technically 
enslaved.285 
 Sugar was also among the items—along with grain, livestock, and tobacco—that British 
merchants like Cox were said to receive from rebels in exchange for arms.286 After his journey to 
Bacalar in late 1848, J. H. Faber wrote to Fancourt about the advantages of Yucatán in general, 
which he said possessed “everything of produce, the communications are easy the country being 
entirely coast and intersected by rivers and the wages for labourers very low.” A boosterish 
exaggeration by any measure, these comments about rivers could only have applied to Yucatán’s 
southern border. Still, Faber’s observations highlight how he—and perhaps, others—perceived 
the peninsula to be useful to British interests. He continued: “The great question if free labour 
can compete with slave labour for the fabrication of sugar can be solved there; by comparisons I 
found that an Indian receiving one shilling sterling a day in Yucatan produced more than any 
slave can do in Cuba during the same time.”287 The “great question” about sugar production that 
Faber hoped Yucatán would answer had real implications for the British West Indies. After 
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slavery had been abolished in Jamaica in 1834, the economic output of the island had declined 
sharply. What had gone wrong in Jamaica, and how to remedy the situation, occupied British 
minds on both sides of the Atlantic.288 
 Jacinto Pat’s own letter included none of the discussion of re-conquest or natural 
patrimony that appeared in Kingdon’s paraphrase of rebel goals to Fancourt. Instead, his stated 
concerns remained those that had first brought him into the war: freedom from onerous 
contributions and taxes, an end to violence, and the acceptance of financial responsibility for the 
war by the Yucatecan government.289 The idea of a formal protectorate, therefore, seems to have 
been a creation of the British. But Pat’s rivals within the rebel ranks would soon embrace it, 
seeing British friendship as the way to gain complete separation from Mexico. By the time 
Fancourt initiated the mediation that Jacinto Pat and John Kingdon had requested, Pat had been 
killed. Announcing themselves “governors” of the rebel party, Venancio Pec and Florentino 
Chan would make no secret of their preference for Britain. 
 
A Return to Borderland Exchange 
Fancourt’s letters to Grey had represented his sentiments at a time when the rebels, aided 
by the British, seemed to have the upper hand. “There does not appear to be the least prospect,” 
Fancourt had informed his superior in March, “of the Spaniards regaining Bacalar at present.” 
While Yucatecan forces had taken several towns, he had believed that they lacked the power to 
establish complete control. This had led him to conclude that Mexican authorities would 
certainly agree to the cession, “as such an arrangement would ensure the future tranquility of 
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Yucatan.”290 By May 1849, however, Bacalar was once again under Yucatecan control. After a 
battle at the mouth of Chac Creek, Yucatán’s new 7th military division, created at great cost and 
including US mercenary soldiers, had indeed taken the city. George Fantesie, the African 
descended signer of Reverend Kingdon’s letter to Fancourt about the division of territory, was 
said to have fought on behalf of the rebels in this warfare.291 This Yucatecan victory began to 
chip away at the official relationship that had been developing between rebel authorities and 
Belize, leaving in its wake the unofficial exchanges of goods and arms that are more familiar to 
historians. 
 In August 1849, Fancourt received word from the British Chargé d'Affaires to Mexico, 
Percy Doyle, that the Mexican government would not permit a division of territory. The Minister 
of Foreign Affairs had agreed to allow Fancourt to carry out negotiations for peace, but had 
specified that rebel Mayas, like Indians in other parts of the republic, might receive “certain 
territories considered as their own, but they themselves would be obliged to yield obedience to 
the General Government of Mexico.”292  Dutifully, Fancourt wrote a letter on September 17 
addressed to the late Jacinto Pat, who he believed was still alive, José María Tzuc, and other 
rebel leaders. He passed the letter through the Yucatecan commander at Bacalar, José Dolores 
Cetina, to Father José Antonio Gloria, who then attempted to convey it to Pat on behalf of the 
rebel officers Angelino Iza and Apolinario Camal. In this correspondence, Fancourt invited Pat 
and other “chiefs” to meet with him in person as he awaited more news from Mexico so that he 
could learn their “views and wishes.” He also relayed Chargé Doyle’s promise to work to end 
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Yucatecan authorities’ trafficking of Maya prisoners of war to Cuba, which Pat, through 
Fancourt, had insisted would stand in the way of any negotiations for peace.293  
 Fancourt would later learn that Pat had died days before he drafted this letter, leaving 
Venancio Pec and Florentino Chan his principal rebel contacts.294 Another victim of factional 
violence, Pat had been assassinated by a party under Pec’s command.295 The warrant that Pec 
and Chan had circulated before the murder had accused Pat of reinstating many of the practices 
that the rebels had so abhorred under Yucatecan rule, including flogging, labor drafts, and war 
taxes. The two men declared: “There will be no taxes, no beatings, no purchases of woodlands to 
cultivate, no collecting of money among the poor, nor will things the troops have gotten from the 
enemy in warfare be taken.”296  
 Pec and Chan’s distaste for the policies that Pat had professedly employed reflected, in 
part, Pat’s social class. As Don Dumond has observed, Pat was “a property owner with numerous 
commercial and personal contacts among Yucatecans of the Peto region,” and therefore atypical 
among rebel leaders. Equally importantly, Pat had “engaged in Yucatecan politics on a broader 
scale so that his support was actively sought by barbachanistas.”297 The term “barbachanistas” 
refers to followers of Yucatecan Governor Miguel Barbachano, a politician from Mérida who 
had been ousted from power by political rivals from Campeche in the years before the Caste 
War. Barbachano retook the governorship in 1848 in large part because many Yucatecans 
believed that rebel leaders preferred to negotiate with him rather than his rival, Santiago Méndez. 
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In the controversial and unsuccessful Treaty of Tzucacab, Pat agreed to govern over all of 
Yucatán’s Indians, a position in which he promised to work alongside Barbachano to ensure 
peace.298 This approach, in which he appeared to accommodate the Yucatecan government, was 
radically different from the insistence on territorial separation that Venancio Pec would embrace 
in his correspondence with the British. 
  With the military of Yucatán again in control of the town of Bacalar and with the central 
government Mexico unwilling to cede territory, Fancourt moved forward with plans to meet with 
rebel leaders. On October 10, 1849, he received a letter from Chan and Pec telling him to meet 
them at Ascension Bay on November 15.299 Fancourt then wrote to the Yucatecan governor 
Miguel Barbachano, asking that he “suspend operations in that quarter” until after the meeting. 
In addressing the governor, he responded to the ongoing complaints that British merchants were 
arming the rebels—in particular, that Austin Cox, George Fantesie, Fantesie’s business partner 
Augustus Lanabit, and others were still trading powder and munitions at Ascension Bay and at 
the town of Chichanhá on the Río Hondo.300 While rebel forces had been in power at Bacalar, 
British logging companies had also begun operating on the Yucatecan bank of the Río Hondo, 
leading to violent expulsions and the imprisonment of twelve “inoffensive British subjects”—a 
team of primarily black woodcutters—when Yucatecan forces had retaken the city.301 In late 
September 1849, Fancourt had issued a decree prohibiting the people of British Honduras from 
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trading arms and powder to the rebels.302 Barbachano did not respond to Fancourt’s letter until 
late December, long after the meeting at Ascension Bay had taken place. Thanking Fancourt for 
his mediation with the rebels, he reminded him again that the war would have ended long before 
without rebels’ access to British arms.303  
As he sailed to Ascension Bay on November 15, 1849, Fancourt wrote again to Chargé 
Doyle, offering a different perspective on the war than that which he had shown to Grey months 
earlier. He complained that British merchants were still aiding the rebels, referring in particular 
to Austin Cox, the trader between Belize and New Orleans who had relayed the message of 
friendship to him from rebel authorities during the summer of 1848. Cox’s ship Four Sisters had 
recently been discovered carrying gunpowder to Jacinto Pat. Mexican authorities had imprisoned 
his crew. “There are persons here,” Fancourt lamented, “who are interested in the Indian 
ascendency and who are not slow in taking advantage of any real or supposed aggression upon 
the rights of British subjects.” He predicted that his main difficulty in convincing the rebel 
leaders to agree to a peace that was acceptable to Mexico would be “the influence which these 
persons possess over the Chiefs of the Indian party.”304  By framing the friendship between 
British Honduras and the Maya rebels as only existing among merchants like Cox, Fancourt 
obscured the interest that he himself had taken in the “Indian ascendency.” 
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 In his schooner in the waters off Ascension Bay, Fancourt finally met with Venancio Pec 
and other rebel delegates. According to the report that he later sent to Barbachano, he asked them 
“whether they would be satisfied if the same rights were secured to them which were enjoyed by 
the Spanish population,” but assured them that “the Supreme Government would not concede to 
them any right of sovereignty or relieve them from their allegiance.” The delegates apparently 
responded that they had no faith in the Mexican government—and in particular, in the 
government of Yucatán—on account of previous broken promises. Instead, they would accept 
nothing less than “to have a portion of the country relinquished to them, a line drawn northward 
from Bacalar to the Gulf of Mexico and to be relieved from all contributions to the Government 
of the State.” The delegates added, according to Fancourt, that “Spaniards” could live in their 
territory but would not be permitted to govern.305 These demands resemble those in the letter that 
Chen and Pec had sent to Fancourt via Faber earlier that year, where they had stated that “liberty, 
peace, and tranquility” depended on their complete independence from the government at 
Mérida.306 
 Yet some parts of Fancourt’s report on these discussions suggested to suspicious Mexican 
officials that he had influenced the proceedings. While the rebels had agreed to accept a reduced 
amount of territory, Fancourt stated, anything short of self-government would cause them to 
“one and all migrate to the British Settlement of Honduras.” More strikingly, Fancourt wrote that 
when asked how they would govern the ceded territory, Pec and others said that they “knew they 
could not govern it themselves but they wished the ‘Governor of Belize’ to be their 
Governor.”307 While in their earlier letter Pec and Chan had emphasized their desire to “act 
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according to the suggestions of the British Government,” no record remains of their desire to be 
governed by him.308 
  In the months that followed Superintendent Fancourt’s meeting with rebel delegates, 
reports circulated in Mexico City that the he was colluding with these Indians in seeking their 
independence. Chargé Doyle would write to Fancourt even more emphatically that such a 
division of territory could not occur.309 Governor Barbachano would also protest this plan, 
writing that he had no authority to cede land or to dismember Mexican territory.310 In response to 
questions from Fancourt, who still hoped that mediation was possible, Doyle explained that in 
Mexico, Indians were divided into the categories of indios bárbaros and indios pacíficos: “the 
former are always at war with the Mexican race and yield them no sort of obedience; the latter 
are placed with respect to contributions and municipal laws on the same footing as all Mexican 
citizens.” He continued that Mexico might be willing either to reduce indigenous Yucatecans’ 
tax contributions to a level equal—or if necessary, even less than—those of white citizens, or to 
send them priests paid by the government in order to lower their ecclesiastical contributions. But 
the most that the government would offer in terms of territory was that it be “made over in 
perpetuity to the Indians,” which they would only concede if completely necessary.311 While 
Doyle did not specify the meaning of this distinction, it seems to have centered on Mexico’s 
willingness to cede property but no degree of sovereignty. 
 Fancourt again wrote to Pec in January 1850, expressing his confidence that the state 
government would agree to the rebels’ terms as long as they did not involve “dismembering the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 Florentino Chan and Venancio Pec to Faber, Oct. 10, 1849, 33-121, BARS. 
309 Doyle to Fancourt, Nov. 15, 1849, 33-185, BARS. 
310 Barbachano to Fancourt, Feb 1, 1850, 33R512, BARS. 
311 Doyle to Fancourt, Jan. 16, 1850, 33-206, BARS. 
 118 
state.”312 But rumors remained—confirmed by surviving, though likely fabricated, documents—
that plans for independent government, territorial rights, and an explicit connection with Britain 
was what this faction of rebel leaders wanted. Letters confiscated by Yucatecan forces around 
this time include three referring to censuses being taken in rebel towns, supposedly at Fancourt’s 
request. Another letter mentioned correspondence from the English Queen about dividing the 
territory of Yucatán.313 While this correspondence with the Queen likely did not occur, the 
rebels’ letter regarding it may well have been authentic, along with the sentiments that it 
represented. 
 Meanwhile, George Fantesie and his French associate Silvestre Adolphus Lanabit 
remained stationed on the Río Hondo, smuggling arms to the rebels and reportedly even fighting 
alongside them.314 At various points along the river, including Chichanhá, Agua Blanca, and 
Douglas, Yucatecans searched ships and storehouses, much to British subjects’ chagrin.315 By 
this time, the Reverend John Kingdon had purchased property for a house and mission station on 
the Belize River, “in a very thinly-peopled neighborhood,” where he studied and translated Maya 
and taught a small school.316 
 Suspicions by the Yucatecan government, along with struggles within rebel ranks 
stemming from the Pec faction’s coup-like takeover, unraveled official proceedings. In February, 
Fancourt received a letter from Governor Barbachano expressing his doubts that a truce was 
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possible.317 In April, he received news that Venancio Pec had lost favor among the rebels 
because of his trust in Fancourt, who had promised a truce that Yucatecan forces had not abided, 
leaving the rebels vulnerable to attack.318 Fancourt also perceived himself to have lost favor with 
Pec because of negative reports about himself published in Belize newspapers.319 Perhaps this 
breakdown in trust was true: in a June 1850 letter, Pec strayed from his usual statements of 
friendship and deference, instructing Fancourt to address him in Spanish and adding that Miguel 
Barbachano always did the same.320 
 The year 1850, in short, saw the closing of the opportunities that had temporarily opened 
for one faction of Maya rebel leaders, their British trade partners, and a British superintendent 
and missionary eager to form official ties between the British Empire and these rebels, whom 
they often described as Indian chiefs. Any hope that Fancourt might have regained for creating a 
British protectorate in Yucatán, or any renewal of trust between himself and the men vying for 
control of the eastern Yucatan Peninsula—Miguel Barbachano, Venancio Pec, and Florentino 
Chan—would never come to be. In the summer of 1850, Fancourt was relieved of his position, 
vacating the post some months later.321 Kingdon was likewise recalled in April, as the Baptist 
Missionary Society was reducing its efforts in Central America. Kingdon apparently sold his 
house and mission station to Fancourt to use as a country residence, but Fancourt could not have 
used it for long.322  
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 The US consul Christopher Hempstead’s position would also end in 1850, when Gen. 
Zachary Taylor entered the office of US President and withdrew the US consulate from Belize. 
In a Special Message to the Senate, Taylor invoked Hempstead’s May 26 letter about the 
“Indians” applying for British protection as part of a rationale for opening negotiations for 
building a canal through Central America.323 Residents of Belize—owners of the settlement’s 
commercial houses and mahogany works, “the chief Spanish residents,” some “resident 
foreigners,” members of the Public Meeting, and clergy “of all denominations of Christians”—
would continue to pressure the British government to settle “all pending questions respecting the 
sovereignty and territorial rights of Great Britain in Honduras.”324 By the time that happened, 
however, the mainland British Caribbean settlement was losing importance, as timber supplies 




 Florentino Chan disappeared from the historical record in 1851, while Venancio Pec saw 
his own end at the hands of Hispanic Yucatecan forces in the summer of 1852. Pec had led an 
unsuccessful attack on Bacalar with eight hundred troops, of whom over one hundred were 
killed. While smuggling between Yucatán and Belize would continue, the political conditions of 
the monte had changed. The economic exchanges of the borderland would no longer be matched 
by territorial disputes so great as to convince a British superintendent and a self-styled Maya 
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governor to embark on a shared political project.  Fancourt’s successor, Phillip Edmund 
Wodehouse, oversaw another mediation along Yucatán’s southern border in September 1853 
with a group of defectors who would become known to the Yucatecans as the pacíficos del Sur. 
After some negotiation, these delegates gave up the demand for a division of territory, choosing 
instead to retain de facto autonomy by the sheer fact of their geographic distance from Mérida.326  
 Strikingly, however, the waning of British interest in establishing formal ties with rebel-
controlled Yucatán coincided with the formation of a new rebel capital just inland from 
Ascension Bay. Led not by Pec and Chan but by José María Barrera, a former underling of 
Jacinto Pat, Chan Santa Cruz—“Little Holy Cross”—would continue to claim complete 
separation from Yucatán and Mexico into the twentieth century. Its people were inspired by 
prophetic crosses, Christian icons that “spoke” to their followers in Pre-Columbian tradition to 
urge them to throw off the shackles of their colonizers. Sustained by these miracles, Santa Cruz 
rebels would again take Bacalar in 1858, retaining it for decades as a military garrison under 
their command.327  
 Like dissident Creeks’ alliances with British adventurers in Florida, this early episode in 
the long and tumultuous Caste War suggests the options for borderland alliance that continued to 
exist for some indigenous leaders long after new nations replaced European empires in North 
America. Not merely a product of borderland smuggling or rumor, the foundational years of 
rebel activity in eastern Yucatán occurred with real and well-founded hope that this territory 
might become an independent Maya state with an official relationship to Britain. That this 
relationship did not materialize in any official capacity—and that hindsight tells us that such a 
partnership might, through indirect rule, have become as fraught as Britain’s relationship to the 
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Mosquito Kingdom—need not detract from the real possibilities that both rebel Mayas and 
Britons imagined in 1848. Set on establishing Maya control over eastern government and 
territory, these early leaders embraced a cosmopolitan array of strategies for achieving this 
independence. 
 While the networks of the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Gulf of Mexico 
presented the indigenous peoples of Florida and Yucatán with opportunities to create new forms 
of independent political and economic power, they also fueled efforts by the United States and 
Mexico to suppress the creation of these rogue states. At moments in the Second Seminole War 
and Caste War, private citizens and local officials used Gulf networks to bring the resources of 
Cuban slavery to bear on these borderland wars. 
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Chapter 3: Cuban Slavery and Borderland Warfare in Florida and Yucatán 
 
 
In January of 1840, US newspapers announced with horror and excitement that thirty-
three Cuban hunting dogs had arrived in St. Marks, Florida to aid US troops in the Second 
Seminole War.328 Proponents believed that these dogs, trained to catch people of African descent 
fleeing slavery on Cuban plantations, would help the US Army and the Florida militia force the 
Seminoles’ surrender, hastening the end of a costly war aimed at removing the Seminoles to 
Indian Territory. Already a powerful trope in English-language accounts of the Spanish 
conquest, the image of dogs attacking humans in Florida would take a central place in US 
political discourse in the coming decades. Believed to represent a new breed called “Blood 
Hounds,” these additions to US military forces were praised and detested for their supposed 
brutality.329 Nine years later, a different set of rumors about Cuba circulated in Mexico City. 
Newspapers reported that the governor of Yucatán had sold over one hundred citizens of Maya 
descent to Spanish merchants to work as slaves in Cuban sugar fields. The trafficking of Mayas 
to Cuba would continue in various forms for decades, offering ways to fight and fund the Caste 
War of Yucatán.330  
 The importation of bloodhounds to Florida [Figure 5] and the Venta de Indios, or sale of 
Indians [Figure 6], endure as “infamous and shameful” chapters of their respective local  
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Figure 6: Fernando Castro Pacheco, "Venta de Indios” (1973) 
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histories.331 Yet they have rarely been used to analyze broader histories of conquest in North 
America, appearing merely as scenes of passing intrigue on US and Mexican peripheries.332 
Situating these events in their Gulf of Mexico context highlights unexpected similarities between 
the Second Seminole War and the Caste War, two of the longest and costliest conflicts fought 
between North American nation-states and indigenous peoples. The United States’ land-based 
policy of Indian Removal, which prompted the Second Seminole War, differed sharply from the 
extractive systems of oppression that indigenous people and their allies protested in Yucatán. 
Such differences have tended to prevent historiographical and theoretical conversations between 
scholars of the indigenous peoples of the United States and Latin America.333 Seen from the 
Gulf, however, these divisions fade. Both the United States and Mexico relied on Gulf trade to 
fight their borderland wars. 
In particular, the residents of Florida and Yucatán found resources for borderland warfare 
in the Spanish colony of Cuba, the largest island in the Caribbean and their neighbor across the 
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Gulf. This chapter shows how Cuba’s expanding sugar empire offered the U.S. and Mexican 
governments a source of military tactics and a market for prisoners of war. US planters migrated 
to both Florida and Cuba at a time when businessmen across the Atlantic world were investing a 
portion of their financial, technological, and human capital in this island’s sugar regime.334 
Hoping to protect themselves from the forces that had destroyed France and Britain’s sugar 
colonies, planters in Cuba developed innovative ways to counter the threat of rebellion and the 
spread of abolition, including raising bloodhounds, recruiting white settlers, and maintaining an 
illicit trade in African captives. This chapter first examines the United States’ purchase and 
unsuccessful use of bloodhounds, whose propensity toward violence that English speakers both 
abhorred and admired because of its associations with the power of the Spanish Conquest and 
with Cuban slavery. The chapter then turns to Yucatán, where the Cuban push for white contract 
laborers created official and illicit markets for prisoners of war and other Yucatecans of Maya 
descent. 
Statesmen in Washington, DC and Mexico City responded to these events with same mix 
of humanitarianism and permissiveness that they exhibited toward the international trade in 
African captives.335 Issuing public condemnations and, occasionally, private orders, they 
distanced themselves from these events in part by reinforcing the peripheral nature of Florida 
Territory and the rebellious state of Yucatán. National governments were also able to distance 
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themselves from the ugly business of conquest through the private and illicit transactions of US, 
Mexican, and Cuban merchants, who ultimately bore significant responsibility for these 
strategies. Rather than absolving national governments, Gulf merchants’ involvement in these 
wars illustrates the transnational nature of North American conquest and borderland warfare. The 
Florida bloodhounds and the Venta de Indios were not rogue conspiracies on wild peripheries but 
complex transactions accomplished with the complicity of national officials.  
 
Caribbean Insurrection on the Straits of Florida: 
 Between 1815 and the start of the Second Seminole War in 1835, efforts by planters and 
officials to expand coffee, sugar, and cotton production in Cuba and the US South enticed US 
investors, traders, and contraband slavers to the narrow channel between Key West and Matanzas 
called the Straits of Florida. In an attempt to create a buffer against revolts by increasing the 
colony’s white population, Cuban administrators in the last years of Spanish claims to Florida 
created a white settlement board, the Junta de Población Blanca, whose land grants to new 
immigrants attracted planters from across the Atlantic world. 336 Meanwhile, borderland warfare 
between the United States and Native Americans in Spanish East Florida provided justification 
(or pretext) for US settlers and their government to invade this colony. After decades of range 
wars, semi-official invasions, and the official extension of US military power into East Florida, 
Spain ceded this territory to the United States in 1821. US commissioners then coerced 
Seminole, Mikasuki, and Lower Creek leaders into exchanging their northern plantations and 
ranches for a reservation in the impoverished south.337 
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 In the 1820s and 1830s, the population of Florida changed dramatically. Planters from 
Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia moved their homes and businesses southward, sending their 
slaves to build cotton plantations on formerly Seminole and Mikasuki territories in North Central 
Florida and sugar plantations along the Atlantic seaboard.338 In the Florida Keys, US wrecking 
companies—moving into what had once been the business of Calusa and Spanish fishermen—
profited from shipwrecks in the swift and dangerous Straits.339 The men who settled and 
speculated in Florida during these years were of the same class as those joining Cuba’s 
established sugar industry. Southern planters-turned-investors and northern merchants-turned-
planters, these businessmen and their enslaved workers connected this new US territory to its 
island neighbor and the economic currents of the Gulf of Mexico.340 
One of these men was Richard Fitzpatrick, a planter from South Carolina who moved to 
Key West during Florida’s second year of US rule. Fitzpatrick profited as an auctioneer and 
business owner in Key West’s wrecking industry, using the wealth he gained to purchase land 
just inland from Key Biscayne.341 By 1835, he owned almost all of the privately held land in 
southeastern Florida. The dozens of people he held as slaves planted sugar and tropical crops on 
this property. Fitzpatrick acted as a booster for southern Florida, which, despite its low, wet 
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climate, he compared favorably to Cuba, lauding its nearness to Caribbean ports.342 Another of 
these men was John R. Evertson, originally of New York, who had married a Savannah woman 
whose family had commercial ties to Havana.343 Evertson became notary public of St. Augustine 
in 1840 and, in 1845, was nominated to the position of auctioneer at Key West.344 In 1842, he 
accepted a land grant at Key Biscayne, near the tracts owned by Fitzpatrick.345 Evertson also 
numbered among a group of men who petitioned the Cuban colonial government to welcome one 
hundred Florida families to settle on the island during the Second Seminole War.346 
Fitzpatrick, Evertson, and other Floridians nursed a fear of black violence common to 
planters across the Atlantic world in the decades following the Haitian Revolution. The belief 
that foreign free people of color might bring Caribbean insurrection to Florida was so great that 
in 1832 Florida Territory passed the Free Negro Act, which prohibited the entrance of any free 
person categorized as Negro or Mulatto, and extended penalties to the captains and owners of 
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ships bringing these people to Florida’s ports.347 As Justice of Peace at Key West, Fitzpatrick 
worked to enforce this act, maintaining a strict, even harsh, interpretation of this law.348 The 
Seminoles caused particular fear for white planters because, having gained a reputation as skilled 
warriors in their previous encounters with the United States, they also had roughly five hundred 
African descended people in their ranks.349 The idea that Seminoles might find allies in people 
fleeing slavery, in foreign governments, and in African-descended people from the Caribbean 
had served as a rationale for confining them to their southern (and inland) reservation in the 
1820s. It also became an argument for their removal to Indian Territory—a policy that, as 
elsewhere, was proceeded by controversial treaties and war.350 
 Three days after Christmas in 1835, Seminole war parties launched a pair of large-scale 
attacks on Florida Territory, violently protesting their proposed removal and formally beginning 
the Second Seminole War. Over the following month, Seminole warriors burned and pillaged 
plantations across Florida Territory, especially the expensive sugar works along the eastern 
seaboard. During these raids, they captured or liberated hundreds of slaves, who were said to 
have joined them in their fight.351 Volunteer troops from other southern states rallied to protect 
the lives and property of their countrymen in Florida. Meanwhile, newspapers and pamphlets 
framed these events both as an Indian war and as a slave rebellion. One publisher used pictures 
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348 Black, “Richard Fitzpatrick, Part I,” 69-72. 
349 Joe Knetsch, Florida’s Seminole Wars, 1817-1858 (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 
2003), 61, 66-67. 
350 Many Seminole leaders were particularly against removal because it threatened their African 
American members, placing them near the territory of slaveholding Creeks. Mahon, History of 
the Second Seminole War, 69-86, 102-106. 
351 Knetsch, Florida’s Seminole Wars, 70-84. 
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to speak alongside words, illustrating his “Massacre of the Whites by the Indians and Blacks in 
Florida” with woodcuts from Nat Turner’s Rebellion [Figures 7 and 8].352 The effect of this 
collage of images was a scene in which men marked visually as slaves killed planters with 
tomahawks and machetes, framed by depictions of the destroyed homes, “savage” rituals, and 
white captives that typically illustrated Indian war. 
 
A Failed Experiment 
 In this context of mixed tropes about blacks and Indians, Floridians and military officials 
began considering the importation of bloodhounds, a Cuban breed of dog made famous on the 
plantations and battlefields of the Caribbean. The use of dogs in North American warfare—by 
Spanish and British soldiers—was as old as Europeans’ presence on the continent.353 In the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, however, this practice had taken a particular form. 
Trained to hunt fugitives in Cuba’s sugar country, bloodhounds were now used in warfare aimed 
at protecting plantation regimes from armed communities of African descent. They had 
reportedly been used by Spanish troops against Miskitos on the coast of Central America, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 “Horrid Massacre in Virginia” in Samuel Warner, Authentic and impartial narrative of the 
tragical scene which was witnessed in Southampton County (New York: Printed for Warner & 
West, 1831); “Massacre of the Whites by the Indians and Blacks in Florida” in Daniel F. 
Blanchard, An Authentic Narrative of the Seminole War (Providence, RI: Printed for D.F. 
Blanchard and others, 1836). 
353 Examples appear in Fernández de Oviedo and Gonzalo Valdés, Historia general y natural de 
las Indias, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Impresa de la Real Academica de la Historia, 1851), 547; Susan 
Juster, Sacred Violence in Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 
51; Henry Bouquet to Jeffrey Amherst, July 13, 1763 in Henry Bouquet, The Papers of Col. 
Henry Bouquet, ed. Donald H. Kent and Sylvester Kirby Stevens (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania 
Historical Commission, 1940), Series 21634: 215. Thanks to Alejandra Dubcovsky and Kate 
Silbert for alerting me to these cases.  
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Maroon War in Jamaica, and against insurgents in Saint-Domingue.354 Mercilessly aggressive 
because of the brutal training they had received as puppies, bloodhounds  
 
Figure 7: “Horrid Massacre in Virginia” (1831) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Robert C. Dallas, The history of the Maroons . . . including the expedition to Cuba, for the 
purpose of procuring Spanish chasseurs. . . (London: A. Strahan, for T. N. Longman and O. 
Rees, 1803) 2:30-67. For arguments for and against the dogs, see debates over the Maroon War 
in the British House of Commons. “From Gales’s Independent Gazetteer,” Stewart’s Kentucky 
Herald, Nov. 8, 1796, p. 1. 
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Figure 8: “Massacre of the Whites by the Indians and Blacks in Florida” (1836) 
 
were said to be perfectly obedient to their masters. Their keen sense of smell, supporters 
observed, made them expert trackers even when they were not allowed to attack. In reality, the 
dogs often proved useless trackers, but they were effective in terms of terrorizing and 
dehumanizing an enemy.355  
 The first recorded mention of bloodhounds in US military records from the Second 
Seminole War appears as a threat from the US Army’s commanding general in Florida in May of 
1837. This threat seems to have associated bloodhounds specifically with hunting African-
descended fugitives. Thomas Jesup wrote a letter instructing his underling Lieutenant Colonel 
Harney to convey the following message to the Seminole leader Osceola: “tell him I shall send 
out and take all the negroes who belong to the white people; and he must not allow the Indian 
negroes to mix with them. Telling him I am sending to Cuba for bloodhounds to trail them; and I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 In the cases of Jamaica and Saint-Domingue, the dogs arrived too late and were of little use in 
the war. Dallas, The history of the Maroons, 2: 4-5, 109. Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror, 159, 184. 
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intend to hang every one of them who does not come in.”356 Jesup did not make good on this 
threat, but his language suggests the ways that slavery and conquest intersected in this war. 
While Jesup expressed disgust for any policy that would make US soldiers into slave-catchers, 
he pursued a victory that would be acceptable to Florida planters, who insisted that Seminole 
leaders be required to surrender the slaves formerly enslaved persons among them before 
departing for Indian Territory.  
 The following summer, a new commanding general, the future president Zachary Taylor, 
initiated concrete steps to bring bloodhounds to Florida. In July of 1838, Taylor forwarded a 
letter to the Secretary of War, Joel R. Poinsett, from the merchant John Evertson, who offered to 
obtain Cuban bloodhounds on the Army's behalf. Taylor told Poinsett that he was anxious to 
accept Evertson’s offer, which he hoped would put an end to the war. Rather than acknowledging 
the bloodhounds’ connection to slavery, Taylor explained that they might be useful in “ferretting 
out” the Seminoles from swamps and the dense stands of trees known as hammocks.357 Jesup 
would later second these ideas, writing that the Army’s most significant challenge in Florida was 
“not to beat and compel the enemy to make peace, but to catch them.”358  Although the wetlands 
of Florida differed greatly from the mountains of Jamaica, Jesup’s letter and another published in 
the Army and Navy Chronicle that September would claim that bloodhounds’ skill at driving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Thomas Jesup to Lt. Col. Harney, May 25, 1837, quoted in Joshua R. Giddings, Speeches in 
Congress (Boston: J. P. Hewitt and Co., 1853), 19. Also cited in Mahon, History of the Second 
Seminole War, 199-204. 
357 Zachary Taylor to John R. Evertson, Esq, July 28, 1838, enclosed in Taylor to Roger Jones, 
July 31, 1838, LR, RG 107, NARA. 
358  The Quartermaster General to Thomas H. Benton, January 19, 1839, in Clarence Edwin 
Carter, ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States 25 (Washington, 1960): 565. 
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“barbarians from their fastnesses” had been proven in their use by the British during the Maroon 
War.359 
Poinsett authorized Taylor to pursue the bloodhound plan but made efforts to distance his 
own department from this business. He stated that he had “always been of the opinion that dogs 
ought to be employed in this warfare to protect the Army from surprises and ambuscades and to 
track the Indian to his lurking place.” But he also clarified that these dangerous creatures should 
be used only for “tracking and discovering the Indians and not to worry or destroy them.” 
Poinsett recommended that Taylor move forward on the plan without the explicit involvement of 
the Office of the Secretary of War. He wrote to Taylor through the Adjutant General, who 
authorized the Commanding General to “procure a sufficient number of dogs” based on his own 
judgment.360 Following Poinsett’s example, Taylor delegated the business to Florida’s territorial 
governor. He stated that the Army would reimburse the territory if the dogs proved useful.361  
The governor, in turn, assigned the purchase to his former aide-de-camp, Richard 
Fitzpatrick, who seemed a good choice for the mission because of his Gulf connections and the 
class of men he represented: men whose capital had developed Florida Territory, and who now 
found their lives threatened and their property destroyed. One of the first attacks of the war had 
occurred at a property belonging to Fitzpatrick, forcing his overseer and slaves to abandon his 
plantation. In later months, Florida’s governor would allude to this event, stating that Fitzpatrick 
was the party with whom the purchase of the dogs “originated, and whose ample justification is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Army and Navy Chronicle 9, no. 10 (September 5, 1839), 146. 
360 Assistant Adjutant General (AAG) to Taylor, Aug. 31, 1838, Vol. 14, Letters Sent (LS), RG 
94, NARA. 
361 Taylor to Richard Keith Call, Dec. 22, 1839 in Taylor to AG, Jan. 15, T-16, 1840, LR, RG 94, 
NARA. 
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the stern necessity which required it.”362 The losses that Fitzpatrick had suffered, in other words, 
served to justify, even necessitate, the governor’s decision to purchase the dogs. Fitzpatrick, 
however, seems to have sought future profit as well as retaliation in this measure. Shortly after 
returning with the dogs from Cuba, he would scheme to use the war to increase the scope of his 
land speculations. In a letter to Congress, he would request the entire 3,200,000 acres offered to 
homesteaders in the Armed Occupation Bill, which promised free land to new Florida settlers 
who armed themselves in self-defense. In exchange for these landholdings, Fitzpatrick offered to 
lead private militia to exterminate the Seminoles or to convince them to surrender.363  
 Fitzpatrick’s business ties and acumen directed his journey across the Florida Straits. He 
left St. Marks in November of 1839 on the Sloop Marshal of Key West and docked at Matanzas, 
a port where other US businessmen might assist him on his journey. From this port, Fitzpatrick 
proceeded inland, where he met an acquaintance—likely another planter—to guide him to the 
town of Madruga.364 Here, at the crossroads of Cuba’s sugar provinces, local authorities helped 
the men obtain bloodhounds. He departed with thirty-three dogs and five dog-keepers, stopping 
at Key West on his return journey home to build houses for the dogs. Docking once more at 
Cedar Key for flour, bacon, and bread, the Sloop Marshall arrived at St. Marks on January 7, 
1840, with Fitzpatrick, the hounds, and their keepers.365 Of the five thousand dollars that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362 Governor’s Message, Feb. 28, 1840 in Reid to Poinsett, March, F-59, 1840, LR, RG 107; also 
in Territorial Papers 26: 109-114. 
363 Black, “Richard Fitzpatrick, Part II,” 38-40, 48-61. 
364 Fitzpatrick to Governor Robert Raymond Reid, Jan. 14, 1840 in Reid to Florida House of 
Representatives, Jan. 17, 1840, Unit 2, E.2, Florida, Executive Records, Early State Records, 
Library of Congress, hereafter Reid Letter Book. 
365 “Return of American vessels arrived at Matanzas, Cuba from the first day of July to the thirty-
first day of December, 1839, inclusive,” Reel 2, Despatches from US Consuls in Matanzas, RG 
59, NARA. 
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Florida’s governor had allocated for the mission, one thousand went as a salary to Fitzpatrick 
himself.366 
 The bloodhounds’ arrival generated much excitement. By mid-month, the dogs had been 
sent out to various Army units: ten bloodhounds and two keepers to the 1st Infantry at Black 
Creek and six more to the 2nd Dragoons.367 One month later, bloodhounds scouted the Florida 
panhandle with Col. William Davenport’s unit between the Apalachicola and Ochlockonee 
rivers.368 In mid-March, nine joined Col. Twiggs’s company near today’s Ocala National 
Forest.369 Language barriers between the dog-keepers and Army troops were mitigated by the 
diversity of the Florida volunteers. Men remaining from the territory’s Spanish period worked as 
interpreters in Army scouting parties.370  Bloodhounds also traveled with territorial units, some 
of which were led by local planters. One of the companies to use the dogs successfully was 
commanded by the “well known Indian hunter” Maj. William J. Bailey, one of Tallahassee’s first 
residents and the owner of twenty-six slaves.371  
 Meanwhile, the Secretary of War faced a different sort of excitement about the dogs. As 
news of their arrival circulated across the nation, Senators and Representatives from at least six 
US states received memorials protesting the federal government’s involvement in this “barbarous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 Fitzpatrick to Governor Robert Raymond Reid, Jan. 14, 1840, Reid Letter Book. 
367 Reid to Taylor, January 16, and various letters from Reid to Fauntleroy, Collins, and Taylor, 
Feb. 2-14, 1840, Reid Letter Book. 
368 Taylor to Jones, Jan. 30, 1840, T-66, and AAG to Davenport, Feb. 1, 1840, in Taylor to AG, 
Feb. 28, 1840, T-76, LR, RG 94, NARA. 
369 Lt. Col. Thomas F. Hunt to AQ, March 14, 1840, Vol. 21, RLR, RG 92, NARA. 
370 Specifically, men from the companies of Lt. Col. Sanchez, Capt. Hindley, and Capt. Dell. 
AAG to Sanchez in Taylor to AG, Feb. 7, 1840, T-61, AAG to Twiggs, Feb. 19, 1840, in Taylor 
to AG, March 4, 1840, T-105, LR, RG 94, NARA. 
371 Reid to Fauntleroy, Feb. 2, and Reid to Bailey, Feb. 13, 1840, Reid Letter Book; Army and 
Navy Chronicle 10, no. 8, 117; Census of Leon County, Florida, 1825, .L 69, Division of Library 
and Information Services, Florida Department of State, available at 
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and inhuman” measure.372 These form-letters— over one hundred total—came mainly from 
Quakers and other abolitionists, who stressed nonetheless the universality of their opposition.373 
A memorial from Rahway, New Jersey professed to have been “signed by the friends and 
opponents of the present administration.” One signer added that he was a military captain and “in 
his 81st year.” While most signers were men, two memorials from Indiana came exclusively 
from women. Another included the signatures of ninety students and faculty—half male, half 
female—at the Quaker boarding school in Mount Pleasant, Ohio.374  
 Under pressure from these citizens’ congressmen, Poinsett treaded lightly on this issue 
when he addressed readers of the Army and Navy Chronicle in late February. He declined to 
challenge Taylor’s decision but emphasized his own lack of involvement in the purchase and his 
humanitarian concerns about how the dogs were handled. In a series of published letters, Poinsett 
reiterated his order that the dogs be muzzled and leashed when used by the Army. He added that 
the Territory of Florida, not the War Department, bore primary responsibility for importing the 
bloodhounds. Poinsett concluded that the memorialists, while “animated by humane motives,” 
were “deceived when they suppose that [the bloodhounds’] employment will degrade the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 These letters are stored in two places in the National Archives in Washington, DC: 
“Committee on Military Affairs: Employment of Blood Hounds in the Florida War against the 
Seminole Indians, March 16, 1840,” g10.1-g10.4, HR:26A, Records of the United States House 
of Representatives (RG 233); and Box 93, g11, Sen.26A, Records of the United States Senate 
(RG 46), NARA. Hereafter these will appear as House Petitions and Senate Petitions.  
373 John Campbell lists the number of petitions as 162, probably because he has counted the total 
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own count numbered closer to one hundred. Campbell, “The Seminoles,” 275. 
374 “The Remonstrance of Sarah Beckett & 30 other Ladies of Indiana against the use of Blood 
Hounds in the Florida War” and “Remonstrance of Lucinda Butler…,” Feb. 11 and May 18, 
1840 , G.11.2, House Petitions. The Friends Boarding School in Mount Pleasant, Ohio, opened 
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www.olneyfriends.org.  
 139 
character of the country.”375 This posture differed sharply from the open disdain that the 
governor of Florida directed toward his critics:  
Shall we look upon our ruined dwellings—upon the murdered and mangled bodies of men, 
women, and children, and then meekly say, ‘the poor Indians have done this—we must be 
merciful and humane to them—we will not set our dogs upon them’—oh no! That would 
be more horrible than these butcheries.376 
  
 Memories of the bloodhound episode would continue to animate abolitionist discourse 
through the decades that followed, but the episode itself ended almost as soon as it had begun. 
Army correspondence leaves the impression that the dogs were ineffective. Troops seem to have 
followed Poinsett’s orders to use these animals only for scouting, a purpose for which they seem 
to have been unsuited.377 Near Lake Bryant in early April, four scouts with bloodhounds 
encountered a small party of Seminoles—whether combatants, they failed to say. The Seminoles 
fled, leaving some of their belongings behind. “The dogs were at this place laid on the fresh 
trail,” Colonel Twiggs later reported to Taylor, “but took no notice whatever of it and after 
repeated trials, recourse was had to the usual manner of trailing which was followed up as far as 
the nature of the soil would admit.” Three days later near another lake, four bloodhounds again 
“took no notice whatever of the trail, neither did they manifest any feelings different from others 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Sturgeow and Buchanan to Poinsett February 7, 1840, Vol. 1, Confidential and Unofficial 
Letters Sent 1814-1847, RG 107, NARA. Army and Navy Chronicle 10, no. 8 (February 20, 
1840), 114. For another insistence that the dogs “have been procured by the territorial, not the 
general Government,” see correspondence from the New York Commercial Advertiser on page 
117 of the same issue of the Army and Navy Chronicle. 
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377 For the debate before Congress, see “The Bloodhounds,” Army and Navy Chronicle 10, no. 8 
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1840, in Taylor to AG, March 4, T-105, 1840, LR, RG 94, NARA. 
 140 
of their race on seeing the dead bodies of the Indians.”378 The bloodhounds, in other words, 
showed no special ability to track or attack Indians. 
 Florida’s governor explained the bloodhounds’ failure through allusions to racial 
difference: “it could scarcely be supposed that Dogs trained to pursue Negroes would 
instinctively pursue Indians.”379 Meanwhile, some officers blamed the dogs’ own “spurious 
breed.”380 One likely problem with the bloodhounds was that their keepers, who had long 
expressed reluctance to fight Indians in Florida, refused to enter its hammocks and swamps. Two 
of these men returned to Cuba at the government’s expense after claiming that their contracts 
only obligated them to work in open woods and on horseback.381 The dogs’ failure might also 
have stemmed from Poinsett’s insistence that they be used only for tracking. Bloodhounds used 
by the Florida volunteers succeeded in capturing six Seminoles near Tallahassee, but in this case, 
they “throttled” one man, “threw him down and secured him.”382 
 In early April, Army officers returned the sixteen dogs they had used, only three months 
after these animals had first appeared in their units. Florida’s governor tried for the better part of 
a year to convince the Secretary of War to reimburse him for their services, but both Poinsett and 
Taylor denied that the dogs had been useful. Ultimately, the federal government paid the dog 
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keepers but nothing toward the dogs.383  The governor later ordered the bloodhounds to be sold 
at public auction, where they were likely purchased by local planters.384   
 Unsuccessful in warfare, the Florida bloodhounds serve nonetheless as an illustration of the 
ideological and material connections between North American conquest and Cuban slavery. 
Trained to protect Cuba’s emerging sugar empire against black insurrection, these dogs had 
gained a reputation for violence that made them desirable to officers fighting Indian and black 
warriors in the Second Seminole War. This military experiment failed, but the importation of 
bloodhounds provided new tools for Florida planters. These animals now patrolled the limits of 
cotton plantations on lands that the United States had conquered from Seminoles. 
 
Miguel Barbachano’s Venta de Indios 
 Like the Florida bloodhounds, the Venta de Indios connected Cuban slavery to North 
American wars of conquest, but differences in time, history, and geography made Governor 
Miguel Barbachano y Tarrazo’s “sale” of nearly three hundred Mayas to merchants in Cuba a 
better remembered affair. During the US-Mexico War, Campechanos, whose economy depended 
on trade with New Orleans, had declared independence from Mexico, while Meridanos rejected 
this declaration. During an attack by the Campeche faction on the city of Valladolid that January, 
this conflict seemed to take on a life of its own. Campechano troops—two-thirds of whom bore 
the social category of indio—were joined by disfranchised people from the outskirts of the city, 
including indios, blancos and mixed-descent mestizos. The six-day siege that followed, along 
with a string of other attacks later that year, had announced the beginning of the half-century war 
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between state forces and Maya-led rebels. The result of long-held grievances over taxation, debt 
peonage, and the alienation of communal landholdings, this conflict appeared in elite writing as a 
guerra de castas or a guerra de bárbaros—a caste war or a barbarian war.385  
 The period of competition and infighting that preceded the Caste War had strengthened ties 
between Yucatán and Cuba, with Havana serving as a place of exile and banishment for people of 
both factions.386 Now, while the Yucatecan government attempted to put down this insurrection, 
some elite heads of household fled Mérida and Campeche with their dependents, including their 
Maya servants, or criados, to seek refuge at Havana and other Gulf ports.387 These movements of 
commerce and people across the Canal de Yucatán to Havana occurred as Cuban officials were 
experimenting with ways to manage enslaved people within their own population. In 1835, Spain 
had signed a treaty with Britian promising (quite disingenuously) to renew efforts to stop the 
illicit trafficking of African captives to Cuba. This agreement, combined with a new wave of 
insurrections near Matanzas in the 1840s, convinced officials to take steps to diversify their work 
force. In 1844, the former Junta de Comisión Blanca—now a commission within the 
development board, or Junta de Fomento—announced a plan to bring five hundred “free white” 
agricultural laborers to the colony.388 
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 This project would offer merchants and politicians from both sides of the Canal de Yucatán 
ways to connect Cuba’s demand for “free white” laborers to the Caste War. Like the names of 
John Evertson and Richard Fitzpatrick in Florida, those of Simón Peón, E.D. Tolmé, and Juan 
Bautista Anduse stand out in the historical record of repression. In February 1848, Peón 
submitted a proposal to the Comisión de Población Blanca to recruit three to four hundred Maya 
laborers to staff his Cuban sugar plantation. He intended this project as his entry into a contest 
that the Comisión had begun four years earlier. Cuban authorities had already been impressed by 
the quality of workers who had arrived in Havana as the criados of Yucatecan refugees. They 
rejected Peón’s proposal but began to investigate recruiting these Yucatecans by other means. In 
March and April of 1848, members of the Comisión wrote to the Spanish vice-consuls at Mérida 
and Campeche to formulate a plan by which these authorities would each recruit two hundred 
Maya bachelors and one hundred Maya families to work five-year labor contracts on the island. 
The vice-consuls agreed that Yucatecan indios would make excellent agricultural hands, but 
expressed concern that these men and women might not leave Yucatán of their own accord.389  
 In fact, Maya men and families were already being landed in Cuba through suspicious 
means. That April, forty-five people designated criados docked in Havana under dubious 
contracts. The same month, fifty-three passengers perceived as indios and mestizos arrived in 
Cuba without masters or contracts. Unlike those arriving as servants, these people received the 
status of colonos, or settlers. In August, the Junta de Fomento officially approved the Comisión 
de Población Blanca’s plan to recruit Yucatecan laborers to the island.390 
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 Miguel Barbachano returned to the governorship of Yucatán in March, 1848, facing a 
ruthless war and few funds to wage it. The eastern half of the peninsula was now in the hands of 
a rebel army, which was perceived as indio, despite the many non-Maya soldiers who also 
occupied its ranks. In the months before Barbachano’s return, his political rivals in Campeche 
had passed a number of measures in an attempt to maintain their independence from Mexico 
while sorting out the financial troubles of war.391 Now Barbachano reunited Yucatán with 
Mexico in an attempt to gain monetary aid.392 While he waited for these funds to arrive, the 
governor turned to private markets to fill state needs. He commissioned the doctor José Matilde 
Sansores, for example, one of thirty-five Spanish Cubans who had fled Mérida for Havana that 
April, to investigate the purchase of livestock from Cuba.393 
 In August, Barbachano commissioned another Spanish Cuban merchant, E. D. Tolmé, to 
investigate the possibility of exiling Maya prisoners of war to Cuba. In the decree he would 
make about the policy three months later, he would attempt to justify it as a way to “reconcile the 
principles of humanity and civilization with the mutual interests of Yucatán and Cuba.”394 
Quashing the insurrection, it would “whiten” Yucatán’s population, and bring financial resources 
to the state. Barbachano also made arguments in favor of the trafficking of Mayas to Cuba that 
resembled those made by US writers about Indian Removal: the expulsion of prisoners, he 
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argued, spared these people from violence while preparing them for the demands of civilized 
life.395  
 In the spring of 1849, Tolmé received his reward for arranging this exchange. His own 
ship, the Cetro, became the vessel by which early prisoners or war were transported to Cuba. On 
March 10, the Cetro arrived at the port of Sisal to collect 135 prisoners. After transporting them 
to Havana, Tolmé sailed back via New Orleans to purchase supplies. Returning to Sisal to deliver 
these goods, he then shuttled military forces to the southern seat of war. On May 17, the Cetro 
again left Sisal for Havana with another 195 prisoners.396 Tolmé paid a “voluntary donation” of 
twenty-five pesos per person to the Yucatecan government—a total of 8,210 pesos. He likewise 
received 12,812 pesos from the Yucatecan government, in part for the purchase of supplies. 
Surely, however, he came out of the exchange with money to spare.397 
 Once in Cuba, these prisoners of war worked in multiple locations: farms, tobacco and 
coffee estates, cattle ranches, cotton fields, and road construction, even performing domestic 
labor for the Catholic Church. The largest number, however, worked on sugar estates in the 
provinces surrounding Havana and Matanzas.398 While these laborers were deemed colonos, not 
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slaves, the Mexican consul at Havana, Buenaventura Vivó, expressed concern about the severe 
punishments that Cuban law allowed overseers to inflict on them. A reglamento issued in 1849, 
for example, allowed them to receive lashes beyond the limit applied to slaves and implied that 
they could be left upside down in the stocks.399 Vivó received reports from these migrants that 
they had departed Sisal in shackles and chains without knowing their destination.400  
 With insufficient funds to pay, clothe, and feed soldiers, Barbachano relied on private 
enterprise to support and motivate troops. In place of rations, the state allowed soldiers half of 
the provisions, furniture, and “all class of effects” that they “rescued” from properties occupied 
by rebels, making plundered cattle, corn, and clothing soldiers’ primary means of survival.401 As 
the ship was preparing to leave Sisal with its first shipment of prisoners of war, Barbachano 
drafted a circular letter to military commanders offering a five-peso bounty for each prisoner of 
war whom they delivered to the capital.402 In this manner, some officers increased their salary by 
at least one hundred pesos that year.403 
Encouraging the taking of prisoners through market incentives opened this practice to 
forms of corruption that would shape it for years to come. Two-thirds of those taken from war 
zones to the public jails of Mérida and Campeche were women and children, many of them 
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noncombatants who had fled with their heads of household.404 The Sisal passport log shows that 
women and children, presumably unarmed, also made the journey to Havana.405 These people 
endured a long march to the public jail at Mérida or Campeche, often arriving improperly 
clothed, and sometimes growing ill or dying along the way.406 On at least five occasions between 
October of 1849 and February of 1850, wealthy Yucatecans complained to the government that 
their criados, who they claimed had not participated in the war, now languished in jail. The 
government released these workers only after demanding the five pesos it had paid for their 
capture.407 Situations like these were common enough that in early 1850, the governor circulated 
another letter to military commanders clarifying the definition of prisoners as men who had been 
caught with arms in hand.408 
Despite being more successful than military scouts’ experiment with bloodhounds in 
Florida, Miguel Barbachano’s Venta de Indios met an equally swift end. Mexico had declared 
illegal the international trade in African captives upon its independence in 1821, and slavery 
itself a decade later, making the reported sale of Mexican citizens to Cuban sugar planters a 
shock to national antislavery sentiments even greater than the criticism brought by reports of 
bloodhound deployment in the United States. The episode also represented a clear breach of 
international agreements: an 1841 treaty between Mexico and Britain had promised to increase 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Their origins included the villages, farms, and haciendas near Tihosuco, Valladolid, and 
Bolonchenticul. 20/116/166, 22/116/166, 54/116/166, 13/117/167, and 16/118/168, M, PE, 
AGEY.  
405 “Cuaderno anotador de pasaportes de 1848 a 1851,” 32/60/110, G, PE, AGEY. 
406 56/116/166, M, PE, AGEY; 69/27/77 and 95/27/77, CO, PE, AGEY; Various entries in Libro 
27, LC, PE, AGEY. Also see correspondence from 1850 in 22/63/113 G, PE, AGEY. 
407 The first of these requests came from Don Diego Crisanto Andrade near Tekax, regarding his 
criado Buenaventura Aké, who had been caught unarmed. Oct. 31, 1849- Feb. 20, 1850, Libro 
27, LC, PE, AGEY. Similar problems would arise near Valladolid in 1854. 94/69/119, G, PE, 
AGEY. 
408 Sebastian Lopez de Llergo to Secretario General de Gobierno, Feb. 4, 1850, 43/121/171, 
M, PE, AGEY. 
 148 
efforts to combat the international slave trade.409 Under pressure from many parties, the Minister 
of Interior and Exterior Relations instructed Barbachano to end this trade even before Tolmé had 
collected his second shipment of prisoners.410 The governor protested his censure but acquiesced; 
no other reports of prisoners leaving Sisal remain in the 1848-1850 passport log.411 
 Yet these early deportations stand as only one chapter in a history that ultimately spanned 
decades. The market opened by Barbachano would persist by other means, with captives 
trickling from Yucatán to Cuba on the ships of Gulf smugglers. The governments of Yucatán and 
Mexico would not officially re-enter this business for another five years, but they, like the US 
War Department, bore more responsibility than they were willing to acknowledge. The 
Minister’s censure of local officials temporarily absolved the Mexican government of 
implication in this transnational trade in captives, but it failed to end the domestic and illicit 
means by which this trade continued. 
 
Smuggling, Slaving and Conquest 
 When the Minister of Interior and Exterior Relations censured Miguel Barbachano for his 
deportation of Maya prisoners of war in May 1849, he said nothing of the local and domestic 
markets through which these people were trafficked. The most significant nexus of these was 
Veracruz, which by September had received one hundred Mayas to perform railroad construction 
at a price of twenty pesos each to the Yucatán state government.412 Prisoners of war continued to 
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leave Yucatán for Veracruz for at least a year after the official end of the trade with Cuba.413 They 
were also sent under similar conditions to the ports of Tampico and Villa del Carmen.414 
Prisoners of war also continued to perform labor for Yucatecan military units. In some cases, 
they were sold locally.415 Meanwhile, merchants in Cuba continued to submit requests to the 
Junta de Fomento to recruit Maya laborers to the island.416  
 Smugglers, many of them known contraband traders in African captives, answered this 
call, filling the positions previously occupied by Tolmé and Barbachano.417 The most notorious 
discovery of smuggling occurred in 1853, when the Superintendent of British Honduras arrested 
a man named Juan Bautista Anduse for selling Maya captives to a Cuban merchant.418 Originally 
from the island of St. Thomas, Anduse had resided, impoverished, in Mérida in 1851.419 By 
1853, he was known for “trading, soldiering, smuggling, & speculating in Yucatan, Belize, and 
the neighboring places.”420 He worked as the agent of the Cuban businessman Francisco Martí y 
Torrens, who had built a career as a fisherman and interceptor of contraband—including 
merchandise and African captives—in the waters near Cuba. Thanks to a concession extended to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
illness; one died on his return journey to the capital. Governor to MRIE, March 15 and Aug. 28, 
1849, and Sept. 5, 1850, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY; Sept. 11-22, Libro 27, LC, PE, AGEY. 
413 Governor to MRIE, Sept. 5, 1850, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY. 22/63/113, G, PE, AGEY. 
414 Jefe Político de Motul to Secretario General de Gobierno, April 19, 1852, 60/30/80, CO, PE, 
AGEY, NSC. 
415 “Comunicaciones dirigidas al secretario general de gobierno…,” July 2-30, 1851, 18/29/79, 
CO, PE, AGEY. 
416 Vivó, Memorias, 328. 
417 García Alvarez, “Traficantes,” 37. 
418 Wodehouse to Military Commandant at Bacalar, June 10, 1854, 40R199, BARS. See also 
Wodehouse to Doyle, Sept. 24, 1853, 40R261; Wodehouse to Admiral Sir George Seymour, 
June 10, 1853, 40R200; and Wodehouse to Chairman of the Board of Jail Superintendent, July 6, 
1853, 40R220. Also in Gonzalez Navarro, Raza y tierra, 129. 
419 That year, an official wrote to the Military Commander of Yucatán asking whether to expel 
Anduse and another foreigner in order to avoid their becoming dependents of the state. The 
commander’s response does not survive. 16/27/77, CO, PE, AGEY. 
420 Wodehouse to Doyle, Sept. 24, 1853, 40R261, BARS. 
 150 
Spanish subjects in 1848, Martí had extended this business to the islands of eastern Yucatán, 
where he was rumored to carry out an illicit trade in African captives bound for Havana.421 Now, 
having purchased a ship from one of the rebels’ trade partners, Anduse docked at the bays of 
Espiritu Santo and Ascención, and lured thirty men and three young girls into captivity. He sold 
the men to Martí at twenty-five pesos each, the same amount as the “donation” that the 
Yucatecan government had received four years earlier. The girls, valued at only eight pesos, were 
said to remain enslaved at Isla Mujeres.422   
 Reports of the trade between Martí and Anduse drew officials in Mexico City back into 
these transactions, first in response to British cries of objection, and then through circumspect 
participation. During this, his last period of rule, the dictator Antonio López de Santa Anna had 
promised to protect Mexico from internal disorder, US aggression and impending bankruptcy. 423 
The inconsistent posturing that he would take with regard to the Venta de Indios grew from the 
challenging nature of these goals, as well as his declining popularity in Mexico. Initially, Santa 
Anna used outrage over the enslavement of Mexican citizens as justification for his minister in 
Madrid to demand indemnity payments from Spain.424 By January of the following year, 
however, he himself had become involved in the trafficking, a change in policy aimed at funding 
an orderly and independent Mexico.425  
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 That month, the dictator signed agreements with two Havana companies known to 
participate in the illicit trade in African captives: Goicouría y Hermano, who also did business in 
New Orleans, and Zangronis Hermanos, insured in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and St. Thomas.426 As 
with the Barbachano-Tolmé agreement, Yucatecans who placed x-marks on Goicouría and 
Zangronis contracts received the formal status of colonos. Their contracts obligated them to work 
for five years, half the time specified by Barbachano in 1849. The companies promised to ensure 
that these migrants received wages, food, clothing, medical care, and transportation to and from 
Cuba. Like Barbachano, Santa Anna and his ministers claimed that this “free and voluntary” 
labor would benefit Mayas by “awakening in them healthy and orderly ideas, economy and the 
love of work.”427 It would also further the cause of abolition in Cuba by offering a “free” 
workforce as an alternative to slave labor.428  
 At first, Santa Anna agreed only to allow these companies to contract with men and women 
who had not been imprisoned, in order to ensure their voluntary participation. By September 
1854, however, he was also allowing them to recruit prisoners of war. Santa Anna’s minister of 
internal relations instructed the Yucatecan governor to monitor the business, sending regular lists 
of the contracts and passports to Mexico City and to the Mexican consul at Havana. He also 
tasked the governor with ensuring that families remain together.429 The men involved most 
directly in recruiting these “contract laborers” also held positions as agents of military conquest. 
A Spanish colonel from Cuba, for example, Manuel María Jiménez, was rumored to have 
approached Havana commercial houses shortly before Santa Anna signed the contracts with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 For these companies’ involvement in the slave trade, see García Alvarez, “Traficantes,” 40. 
427 Bonilla to Governor, Jan. 23, 1854, 15/69/119, G, PE, AGEY. 
428 Copy of Tito Visino to Santa Anna, Jan. 16, 1854, 15/69/119, G, PE, AGEY. 
429 See letters between Manuel María Jiménez and Governor Barbachano, and between Santa and 
the agent of Goicouría y Hermano in 15/69/119, and 60/69/119, G, PE, AGEY. One of the 
contracts survives in 32/70/120, G, PE, AGEY. 
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Goicouría and Zangronis with a plan to raise a militia for Yucatán in order to capture and sell 
prisoners of war.430 When Goicouría y Hermano established their Agencia de Colonización de 
Indígenas in Yucatán, Manuel María Jiménez and a man named Eduardo Jiménez acted as its 
agents, working alongside the prefect of war-torn Valladolid to prepare “labor contracts” for 
prisoners of war and for noncombatant families from the surrounding area. The company offered 
the central government of Mexico sixteen pesos for each laborer they sent, depositing 20,000 
pesos up front with the governor of Yucatán.431 Some of the people recruited later claimed that 
they had been taken prisoner while hiding in the woods so as not to be confused with the 
rebels.432 
 Objections circulating Mexico City again halted official government involvement in this 
trade, but the trade itself would continue. In December of 1854, Santa Anna’s minister wrote to 
the Yucatecan governor announcing the cancelation of his agreement with Gouicouría and 
Zangronis, a measure that was necessary to “remove pretexts by which to discredit the Supreme 
Government.”433 The minister instructed the governor to halt the contracting and trafficking of 
Maya laborers, but the governor claimed that he could not: he had already spent 17,000 pesos of 
the 20,000 pesos that Goicouría y Hermano had paid. By this time, the company had already 
taken twenty-seven prisoners of war and 106 other laborers to Havana.434 Mexican officials 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Gonzalez Navarro, Raza y tierra, 134. In 1855, Manuel María Jiménez would request the 
concession that had been extended to Martí in order to establish fishing camps on the coasts of 
Yucatán. 61/60/110, G, PE, AGEY. 
431 Manuel María Jiménez to Barbachano, Sept. 12, 1854, 60/69/119, G, PE, AGEY. 
432 Gonzalez Navarro, Raza y tierra, 136. 
433 Bonilla to governor, Dec. 4, 1854, 15/69/119, G, PE, AGEY.  
434 Response in margin of Bonilla to governor, Dec. 4, 1854, 15/69/119, G, PE, AGEY. 
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removed themselves from these proceedings, but the migration of Maya families through 
Goicouría y Hermano would continue into the following year.435  
 Even after this chapter of official trade had ended, Cuban commercial houses, planters, and 
even convents continued to receive permission to recruit Maya laborers, while Spanish sailors 
and merchants still trolled the coast of Yucatán.436 All three of the officers to hold the position of 
governor in Yucatán between 1858 and 1860—Martín Francisco Peraza, Liborio Irigoyen 
Cárdenas, and Pedro Acereto—were directly involved in the trade or at least tacitly supported it. 
Acereto’s successor, Colonel Lorenzo Vargas, cracked down on international sales but continued 
to rely domestically on the coerced labor of prisoners of war.437 Juan Bautista Anduse also 
appeared again in Yucatecan records, when in the late 1850s he and three other men were 
arrested at the island of Cozumel for attempting to take eighty-two indígenas to Havana, without 
even the formality of a labor contract. He and his business partners declared that their company 
had approached these Yucatecans only to trade with them.438 Earlier that year, however, Anduse 
had received a concession from the state government to “conquistar indios” in order to establish 
a logging camp at Espiritu Santo Bay.439 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 Bonilla to Governor, July 12, 1855, 56/70/120, G, PE, AGEY. 
436 García Alvarez, “Traficantes en el Golfo,” 40. Rugeley, Rebellion, 188.  
437 The trafficking of Mayas was so integral to the Caste War that the historian Terry Rugeley has 
recently described the Yucatecan military’s motivation in occupying the rebel capital of Chan 
Santa Cruz in 1860 as “human booty by the thousands.” Rugeley, Rebellion, 174-189. 
438 Records can be found in “Expediente creado contra D. Juan Bautista Anduze . . . ,” July 1- 
Sept. 30, 1856, 20/97/145, J, PE, and “Oficio del Superior Gobierno . . . contra Juan Bautista 
Anduze,” July 7-12, 1856, 8/86, Penal, Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Fondo Justicia, AGEY. 
Anduse wrote to the governor requesting permission to go to Campeche to clear his name of 
these charges. Anduse to Governor, July 22, 1856, 100/71/121, G, PE, AGEY. 
439 “Oficio del Superior Gobierno . . . contra Juan Bautista Anduze,” July 7-12, 1856, 8/86, 
Penal, Tribunal Superior de Justicia, Fondo Justicia, AGEY. 
Francisco Martí y Torrens was also believed to be involved in this incident. Pedro Regil y Peón 
in Consul-General Crawford to the Earl of Clarendon, Aug. 18, 1856 (No. 535), House of 
Commons Papers 44: 433-435. 
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 The decade-long trafficking of Mayas from Yucatán to Havana reinforces the connection 
between North American wars of conquest and forms of coerced labor in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Handled delicately by the Mexican government, this trade served to fund a war that supported 
social hierarchies and labor systems in a borderland region. Like the Florida bloodhounds, the 
Venta de Indios came to an end when its promised benefits no longer sufficed to sustain 
government complicity. A short-lived Yucatán cotton boom during the US Civil War and the 
subsequent expansion of henequen planting renewed local demand for Maya labor, giving 
Yucatecan elites little reason to support the risky smuggling trade.440 Many of the merchants who 
had been active in the first decade of the Caste War emerged as major planters and investors in 
this later period, their attention now turned to enterprises that required employing Maya laborers 
on Yucatecan soil. These entrepreneurs included Simón Peón, who by the time of his death in 
1869 owned a mansion on Mérida’s main square.441 
 
Conclusion  
  Reliant upon their own coercive labor systems, most white residents of Florida and Yucatán 
held few objections to waging borderland wars that quickly became entangled with two 
controversial elements of Cuban sugar planting: the brutal suppression of insurrections and the 
illicit trafficking of captives. The boldest among them entered eagerly into trade with Cuba, in 
part because they believed this plantation regime held useful tools for conquest and in part 
because they desired to profit from these exchanges. Whether attempting to expel indigenous 
peoples or to control a rebellious labor force, officials of the United States and Mexico found 
resources in the Atlantic networks at their Gulf shores. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Rodríguez Piña, Guerra de Castas, 14-15. 
441 “Intestado del Sr. Don Simon Peon,” 13/148, Juzgado Segundo de lo Civil, C, J, AGEY; 
Rugeley, Rebellion, 217-218. 
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 Today some Yucatecans recall having heard that overseers used dogs to hunt laborers on 
henequen plantations at the turn of the twentieth century, just as planters had done with enslaved 
Africans in other Gulf and Caribbean regimes. While the evidence to support these sweeping 
analogies is limited to more isolated episodes, the idea highlights the common history from 
which the Second Seminole War and the Caste War emerged.442 As the next chapter will show, 
the interweaving of slavery, conquest, and Indian war in the Gulf also shaped power relations 
between the governments of the United States and Mexico. Decades before Florida’s merchants 
and planters schemed to import Cuban bloodhounds for their war against Seminoles—as early, in 
fact, as the War of 1812—volunteer armies and private militias shipping out from New Orleans 
had attempted to justify their violence as protecting the Gulf from Indian savagery and Spanish 
tyranny. Attacking Native American, Spanish, and Mexican territories, these armed forces 
expanded the reach of the United States, while professing to defend civilization in North 
America.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Archivists at the AGEY told me these stories about bloodhounds, citing a 1910 exposé by the 
journalist John Kenneth Turner, whose first chapter, “The Slaves of Yucatán,” uses scenes of 
cruelty between masters and workers on henequen plantations to argue for the end of US 
intervention in the Mexican Revolution. I found no mention of dogs in this source, however. 
Turner, Barbarous Mexico, 3rd ed. (Chicago: C.H. Kerr, 1914), 6, 9-36. 
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Chapter 4: New Orleans, Indian War, and US Conquest across the Gulf of Mexico 
 
  
 In 1849, the New York mapmaker Joseph Hutchins Colton published a hand-colored wall 
map [Figure 9] positioning the United States amidst a curious mix of national and international 
images and geography.443 In its top right quadrant, off the Atlantic coast of Maryland, a bald 
eagle stands on a crest of stars and stripes, preparing to fly from a nameless port toward the 
nation’s capital. Along the map’s edges, sketches of four monuments memorialize the United 
States’ independence from Britain: the Bunker Hill Monument in Boston, the Washington 
Monument in New York, and the Pulaski Monument in Savannah, all tributes to the American 
Revolution, as well as the Battle Monument in Baltimore, a tribute to the War of 1812. Across 
the top, idyllic scenes from the Connecticut Valley, Lake Saratoga, and the Columbia and 
Willamette rivers portray the nation’s recent expansion from the pastures of New York and New 
England into the Indian lands of Oregon Territory. And along the bottom march a series of 
images that go from expected to strange: the capitol building in Washington City, the entrance to 
a port, “Mexicans Catching Wild Cattle,” and the cathedral of Mexico City. Celebrating the 
United States’ independence and civilization, this map also reaches beyond US borders, pulling 
Mexican society and landmarks into its patriotic imagery. 
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Indies and Central America, with part of New Granada and Venezuela (New York : J.H. Colton, 
1849), Library of Congress Digital Collections. 
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Figure 9: J.H. Colton, Map of the United States of America (1849) 
 
 
 The title of J.H. Colton’s map similarly focuses both within and beyond US borders. Below 
the bald eagle, bold type exclaims, “Map of the United States of America,” with script adding 
more subtly, “The British Provinces, Mexico, the West Indies and Central America with part of 
New Granada and Venezuela.” The clear subject of this map, the United States, sits in the upper 
left corner while Mexico, Central America, and the West Indian Islands pull the viewer’s eye 
southeastward toward the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. An inset positioned in the 
lower left corner of the map likewise expands its focus outward, depicting wind and steam 
vessels traveling the Gulf, Caribbean, Pacific, and Atlantic waters between the Americas and 
Europe. Produced in New York by a man who over the course of his lifetime had watched his 
own port city grow from 60,000 to over 500,000 inhabitants, this map’s emphasis on the United 
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State’s maritime connections shifts the geographic heart of this world southward toward his 
home city’s rival, New Orleans.444 The nation’s major port on the Gulf of Mexico sits at ninety 
degrees longitude and thirty degrees latitude—framed as the exact center of the map itself. 
 New Orleans provides the key to understanding US expansion in the mid-nineteenth 
century: not only a march east to west but journeys outward across water, an imperial vision 
based both in slavery and in Indian war. Founded by the French in 1718, later claimed by Spain, 
and finally annexed to the United States in 1803 as part of the Louisiana Purchase, New Orleans 
grew over the first half of the nineteenth century from a rogue colony into a metropolis for the 
US Cotton Kingdom.445 Like Havana and Matanzas in Cuba, this city has become a prime site 
for the study of nineteenth-century slavery and freedom. Historians have scrutinized its trading 
blocks, streets, and levees to understand the workings of the Atlantic and domestic slave trades, 
emancipation, and the post-emancipation society that followed, as well as African-descended 
people’s ability to live within, against, and alongside these systems.446  
 More recently, histories of New Orleans have also begun to explore the role of territorial 
conquest in keeping slavery alive, showing that southern planters’ dreams of a Caribbean 
“empire for slavery” led also to attempts, often bursting forth from New Orleans, to bring Cuba 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 1850 U.S. Census, “Table XXIV: Comparative Population of Thirty-two of the Largest Cities 
in the United States,” under “Progress of the Population,” pg. li.  
445 For New Orleans as a site of “rogue colonialism,” see Shannon Lee Dawdy, Building the 
Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 4-
5. 
446 Rashauna Johnson, Slavery’s Metropolis: Unfree Labor in New Orleans during the Age of 
Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Rebecca J. Scott and Jean M. 
Hébrard, Freedom Papers: An Atlantic Odyssey in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012); Scott, Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba After Slavery 
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and other slave societies into the US domain.447  When the United States acquired the Mississippi 
River Valley from Native Americans and French colonists, its leaders intended this region as a 
place for white small-scale farmers. Instead, the most populated portions of the Territories of 
Louisiana and Mississippi, like other parts of the Deep South, became the domain of speculators 
and planters, who grew wealthy on cotton produced by the hundreds of thousands of enslaved 
African Americans, whom they relocated from Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky, and by 
African captives they purchased from smugglers. New Orleans grew alongside the Cotton 
Kingdom, its population expanding to bring this cotton to the Atlantic market.  
 Fears of large-scale insurrection convinced many Louisiana planters that their society must 
continually expand or risk its own ruin. These fears had began as early as 1811, when an 
enslaved Louisianan named Charles Deslondes led hundreds of Africans and African Americans 
in an uprising planned in the swamps of the territory’s “German Coast.” Newspapers suggested 
that these insurgents had been mobilized by black agitators from France, Spain, or Britain, by 
black revolutionaries from Saint Domingue, or by French privateers (although, notably, not by 
Indians). The volunteer militias and federal troops ordered by the territorial governor and the 
brutal violence unleashed later by white mobs both testified to the strength of these rumors.448 By 
1840, a period of economic depression had intensified Louisianans’ fears of slave rebellion. So-
called “filibusters” departed New Orleans in 1850s, aiming to attack and occupy ports 
throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. Named after the French flibustiers, or freebooters, 
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River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom (Cambridge: Harvard 
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a colorful strand in the fabric of New Orleans since its founding, these private militias promised 
to connect the South—or so planters hoped—to new lands and markets that might relieve social 
pressure in order to restore democracy and liberty.449 
 Yet if southern planters in the 1850s understood military conquest as having preceded and 
followed the rise of New Orleans, the soldiers who participated in these filibustering expeditions 
would have known that conquest had also permeated the entire nineteenth-century life of their 
city. From the War of 1812, when New Orleans had nearly fallen to British forces, its men had 
also voluntarily borne arms to protect what they saw as civilization, independence, and 
republicanism across the Gulf. Having defended their republic from an army that—like US 
forces—included Native American and African American soldiers, they later responded to calls 
for aid from other governments and revolutionaries seeking protection from “savage” Indians, 
British colonizers, and “tyrannical” Spaniards. Seizing land from Seminoles in Florida and 
helping to “liberate” Texas from the Mexican government, these volunteers solidified and 
expanded US territorial claims, later sailing under some of the same officers on some of the same 
ships to fight in Yucatán and Cuba, the “lock and key” to the Gulf.450 The filibustering 
expeditions of the 1850s grew out of this history as much as they responded to the demands of 
slavery.  
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Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973). For the 
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Mora, 2000), 17-18. 
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 In this way, New Orleans volunteers maintained the ambiguous “boundary between 
banditry and statehood” that had long characterized colonialism in their city—now a rogue form 
of state-building that offered ready, if unpredictable, resources for other governments and 
revolutionaries.451 Following the tradition of warfare that had become central to New Orleans’ 
image, these soldiers carried US military power to distant ports without concerning themselves 
with the debates about territorial annexation and the incorporation of people that had stalled 
official efforts at expansion. Their actions, both licit and illicit, demonstrate how, in this moment 
before the United States’ Age of Empire had professedly begun, some of its residents envisioned 
southern overseas expansion as consistent with the values of its founding. 
 
The Battle of New Orleans in the Second Seminole War 
 In the days before Christmas in 1814, General Andrew Jackson led thousands of US troops 
across the swamps, canals, and plantations that lay between this Mississippi River outpost and its 
outlet to the Gulf of Mexico, defeating British forces in a famous series of battles waged after the 
War of 1812 had officially ended but before news of peace had reached the Americas. For New 
Orleans residents, the Battle of New Orleans was later recalled as a foundational moment, an 
event that confirmed the power of patriotic citizens to protect civilization and republican 
independence at home and abroad. Those who would take pride in its memory included many 
free men of color, who had formed a unit within Jackson’s army.452 On December 23, however, 
the first night of the battle, the greatest US losses were sustained by a volunteer company 
composed primarily of local lawyers and merchants, who had famously fallen before an army 
consisting of British regulars, Native Americans, formerly enslaved Georgians and Floridians of 
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African descent, and black troops from Jamaica. Thrusting Andrew Jackson into national fame, 
the Battle of New Orleans also acted as a sequel to the American Revolution, offering some 
white New Orleans residents a central role in the history of US independence from savage 
warfare and colonial oppression.453  
 As decades passed and New Orleans grew in size and commercial strength, some of its 
citizens evoked this battle as a rallying cry for volunteer enlistment in the Second Seminole War. 
Twenty-one years after the Battle of New Orleans, the French-English newspaper called the The 
New Orleans Bee/ L’Abeille de la Nouvelle-Orléans reported that US troops and civilians had 
fallen victim to Indian attack as a cohort of young Seminole leaders engaged in a violent 
rejection of treaties demanding their removal to Indian Territory. Launching attacks from 
swamps and forests, and burning and looting plantations, these Indians had become “masters” of 
various posts in Florida. In an anxious reference, one article alleged that some of their 
“chieftains” had attended West Point Academy.454 
 When in January Major General David E. Twiggs arrived to recruit volunteer troops to 
serve in the US Army in Florida, a committee of local elites published an announcement in the 
New Orleans Bee explicitly connecting the Second Seminole War to the Battle of New Orleans: 
“The spirit which pervaded New Orleans, on the 23d of December 1814,” the announcement 
began, “was awakened in this community on Saturday, the 23d of January, 1836. About 10 
o’clock colonel Twiggs expressed the wish of the government that the citizens of New Orleans 
should raise volunteers to aide our brave and suffering officers and soldiers, to meet, disperse, 
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and conquer the mostly [sic] hordes of Seminoles and negroes, that are now spreading havoc, fire 
and massacre among our countrymen in Florida.” It concluded, “The horizon lowers: the calm of 
peace that has smoothed the surface of our affairs for twenty years is ruffled. External and 
internal troubles begin to threaten. We are an out-post of our country. Let the Orleans volunteers, 
and our legion, form a Hercules, around which the valor and patriotism of the country will 
successfully rally in the extremest emergency.”455    
 In this way, the committee charged with recruiting volunteer soldiers for Florida framed 
enlistment in this sort of warfare as a duty particularly suited to New Orleans men. On one hand, 
the Second Seminole War appeared similar to the Battle of New Orleans because of the “hordes 
of Seminoles and negroes” in enemy ranks, whose violence threatened the life and property of 
Florida planters as it had threatened Louisiana’s plantations in 1814. Yet geographic themes also 
came through in this announcement. Themselves residents of an “out-post of our country,” New 
Orleans citizens could sympathize with their vulnerability and help them in “the extremest 
emergency.” The great distance of Florida from Washington, stated an act of the Florida 
legislature also published in the Bee, suggested that “the assistance they are entitled to” would 
arrive too late. As lines of communication had been cut off between forts, Floridians would not 
survive except by aid from the sea.456 Having itself been a similarly isolated maritime settlement, 
New Orleans was now in a position to place itself at the center of national efforts to support this 
territory. 
 The committee announcement referred to New Orleans soldiers as a “Hercules,” signaling 
at once the mighty hero of Greek mythology and the Pillars of Hercules, or the Rocks of 
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Gibraltar, which as the outer limit to the Mediterranean Sea had once been thought to support the 
western boundary of the world.457 Like this geographically peripheral rock formation, New 
Orleans was, by the committee’s estimation, central to the survival of its region. An “out-post of 
our country,” it provided the United States with soldiers whose strength and bravery were 
capable of rallying the “valor and patriotism” of the nation. In fact, while New Orleans’ war 
effort extended a unifying pull to the nation, it also followed and eased internal fractures. The 
same month that the US Army requested volunteers for Florida, the Louisiana legislature had 
been accused of launching a local “war of races” in its acquiescence to Anglo-Americans’ 
pressure to divide the city into distinct municipalities that would separate them from the French 
and Spanish Creole elite.458  
 Non-regular soldiers were prevalent even in the upper ranks of the companies sent to 
Florida—a trend that emerged out of the political divisions within Louisiana. The new Whig 
governor, Edward Douglass White, refused to place the regiments under the command of John B. 
Dawson, his Democratic political rival and a senior major general in the state’s regular military 
corps, the Louisiana Militia. Instead, White gave command of the company to Persifor Frazer 
Smith, a friend and attorney, whom he had appointed Adjutant General despite Smith’s lack of 
military experience. For Smith, his politically motivated service in this war would mark the first 
event in a distinguished military career in the Gulf.459 John B. Dawson and another state militia 
officer, William Debuys, would attempt to raise their own thousand-man corps in East and West 
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Feliciana parishes while volunteers were gathering in New Orleans, but White refused the offer 
with the excuse that the requested number had already been filled.460 The committee’s applause 
of the “the Orleans volunteers, and our legion” glossed over these tensions, ignoring the 
governor’s refusal to allow his political opponents to lead the units in Florida and instead 
describing the force as a unified campaign. 
 Newspaper accounts of recruitment highlighted the participation of both Creole and Anglo-
American residents in planning and joining this effort to aid ailing countrymen in Florida. The 
committee responsible for raising troops and funds for Florida was formed on January 11 in the 
coffee room of the Banks’ Arcade, a posh new building in the part of the city known as the 
American sector. This group of Creole and Anglo-American elites, led by Governor White, 
urged citizens to come forward “to afford assistance and stop the murderous effusion of blood by 
the merciless savage.”461 On January 23, the committee held a second public meeting, in which 
one hundred men enlisted at the US Custom House in the older part of the city before marching 
“through the rain and mud” to enlist another hundred men in the American sector.462 During the 
week that followed, volunteers would continue to enlist in both municipalities, at hotels and 
coffee houses easily accessible to the city’s growing working class.463 
 These efforts would succeed in raising a body of support that only a growing economic 
powerhouse like New Orleans was able to provide. Over the course of two months, funding 
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allocated to the war nearly tripled, with an act of the state legislature ultimately authorizing 
$75,000 to be placed at the governor’s disposal and allowing him to borrow money from New 
Orleans banks.464 Among other things, these funds would provide transportation, arms and 
ammunition, provisions, medicine, camp equipage, and a $30 bounty for each volunteer.465 The 
US War Department would also purchase provisions from New Orleans throughout the course of 
the war, monitoring market prices there and in New York in order to choose the most affordable 
option.466 Eight volunteer companies totaling four hundred men departed New Orleans under 
General Persifor Smith on February 3, alongside three hundred US regulars under Lieutenant 
Colonel David Twiggs.467 The following week, the Louisiana legislature authorized Governor 
White to accept the services of three hundred additional men, a company that would comprise 
more New Orleans volunteers as well as troops from Mobile, Alabama.468 
 One Louisiana volunteer who published an account of his service in Florida, Captain James 
Barr, described this experience as, in part, an adventure through scenes of war that had become 
well known to US readers. When the company arrived to Fort Brooke in Tampa Bay, Florida, 
they found, as newspapers had reported, that residents of this small settlement had fled their 
homes, now destroyed, to seek shelter on ships off the coast.469 Fewer than two hundred soldiers, 
half volunteers and half regulars, manned the fort; many of them were sick or injured after the 
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battles of the previous month. The fort itself bore memories of the war, the cannons on either 
side of its main wall painted with the names of men who had fallen in the ambush known as the 
Dade Massacre, which from the US perspective had officially started the war.470 Also at camp 
were over four hundred Upper Creeks, appearing in Barr’s narrative as “friendly Indians,” who 
engaged in their own skirmishes with the enemy and, in at least one instance, joined with their 
families and US troops to bury their dead after a military procession.471  
 In the months that followed, more volunteer troops arrived from other states and territories 
lining the United States’ southern Atlantic and Gulf coasts—from Florida, Alabama, Georgia, 
and South Carolina—marching in an eleven-hundred man force under Edmund Pendleton 
Gaines. Barr had the apparent misfortune of remaining at Fort Brooke, but he recorded the 
stories of men who had experienced the Dade Massacre and the ensuing battle between US 
regulars, Florida Volunteers, and Seminoles at the Withlacoochee River. Barr also recorded the 
stories of his fellow Louisiana Volunteers when they returned from their march in early April. 
This journey had taken them to the sites of highly-publicized US defeats, where they had buried 
the dead, rescued whatever money remained to send to the fallen soldiers’ widows and orphans, 
and bore witness to the violence that their countrymen had endured.  
 From Fort Brooke, the Louisiana Volunteers had marched toward the site of Major Francis 
Langhorne Dade’s last camp, past plantations and bridges that had been burned by Seminole 
warriors. They also engaged in destruction of their own, looting corn, rice, and cooking utensils 
before burning an unnamed Seminole village. On their arrival to the site of the Dade Massacre, 
they found “a spectacle never to be forgotten.” More than one hundred bodies—weapons and 
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ammunition gone—still lay where they had fallen. The troops buried “the whole command with 
the honours of war,” and then continued across the Withlacoochee River to Fort King to wait for 
provisions. From there, they marched to the site of the Battle of Withlacoochee, burying the dead 
and camping erecting their own breastwork around that of the fallen soldiers. The “friendly 
Indians” also joined on this march, their “chief,” Captain Saunders, dying in battle.472 
 The sense of adventure and patriotism that Barr brought to his narrative appeared alongside 
material interests—a fact that became clear in his depiction of a short march that he took in his 
last weeks of service. Before they departed Florida, the Louisiana volunteers were called to 
march inland from Charlotte’s Harbor, the bay just south of Tampa, in search of Seminole forces. 
As it was already late April by the time they set up camp at the mouth of the Myakka River, the 
troops thinned quickly, fatigued from the heat and some lacking shoes and canteens. Barr 
continued upriver along with 160 other troops, half ascending in canoes and half by foot. Their 
guide was a Seminole prisoner, who spoke a “mixture of Spanish and Indian,” which the troops 
found suspicious. This man led them along a circuitous road running through swamps and dense 
thatches of trees known as hammocks. As they marched inland near the banks of the river, Barr’s 
company passed Seminole villages still in use, one with “the ashes of a fire recently 
extinguished, green hides, two live fowls, . . . and several razors and other articles supposed to 
have been the property of the murdered collector of customs.” Another sported a large cattle pen. 
They encountered no people, however, and ultimately returned empty handed, concluding that 
summer was no time to launch an attack.473 
 While perhaps disappointing for military strategy, this march allowed Barr to bring his 
narrative to a close with commentary on Florida’s landscape: the beauty of the river, the fertile 
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soil at its banks, its timber, and the game and vegetation that seemed to grow spontaneously. 
“The expedition has answered one good purpose,” he expressed; “it has given some knowledge 
of a very interesting and before unknown section of the territory. The land is excellent and the 
river may be made navigable for steamboats at a very trifling expense; it is besides adjacent to 
the Orleans market.” At least for this volunteer soldier, the war in Florida provided both an 
opportunity for New Orleans men to participate in memorable triumphs over Indians and a way 
for the city’s investors to reinforce the economic ties that bound them to other Gulf ports.474 For 
regular officers stationed in Florida as well, warfare against Seminoles provided opportunities 
for adventure and land speculation: after marching under Col. David Twiggs near Lake Apooka, 
the US Army surgeon Edward Aldrich came home with a scalp and three heads, expressing in 
certain terms to his fiancée, Corinna Brown, that he wished to live on that land.475 
 “Then let the other States follow the example so nobly set by Louisiana,” Barr declared in 
the final paragraph of his narrative; “let them raise such men as she sent out, and like her place 
active and skillful Commanders over them.”476 Residents of a geographic outpost of the United 
States, these men of New Orleans saw themselves also as a strong unifier for the nation in this 
time of war. Recently arrived to the ranks of the United States’ major cities, this bustling center 
of Gulf commerce had moved past its own internal divisions to supply troops and aid to white 
planters and soldiers in Florida as they battled an apparently savage foe. An effort to protect a 
growing plantation economy and to reinforce the connections that drew these plantations into the 
orbit of New Orleans, the participation of the Louisiana Volunteers in the Second Seminole War 
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was also a sequel to the city’s own foundation story, in which local businessmen had defended 
New Orleans and the nation against British, Indian, and black forces. 
 
The Conquest of the Northern Gulf of Mexico 
 The Battle of New Orleans and the Second Seminole War were connected not only by 
historical memory but also as two chapters in a half-century struggle by which the United States 
came to possess the internationally recognized claim to all of the lands along the northern shores 
of the Gulf of Mexico. The purchases and cessions through which Spain and France transferred 
this territory to the United States ran parallel to other, private expansionist activities. From 1795 
onward, and especially after 1810, private militias of US citizens invaded the territories of East 
and West Florida, Louisiana, and Texas to wrangle livestock or to fight Native Americans. 
Affiliating with Latin American revolutionaries, some fought to “liberate” these colonies from 
Spain or to protect them from influence by England. Neutrality laws, passed roughly every half-
decade between 1794 and 1818, declared these private military expeditions illegal, but 
intermittent federal efforts to suppress these expeditions alternated with instances when 
government officials overlooked and even aided them. Not yet given the semi-formal title they 
would ultimately hold, “filibuster,” these missions already constituted a key aspect of the United 
States’ presence across the Gulf.477 
 Overlapping with these private military efforts, the US military invaded foreign Gulf 
territories as part of its warfare against Native American peoples of southeastern North America, 
conflicts that often coincided with those against European powers. When Andrew Jackson led 
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regular and volunteer troops in the War of 1812, his enemy was not only Britain but also Red 
Stick Creeks and Seminoles, who had allied with British officers as part of their own war against 
the United States. Over the previous year, Jackson had commanded troops against Red Sticks in 
Alabama and Georgia, brutally defeating them at the battle of Horseshoe Bend. Later, he trailed 
the survivors to Spanish Pensacola, which he violently if temporarily took for the United States. 
In the years that followed the US victory at New Orleans, US soldiers returned to Spanish East 
Florida, repeatedly invading this territory to pursue Red Sticks, Seminoles, and others who allied 
with them. From the perspective of Atlantic diplomacy, this long “struggle for the Gulf 
borderlands” ended with a decisive US victory—the end of British designs on this part of North 
America and the cession of this territory from Spain to the United States in 1821.478 
 In the 1820s, New Orleans had not yet entered its boom times. Its population hovered 
around 30,000 at the beginning of this decade, nearly quadruple its size in the 1790s but still on 
par with the port city of Charleston, barely half the size of Baltimore, and less than a quarter of 
Philadelphia or New York. Yet these 30,000 souls exceeded the total white population of 
Florida, which despite the departure of Spanish officials, remained largely beyond the purview of 
the United States.479 Over the course of this decade, which saw a lull in the activities that would 
become known as filibustering, US officials attempted to consolidate their control over the land 
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to which they now held title.480 In East Florida, they sought to reduce Red Stick, Mikasuki, 
Lower Creek, Seminole, and Black Seminole power in the territory, obtaining some of these 
peoples’ coerced consent to consolidate into two reservations, the larger of which was the 
Seminole Reservation in the southern swamps. Elected to the US presidency in 1828, Andrew 
Jackson then signed the Indian Removal Act of 1830, after which commissioners began efforts to 
remove these peoples—now collectively termed “Seminoles”—from Florida entirely.  
 As the United States worked to make its international claim to Florida a reality, its citizens 
reinforced ties between this peripheral territory and the emerging metropolis to its west. Andrew 
Jackson had served as the military governor of Florida during its first year in US possession, 
naming those close to him to places in the territory’s government.481 Some of these men had ties 
to New Orleans. Colonel Robert Butler, for example, a ward of Andrew Jackson, was appointed 
as the first surveyor general of the territory. When Robert’s relative Edward George Washington 
Butler looked to leave the Army to establish his own plantation in the mid-1820s, the young 
officer considered buying land near Butler’s plantation near Tallahassee and near his sister 
Caroline’s estate in Iberville Parish, Louisiana.482 Florida became and would remain a peripheral 
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contributor to the emerging Cotton Kingdom, but during these early years boosters saw potential 
for building a sugar empire in its lowlands and “hammocks,” the local name for the dense 
hardwood forests that scattered across Florida’s northern border and into the northwestern 
quadrant of its peninsula.483 These men looked to examples of successful sugar planting in 
southern Louisiana for insight on how to manage the benefits and challenges of Florida’s low, 
tropical climate.484 During this lull in the United States’ military conquest of the lands 
surrounding the Gulf, in other words, New Orleans remained a source for US conquest, 
contributing to citizens’ attempts to replace Native American peoples and properties in Florida. 
 The outbreak of war in 1835 demonstrated that the US conquest of Florida—and by 
extension, Andrew Jackson’s war on Seminoles and Red Sticks—was still unfinished. A violent 
rejection of a treaty signed that year demanding the Seminoles’ removal to Indian Territory, the 
battles of 1835 and 1836 were organized by a cohort of young men from the Seminole 
Reservation, including Osceola, the son of a Red Stick refugee. These men had not been party to 
this treaty and insisted that they were not legally obligated to leave Florida.485 Even though New 
Orleans residents described the local soldiers rallying for this war as protecting US lives and 
property from “motley hordes” in the tradition of their forefathers, these men were in fact 
invading a territory whose rightful claim was still contested. The slippery line between national 
defense and conquest in Florida mirrored a parallel tension at the opposite edge of the northern 
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Gulf. By the time Seminole forces attacked Dade’s command in December of 1835, Mexican 
troops had arrived to Texas to suppress the Texas Revolution, a federalist rebellion that has also 
been called “the most successful filibuster in American history.”486  
 The men who led revolutionary forces in Texas consisted primarily of Anglo-American 
planters. These former US citizens who had acquired Mexican citizenship often described 
themselves as fighting for freedom from bondage under Mexican rule. Their longstanding 
tensions with the Mexican government, however, in fact stemmed in large part from conflicts 
over their own reliance on chattel slavery. Across the 1820s, Mexico had passed a number of 
measures gradually weakening the institution of slavery before abolishing it (with an exemption 
for Texas) in 1829. In the 1830s, many planters became convinced that slavery was also in 
danger in Texas. They began a movement for separate statehood in which many held a clear 
interest in forming political connections between Texas and the United States. As in Florida, 
Texans’ belief that slavery was necessary for their survival had to do, in part, with the state’s 
environmental challenges.487  
 From the beginning, Mexican officials voiced suspicion that the United States government 
was encouraging this rebellion. For their part, US citizens rallied to aid those they perceived as 
their former countrymen, whom they claimed were victims of oppression by a tyrannical 
government.488 In October of 1835, three months before New Orleans elites met in the coffee 
room of the Banks Arcade to raise aid for Florida, the “friends of Texas” had met in the private 
conference room at the same location to organize troops for the “glorious struggle for liberty” 
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there.489 In an attempt to encourage enlistments for the Florida war, Bee editors reminded readers 
of the distinction between domestic service in Florida and foreign warfare in Texas, an 
exhortation whose necessity highlighted the indistinct nature of such boundaries. “Let us then up 
and be doing,” the editors opined. “If we aid Texas by men and means, why not our own 
country?”490 
 Indeed, New Orleans residents were intimately involved in the affairs of Texas, with 
migrations and investments linking this new metropolis to the burgeoning plantation economies 
accessible through its Gulf ports.491 Land speculation in Texas was so prevalent by early 1836 
that the Bee recommended that readers move on to invest in new sites such as those on the Gulf 
of California.492 Correctly believing that US citizens were aiding revolutionaries in Texas, the 
Mexican government closed its ports to US merchants in late 1835, later declaring that any 
foreigners caught importing arms and ammunition to Mexican territory would be recognized and 
punished as pirates.493 In New Orleans, the Mexican consul monitored the wars in Florida and 
Texas simultaneously, understanding that the end of the one would free up resources for the 
other. In particular, the consul suggested to superiors in Mexico City that volunteers leaving 
Tampa Bay once peace was obtained in Florida might transfer to Texas by sea.494 The consul’s 
fears appear to have been well founded. Twenty-eight Louisiana Volunteers, reported one US 
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newspaper, had been present at the fall of San Antonio to the revolutionaries. “So little have the 
perils of Indian warfare affected these brave fellows,” the editors remarked, “that they go directly 
to Texas when they are discharged.”495 
 One a domestic war against Indians and the other a foreign war between Mexican citizens 
and their government, the Second Seminole War and the Texas Revolution appeared from the 
perspective of New Orleans as two parts of an ongoing effort to protect white lives and property 
along the northern Gulf. Fighting against perceived savagery and tyranny while also reinforcing 
connections between these peripheral places and the New Orleans market, volunteer soldiers 
contributed to conflicts that ultimately placed the United States in possession of a semi-circle of 
coastline extending from the Florida peninsula to the mouth of the Rio Grande. The US Congress 
passed a joint resolution to annex the Texas Republic in March of 1845, the same month that 
Florida achieved its statehood. By this time, many Seminole families had been removed to Indian 
Territory, while those remaining continued to engage US troops in skirmishes that received little 
attention at the national level. 
 Mexico disputed the border that the United States claimed for Texas, an issue that would 
remain in dispute until the passing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. This treaty 
ended the U.S.-Mexican War, known in Mexico as the Guerra de la invasión estadounidense—
the War of the US Invasion. It involved a huge transfer of territory, which, along with possession 
of Oregon, completed the United States’ continental expansion from the Atlantic to Pacific 
oceans. The transfer also completed the U.S. conquest of the northern Gulf. From New Orleans, 
ships could now travel five hundred miles west or east and reach US-held ports. Unlike in war-
weary Florida, where men volunteered reluctantly to serve in Mexico, Louisiana met its own 
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four-regiment muster demand in one week—so quickly that the governor issued a proclamation 
temporarily declining to receive additional soldiers.496 In all, Louisiana sent more volunteers to 
Mexico than any other state, with the legislature and private investors channeling hundreds of 
thousands of dollars into the conflict.497 
 While not itself an Indian War, the US-Mexico War was influenced significantly by Native 
American peoples, who contributed indirectly to the United States’ victory and to the land 
transfer it incurred. As scholars of Native American history have recently shown, decades of 
pillage, destruction, and captive taking by Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, and other Great Plains 
peoples had by 1846 weakened northern Mexican economies and intensified grievances between 
northern citizens and Mexico City. As they had done toward Spain in East Florida decades 
earlier, US citizens criticized Mexico’s inability to control these Indians, using this failure as 
proof of the Mexican government’s deficiencies and as justification for staking claim to its 
northern lands.498 While Mexican officials would have disagreed with the tone of this rhetoric, 
many lamented their failure to intervene sooner in these Indian wars. As part of a multifaceted 
attempt to protect Mexican citizens from future raids, Mexican diplomats negotiated the 
inclusion of an article in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo requiring the US government to 
“forcibly restrain” the indios bárbaros or “savage tribes” in the transferred territory. 499 
 In US public discourse, however, the patriotic ardor displayed by volunteer soldiers proved 
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the power of republican government as it had in New Orleans in 1814. Seen as undisciplined and 
rowdy in comparison to regular soldiers, volunteers were also believed to inspire greater fear 
among the Mexican people.500 Memories of the War of 1812 proliferated in history books and 
ritual commemorations during the war, while volunteer companies from across the nation 
mustered in and out at Camp Jackson, the site of the Battle of New Orleans.501 The leadership of 
these companies, and the US-Mexico War as a whole, bore direct ties to both the War of 1812 
and the Second Seminole War. The commanding generals in Mexico, Winfield Scott and 
Zachary Taylor, had served as young men in the War of 1812, and had held positions of 
command in Florida.502 Likewise, the largest volunteer force from New Orleans was the six-
regiment Brigade of Louisiana Volunteers, led by Persifor Frazer Smith, former commander of 
volunteer troops during the Second Seminole War. The brigadier generals in Mexico also 
included Thomas Jesup and David E. Twiggs of Second Seminole War fame.503  
 Now an “out-post of our country” only in the sense of its coastal position, New Orleans 
had become a center for economic activities and volunteer warfare for slavery and against 
savagery and tyranny. As US imperial visions shifted southward, this regional metropolis would 
continue to act as a unifying site for these aspirations.    
Civilization, Republicanism and Independence in the Southern Gulf 
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  With the acquisition and confirmation of the lands and coastline contained in the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States accomplished what enthusiasts would describe as its 
“manifest destiny”: a contiguous continental empire stretching from the Atlantic to Pacific 
oceans. A half-century before the island acquisitions that would later initiate its formal “age of 
empire,” the late 1840s and early 1850s saw a renewed rise in US filibustering, a term modified 
from the French flibustier and the Spanish filibustero. (Appropriately, the word became more 
common in English in the early 1850s.)504 These private military expeditions to Mexico, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Honduras have typically entered the larger narrative of US history as 
precursors to the Civil War, demonstrating the push and pull factors that drew southern planters 
toward the Caribbean in the years leading up to their attempted secession from the United States. 
Having flourished from expansion along the Mississippi River Valley in the 1830s and 1840s, 
slaveholders later supported a push into Latin America and the Caribbean as the only way to 
ensure the prosperity and predominance of plantation slavery.505  
 These expeditions also hold meaning for the broader course of US imperialism, which 
prevailed across the nineteenth century and beyond. The US-Mexico war contributed to the 
revival of filibustering, creating “a pool of latent filibusters—conquering soldiers accustomed to 
military campaigning who dreaded being mustered out of the service (if they were volunteers) or 
being posted to routine peacetime assignments (if they were regulars).”506 These men used “the 
new Latin American frontier” as an opportunity to practice the “martial manhood” that had 
prevailed in the preceding decades, which would rise again in the final decade of the century.507 
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These connections among Manifest Destiny, filibustering, and overseas imperialism also reached 
beyond the personal experience of soldiers. Having already used tropes of civilization, 
republicanism, and independence to justify warfare that walked the line between national defense 
and foreign conquest, soldiers and merchants continued to use these strategies to reinforce 
connections between New Orleans and other Gulf lands, people, and ports. The tensions these 
expeditions posed for government officials mark them not as divergent from the goals of the 
nation but as signs that national interest in expansion continued even when racial prejudice 
toward the people living in these territories complicated politicians’ plans for annexation.508   
 While the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo evoked the “savage tribes” that dominated what 
became the US West, the US-Mexico War had also carried soldiers, politicians, and readers 
farther into the heart of Mexico, where they had met other Indians, leading some to speculate 
about the nature of Mexican society itself. After a series of northern battles under Zachary 
Taylor, regular and volunteer companies had launched an invasion that took them into Mexico 
City under Winfield Scott, sailing from Brazos and Tampico to invade the southern port of 
Veracruz and then marching inland through Xalapa and Puebla, along a route similar to the one 
taken by the Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés in the sixteenth century.509 Familiar with the 
Spanish Conquest from the popular history published by William Prescott in 1843, some soldiers 
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imagined themselves reenacting these events.510 Scott’s force occupied Veracruz on April 9, 
Good Friday, the same holiday on which Cortés had reportedly landed at the same place. Had 
Cortés seen their landing, wrote the naval officer Raphael Semmes, he would have understood 
that time had brought “a newer race, to sweep away the moldered and moldering institutions of a 
worn-out people, and replace them with a fresher and more vigorous civilization.” The images 
that Semmes associated with this progress included also the steamship, “that most wonderful and 
most potent of all modern machines,” and a technology that had accelerated the growth of New 
Orleans.511⁠ 
 Semmes explained his doubts about Mexico’s progress by recounting the failures of 
Mexican elites. Encountering people of indigenous descent on his journey, men and women 
whose ancestors had long ago been subordinated within Spanish social and economic structures, 
Semmes described these people as laboring in a slave-like state while living in “miserable huts, 
no better than the wigwam of the North American Indian.”512 Mexico had lost the recent war, he 
suggested, because elites had neglected these “docile and comparatively civilized people.” In 
particular, they had failed “to educate and elevate them to the rank of citizens; not to that 
nominal rank which they do, indeed, enjoy, but to that real rank which springs out of, and finds 
its sustenance in, social equality.” A radical idea for its time, “social equality” was not something 
that Semmes seemed to support in the United States because he believed that nature had planted 
an “unconquerable antipathy” between “the white man and the negro.” Yet he claimed that 
equality and even racial mixing would be beneficial in Mexico, where most indigenous Mexicans 
were “physically, the superior of the compound of the Celt and the Moore which is there 
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denominated the white man.” Semmes expressed hope that US-Mexico War had served as a 
“moral shock” to Mexican elites, teaching them the value of federal republicanism.513   
 Concerns over republicanism and race also underpinned the debates that preceded the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which offered a compromise between politicians who aimed to 
acquire all of Mexico and others who resisted any form of territorial acquisition. In the Senate, 
the former position was held by a group of expansionist Democrats not from the Cotton 
Kingdom but from northwestern states such as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, as well as the 
Michigan senator Lewis Cass, who had served as secretary of war during Indian Removal.514 On 
the other side, some Whig senators raised doubts that Mexico, then under a republican 
government, held the power to divide and cede territory over which its people were sovereign. 
These men and moderate Democrats—many of them, like John C. Calhoun, from slaveholding 
states—also raised concerns about whether the people living on these lands were prepared to 
become full members of the Union. Not only “ignorant and indolent half-civilized Indians,” 
Mexican citizens included “free negroes and mulattoes, the remnants of the British slave 
trade.”515 
 The eventual decision to draw the US-Mexico border at the Rio Grande ended 
congressional debates about the immediate annexation of all of Mexico, offering, in the words of 
one Democratic newspaper, “all the territory of value that we can get without taking the 
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people.”516 Some politicians and citizens maintained the expectation, however, that Mexico 
would eventually fall under US dominion. For some, like Raphael Semmes, a political revolution 
and three to four generations of independent progress would prepare Mexico’s Indian population 
to voluntarily join the United States and the “Anglo-American family.”517 Others believed that 
the transfer would occur through piecemeal annexations akin to Texas, as US-Mexico War 
veterans and other Anglo-American pioneers settled in Mexico, invigorating their race or 
occasioning their disappearance. These predictions followed theories about Anglo-American 
settlement and the racial progress of Indians that had been rehearsed during the invention of 
Indian Territory and the removal of eastern Native Americans like the Seminoles to this space. 
During the Congressional debates over annexation, in fact, some Democrats in Congress had 
suggested removing Mexico’s nonwhite populations to reservations.518 
 US citizens, however, continued efforts to incorporate Mexican territory into the United 
States, launching filibustering expeditions that merged with the US-Mexico War. In August, 
1848, while US troops were still departing for home from the northern theater of war, 
adventurers plotted with revolutionaries in the northern states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, and 
Coahuila in an attempt to establish the Republic of the Sierra Madre, a project begun during the 
federalist movements of the 1830s and now, according to one observer, set to create “the Texas 
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story all over again.”519 Louisiana volunteers were eager participants in the Sierra Madre 
Movement. Late in the war, companies out of New Orleans had defended the garrison of 
Tampico, the port to Tamaulipas.520 In October, the Daily Delta called for soldiers to return to 
this port, whose commandant general had reportedly offered $100,000 to the first thousand-man 
company that would “aid the people in a struggle for the Independence of Mexican rule.” 
Drawing on the ideas about republicanism that had circulated previously, the Delta added, 
“Having once tasted the blessings of enlightened government, nothing will satisfy them but a 
recovery of their late state of peace and contentment.”521 Later that fall, a group of adventurers 
traveled from New Orleans to Corpus Christi to aid Sierra Madre revolutionaries, just before the 
movement receded from national view.522 
 Mexican officials continued to watch this movement, however, which they believed was 
led by foreign merchants seeking to foster political rebellion in order to engage in contraband 
trade.523 They also saw this movement as connected in some way to indigenous rebellions 
occurring in the Sierra Madre and Sierra Gorda mountain ranges.524 One leader of the Sierra 
Madre Movement, José María Jesús Carbajal, who had earlier participated in the Texas 
Revolution, issued a proclamation in 1851 demanding the withdrawal of Mexican troops from 
northern Mexico and a period of duty-free trade between northern Mexico and Texas. Recruiting 
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hundreds of US volunteers from Texas, this revolutionary launched attacks along the Rio Grande 
over the next two years, successfully obtaining reduced duties on US goods.525 Likewise, US-
Mexico war veterans received appeals for aid by Cuban revolutionaries—merchants, planters, 
and professionals who were believed to seek annexation by the United States.526 
 Other points across the Gulf were also of interest to expansionist politicians, who in the 
spring of 1848 found, with the intensification of the Caste War of Yucatán, a second opportunity 
to extend US influence southward. In 1847, while the US-Mexico War was still in progress and 
Yucatecan elites were still quarreling over whether to secede from Mexico, the secessionist 
government, then in power, had sent two diplomatic expeditions to Washington to negotiate an 
end to the US wartime blockade of its ports. The second delegation, led by Justo Sierra O’Reilly, 
a lawyer, literary figure, and the son-in-law of the separatist governor Santiago Méndez, was still 
present when news arrived that a series of struggles between state officials and Maya elites that 
had begun earlier that year had grown into a war that now claimed the state’s eastern cities. In an 
attempt to gain the upper hand in this conflict, thereby maintaining separation from Mexico, 
Sierra befriended these expansionist politicians and the newspapers that supported them. 
Together, these men and their opponents brought previous configurations of whiteness, 
civilization, and republican independence to bear on new territories of the Gulf.  
 In newspapers and before Congress, Sierra and his allies rhetorically linked the war in 
Yucatán with other Indian Wars occurring throughout US history. As in central Mexico, Yucatec 
Mayas had long been incorporated into colonial and national systems, particularly in the more 
densely populated northwestern regions, where Sierra recalled, “Our policy has always been to 
alleviate the indios’ social condition, improving them by civil and religious instruction and 
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extending to them the gift of civilization in the same manner and to the same extent as they have 
offered their own resources to us.”527 The outbreak of war, however, had shown the futility of 
these efforts, marking these people as indios bárbaros who must disappear.528 Their “savage and 
atrocious fury,” wrote Sierra, threatened to exterminate Yucatán’s familias blancas, white 
families, having already reduced its women and children to rape, torment, and murder.529 
Likewise, other Yucatecan elites appealed to US officers and diplomats stationed near the 
peninsula, observing, in the words of one Campeche merchant, that the Indians “seem to be as 
wild in their atrocities as they were at the time of Conquest.”530 Predictions of the imminent 
decline of civilization in Yucatán also appeared in US newspapers, supporting appeals to US 
citizens to rise to this state’s aid.531  
 Yet if civilization was endangered in Yucatán, so was republican independence—a virtue 
that seemed to align poorly, as it had in Mexico, with either side of the conflict. For Sierra, the 
war threated to force Yucatán back into the fold of Mexico, whose militarization under centralist 
leaders had distanced it from his own liberal state.532 On the other side, some US politicians and 
writers described the Caste War as Mayas’ own political revolution against the tyranny, 
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oppression, and slavery placed upon them by elite Yucatecans.533 A surgeon stationed near 
Campeche wrote home that neither Hispanic nor Maya Yucatecans were capable of governing 
the state: “The one is too uncivilized—the other too ignorant & lazy & selfish.” For this 
observer, the solution lay in the intervention of “some foreign power,” which “should come here 
to keep the two races, now much intermixed from entirely destroying each other.”534 As Sierra 
pleaded for US aid and intervention in the conflict, he also intimated that such policies might 
include Yucatán’s annexation by the United States, a topic that was taken up and widely debated 
in US newspapers.535  
 After investigations by the War Department and Committee on Foreign Affairs and a 
private meeting with Sierra, President James K. Polk, an aggressive expansionist, put a bill 
before Congress in May of 1848 requesting that the United States pursue a military occupation of 
the peninsula. In the days before the Yucatan Bill went before the Senate, Sierra joined forces 
with the expansionist Democrat Edward Hannegan of Indiana to translate information and 
statistics about Yucatán to support the bill.536 Hannegan, along with Lewis Cass, had been one of 
the primary supporters of the All Mexico Movement, which in addition to claims about 
civilization and republicanism had used the Monroe Doctrine to argue that the United States 
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must protect Mexico at all costs from dependence on European powers.537 Now Hannegan 
applied similar arguments to Yucatán. He assured his fellow congressmen that no permanent 
occupation was intended, but added, “considerations may arise which will lead us beyond our 
first intentions.”538 
 Hannegan’s argument about the Monroe Doctrine and Yucatán focused on the threat of 
British influence, indirectly connecting the proposed occupation of this state to the War of 1812. 
Months earlier, when debating the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, expansionist 
Democrats had again resurrected the memory of this foundational war, describing themselves as 
descendants of patriots like Andrew Jackson while comparing their opponents to the pro-British 
secessionist movement that had grown among some New England Federalists in 1814.539 Now, 
Hannegan used reports from Sierra to argue that Britain was interfering in the Caste War, 
deploying troops to Yucatán and sending its agents to arm Maya rebels.540 He concluded that 
Britain aimed to control Yucatán, thereby securing her claim to Atlantic-Pacific connections 
through the isthmus of Central America. More significantly, controlling Yucatán would position 
Britain to take Cuba. With these two territories, the “lock and key” to the Gulf of Mexico, this 
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European power could make the region a mare clausum, or closed sea, shutting off New Orleans 
and the entire Gulf of Mexico from foreign commerce. Instead, concluded Hannegan, “The Gulf 
of Mexico should be American: not that America should exclusively use it in time of peace; but 
in case of war, we should be able to close it against hostile occupation.” 541  
 Events in Yucatán and the United States soon ended discussions of the Yucatan Bill, again 
pushing the impulse for intervention into the private arena. That March, Miguel Barbachano y 
Tarrazo (Sierra’s father-in-law’s political rival) had returned to power in Yucatán, signing a 
short-lived peace treaty with Maya rebels. News of the treaty arrived while Sierra and the 
Democratic senator John Dix of New York were planning a compromise to push the bill through 
Congress. The apparent end of the Caste War, combined with national criticism of President 
Polk’s expansionist policies, which now appeared also to include designs on Cuba, made the 
occupation of the peninsula appear unfeasible. Hannegan himself declared the Yucatan Bill 
unnecessary. Sierra returned to Yucatán, which by August had rejoined Mexico.542 Months 
before, however, citizens of US port cities had written to Sierra, expressing their sympathies for 
Yucatán and offering to raise militias on the state’s behalf.543 Even after Barbachano brought 
Yucatán back into the Mexican fold, he would rely on foreign countries to support state war 
efforts, which in fact were still in their earliest stages.544 Under contracts impermissable by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 CG, 30 Cong., 1 sess., App. 597 (May 5, 1848); Hietala, Manifest Design, 248.  
542 Sierra, Diario de nuestro viaje, entry from May 17; Don E. Dumond, The Machete and the 
Cross: Campesino Rebellion in Yucatan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 106-117; 
Hietala, Manifest Designs, 212; May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld, 16. 
543 These early overtures came from the Atlantic seaboard: New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. 
Sierra, Diario de nuestro viaje, entry from April 22. 
544 The arrival of ships carrying this aid to the ports of Campeche and Sisal appear in “Copiador 
de la correspondencia del gobernador, relativa a la Hacienda Pública” (Libro 27), Libros 
Complementarios (LC), PE, AGEY.  
 190 
Mexican law, Yucatecan merchants imported grain, arms, and ammunition from foreign cities, 
and outfitted companies of soldiers from the United States and Cuba.545 
 The Caste War reached New Orleans through multiple paths. By late 1848, two 
commissioners from Yucatán, José Tiburcio López and Salvador Fernandez, had established a 
presence in the city, importing thousands of dollars in specie and exporting thousands of sacks of 
corn, bread, arms, and gunpowder.546 Silver from Yucatán’s churches was also said to have 
traveled across the Gulf as payment for munitions from New Orleans.547 In November of 1848, 
roughly one-third of the New Orleans corn exports recorded in the Daily Delta were bound for 
Yucatán, leading the paper to report the grain in “brisk demand.”548 New Orleans men would 
also rise to the assistance of the rulers of Yucatán, taking the lead in US efforts to conquer a 
“savage” foe in exchange for glory and material connections. The multiple ties between this 
expedition and the US-Mexico War, the Sierra Madre Movement, and future attacks on Cuba 
have caused one historian to write that it “would seem to be splitting hairs” to try to differentiate 
this episode of mercenary service from the filibustering expeditions of the 1850s.549 Rather than 
tarnishing the authenticity of US volunteers’ claims about their own motivations, the 
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filibustering dimension of the New Orleans mercenary expedition to Yucatán highlights the 
continued entanglement of conquest, Indian War, and political revolution. 
 
George W. White's Yucatan Company 
 The Caste War stood as yet another conflict in which New Orleans men tied their city and 
country more closely to the Gulf ports through warfare aimed at advancing the causes of 
civilization, republicanism, and independence. Traveling to Yucatán in October of 1848 as 
mercenary soldiers, and months later setting sail a second time from New Orleans with plans to 
attack Yucatán, other Mexican coasts, or Cuba, the company of men led by “Captain” George W. 
White, who had served in Mexico as a captain under Persifor Frazer Smith of Second Seminole 
War fame, continued the march of conquest that had proceeded from New Orleans outward to 
Florida, Texas, and other Mexican ports. A movement that foreshadowed the 1851 filibuster in 
which US forces attempted to aid revolutionaries in Cuba, this episode highlights the complex 
ways that tropes of savagery, tyranny, and colonial oppression were realigned when applied to 
the peoples of the southern Gulf. In Yucatán, a place where power seemed to be contested 
between savages and tyrants, some armed US men moved easily between roles as mercenary 
soldiers and conquerors. 
 In the summer of 1848, US-Mexico War veterans still stationed in Veracruz made 
overtures to the Yucatán government offering their services in the Caste War, which had 
continued despite attempts on both sides to negotiate a treaty. Announcements that men were 
enlisting for this movement appeared in the Free American, one of the US newspapers in 
Veracruz, as early as June 2: officers such as Captain William Tenbrink of the Independent 
Company of Louisiana Volunteers hoped in a few days to recruit “four hundred noble hearts” to 
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save Yucatecans from “the dreadful knife of the blood-thirsty savages.”550 In mid-July, John H. 
Peoples, a veteran and former correspondent for the New Orleans Delta, traveled from Veracruz 
to the capitol of Yucatán, signing a contract to bring thousands of US soldiers to the peninsula.551 
The Delta would later report that the contract guaranteed soldiers “eight dollars a month, with 
comfortable clothing and good rations, besides granting to each soldier three hundred and twenty 
acres of the best land in the world.”552 Barbachano’s hope, the New Orleans paper proclaimed, 
was to “form a nucleus for an army which Yucatan may depend on in any future difficulties, 
either with the Indians or with any foreign foe.”553  
 Straight out of their service in Mexico, New Orleans men continued to fight for civilization 
and a version of independence in other parts of the Gulf. That October, recruitment for Yucatán 
began in New Orleans, led by the US-Mexico War veteran George White. The first regiment of 
White’s company left New Orleans for Sisal, Yucatán on October 14, on the Brig Harriet—a 
force of 125 men that included other officers who had volunteered in Mexico. Leaving the troops 
at Sisal on October 22, the ship returned three weeks later with White, David S. McDowell, who 
had served as a lieutenant in the same regiment in Mexico, and Robert J. Kelly, who had served 
as a senior officer in the Battalion of Louisiana Mounted Volunteers.554 These men and other 
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veteran volunteer officers began efforts to recruit a second force of one thousand men, which 
would depart in late November, also carrying grain for Yucatán.555  
  In contrast to the enthusiastic official collaboration during the Second Seminole War, city 
officials held no public meetings about White’s Yucatan Company. Likewise, no mention of the 
conflict appears in the letter books kept by the New Orleans mayor.556 Yet for those being 
recruited, enlistment still promised the chance to participate in a long history of military service 
by which New Orleans residents achieved glory for themselves and their city. The coverage of 
recruitment offered by the Daily Delta explicitly made this connection in its reports of the 
company’s officers. Lt. John McDonald had proven his bravery by fighting in the Battle of 
Okechobee in the Second Seminole War under Zachary Taylor, “Old Zack.”557 James J. 
Connolly, another officer from Persifor Smith’s Louisiana Volunteers, had earned a reputation in 
Mexico as the War-horse of Buena Vista. “If laurels are to b'won,” the Delta observed, he would 
surely earn his share.558 Another officer from Smith’s company, George H. Tobin, had kept a 
newspaper column called “Tobin’s Knapsack” during the Mexican War. Now he promised to 
entertain readers by investigating “some of the natural curiosities and antiquities” of Yucatan.559 
Another officer, Lorenzo Besançon, had captained the Louisiana Mounted Volunteers and would 
later participate in the Sierra Madre Movement.560 
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 The hundreds of men who responded to this opportunity to fight on behalf of New Orleans 
in yet another Gulf war represented not only the pool of potential soldiers available after the war 
between the United States and Mexico, but also the mass of wage laborers available in the 
growing city of New Orleans.561 Official recruitment began, as before, with a highly-publicized 
rendezvous in a posh area of town—this time, at Devereaux’s Coffee House, across from the 
new and majestic St. Charles Theater.562 As troops departed for Yucatán, the Delta professed the 
“assurance that their gallantry and energy will add greatly to the strength of the Yucatecos.”563 
Meanwhile, a group of self-made officers opened a second rendezvous at the Rainbow Coffee 
House, a business closer to the levee. “Though not claiming to be ‘the hero of a hundred fights,’” 
wrote the Delta of one of these officers, John G. Malloy, he was “an ambitious officer, who will 
no doubt do the State of Yucatan good service.” Newspapers did not report on the departure of 
this independent company, but Molloy, at least, ended up serving in Yucatán.564  
 Upon their arrival in Sisal, the Yucatán Company marched inland to the capital of Mérida, 
later congregating in Tekax, one of the major seats of war.565 Mérida’s official paper reported 
enthusiastically on their arrival, praising their prompt and enthusiastic answer to the governor’s 
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call, the good conduct of the soldiers, and the firm deportment of their officers.566 While thirty-
two men returned only a month after their arrival—unable, according to Governor Barbachano, 
to tolerate the scarcities of military service in Yucatán--, many more, including the officers 
McDowell, Mace, Freeland, Molloy, and Tobin, stayed until March, when the Yucatecan 
government officially discharged its foreign companies.567 Others stayed even longer, 
accompanying Yucatecan forces to the port of Bacalar, the heart of rebel territory.568 The 
Yucatán state government armed these men and committed, though it often failed to fulfill this 
promise, to support those who became disabled in battle or were otherwise unable to support 
themselves.569  
 No simple filibuster, the participation of New Orleans men in the Caste War was an act of 
mercenary military service in a conflict that many saw as protecting North American civilization 
from savagery and from British control. If these soldiers carried expectations of receiving 
material rewards in exchange for their service, these expectations were nothing new. The US 
government had offered free homesteads to armed citizens in Florida during the Second 
Seminole War, a conflict during which regular and volunteer soldiers were accused of using 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
566 “Late from Yucatan,” Daily Delta, Dec. 25, 1848 
567 Passenger logs kept by the U.S. Customs Service only account for the return of around 250 of 
the 1100 men who went to Yucatán. See entries from January, March, and April, “Quarterly 
Abstracts of Passenger Lists of Vessels Arriving at New Orleans, Louisiana, 1820–1875,” 
Records of the U.S. Customs Service, RG 36, NARA.  
Barbachano’s comment that some of the US soldiers “no puede soportar la escasez y penuración 
que se sostiene la guerra” in Yucatán appears in his letter to the Minister of Interior and Exterior 
Relations, Jan. 26, 1849, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY. 
568 Barbachano to MEDRIE, March 21, 1849, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY. 
Praise of American soldiers and the death of Robert Kelly in this battle appears in the Boletin 
Oficial at the Biblioteca Yucatanense in Mérida. I have lost my notes on this periodical and will 
need to consult it again on my next trip to Yucatán. 
569 Barbachano to MEDRIE, Jan. 26, 1849, and Aug. 31, 1850, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY.  
 196 
military service as a way of generating income.570 Mexican War veterans had received bounty 
land totaling 14,400,000 acres.571 Likewise, the pay for filibustering soldiers in the 1850s was 
roughly equivalent to that offered by the Army.572 While little evidence remains that Yucatecan 
officials actually intended for US veterans to settle among them, they did consider establishing 
colonies of Frenchmen and Spaniards on the eastern islands and coasts in order to “whiten” the 
area between themselves and Maya rebels.573 Yucatán’s coastal areas had long intrigued US 
developers because of the opportunities they held for tropical crops.574  
 The first waves of soldiers who returned from Yucatán, however, professed to have been 
convinced during their service that “the Yucatecos, or whites” did not deserve US sympathy. 
Picking up themes that had circulated during deliberations on the Yucatan Bill, they described 
Yucatán’s Indians as “a brave, virtuous, and interesting race, full of patriotism, fidelity, and 
honesty,” narrating scenes in which rebel soldiers had approached their camp, beckoning “to the 
Americans to come over and join them.”575 If true, these conversations would have been made 
possible by the decades of trade between Mayas and Britons along the Yucatán-Belize border, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 While the Armed Occupation Act was generally unsuccessful at bringing civilians into the 
conflict, the commanding general Zachary Taylor believed that the establishment of state militias 
allowed Floridians to demand financial support from the government while never leaving their 
homes. Joe Knetsch and Paul S. George, “A Problematical Law: The Armed Occupation Act of 
1842 and Its Impact on South Florids,” Tequesta (Miami: Historical Association of Southern 
Florida, 1993); Taylor to Poinsett, May 11 (T-175), 1840, Letters Received, Records of the 
Adjutant General (RG 94), NARA. 
571 Daily Delta, Oct. 3 and 24, Dec. 15, 1848. 
572 May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld, 96. 
573 July 28, 1849, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY. 
574 The US consul to Campeche in the late-1820s and early-1830s, Henry Perrine, imported 
hemp, logwood, and other tropical plants from Yucatán to the United States, hoping to 
“domesticate” them in southern Florida or Louisiana for use by the United States. See various 
dispatches from Henry Perrine to Secretary of State between June 30, 1830 and February 1, 
1834, Vol. 1, Despatches from United States Consuls in Campeche, 1820-1880, RG 59, NARA; 
“Dr. Henry Perrine—Tropical Plants,” Report No. 564, Reports of the House of Representatives, 
25th Congress, 2d Session, Feb. 17, 1838. 
575 “From the New Orleans Delta,” Washington Daily National Intelligencer, May 21, 1849. 
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which made some eastern Mayas as conversant in English as Spanish. Learning of these and 
other newspaper reports in favor of the rebels, Mexican statesmen voiced concerns not only 
about their country’s international reputation but also that rebel leaders might discover that they 
had US support.576 According to returning volunteers, Yucatecan commanders had kept their 
regiment divided from one another in order guard “against the possibility of our volunteers 
accepting these invitations, as well as against another not less serious peril, of their assuming the 
government of the country.”577 
 At least one US citizen in British Honduras would experience a similar change of heart 
over which Yucatecans, if any, deserved US sympathy. The Connecticut merchant Christopher 
Hempstead, who had moved to this territory in 1845 and accepted the position of US consul at 
Belize two years later, found his support for elite Yucatecans waning over the course of the 
war.578 When refugees first arrived in Belize in the summer of 1848, Hempstead found these 
“white” people in a “truly heartrending” state.579 Two years later, attacks by “Spaniards or 
Indians” on mahogany works in British territory appeared in his letters as one and the same: “the 
depredations of a lawless and savage people whom fear alone can constrain or control.”580 For 
Hempstead, the military power of the United States offered one of the only ways to instill this 
fear among the Hispanic and Maya populations of Yucatán. As an explanation of why Caste War 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Political report of Luis de la Rosa, May 22, 1849 (No. 69), Exp. 2, Leg. 31, AEMEUA, SRE. 
577 “From the New Orleans Delta,” Washington Daily National Intelligencer, May 21, 1849. 
578 Hempstead to Secretary of State, May 12, 1847, Vol. 1, Despatches from United States 
consuls in Belize, 1847-1906, RG 59, NARA. 
579 Hempstead to Secretary of State, May 26, 1848, Vol. 1, Despatches from United States 
consuls in Belize, 1847-1906, RG 59, NARA. 
580 Hempstead to Secretary of State, May 30, 1850, Vol. 1, Despatches from United States 
consuls in Belize, 1847-1906, RG 59, NARA. 
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attacks had not targeted his own property, he wrote, “Since the Mexican War there seems to be a 
dread of and a respect for the U.S. by the Spaniards and Indians in this vicinity.”581  
 By the time Hempstead wrote this 1850 letter, officials across the Gulf of Mexico were 
watching in suspense as private US militias crisscrossed the Gulf in search of revolution and 
filibuster. In addition to the Sierra Madre Movement, one of the earliest examples was a failed 
movement by many the same men who had traveled as mercenary soldiers to Yucatán in 1848. In 
July of 1849, a reported four to six hundred armed men under George White again departed New 
Orleans, bound to attack an unknown foreign port. The forces set up camp at Round Island, a 
barrier island ten miles off the coast of Mississippi, where they remained for the following two 
months. During this time, officials across the Gulf circulated anxious letters, hoping to determine 
the force’s next move; it was said that even the subordinate officers were ignorant of their final 
destination.582 In Yucatán, Miguel Barbachano received word that New Orleans commercial 
houses supported these activities.583 The steamer Fanny that they were believed to have 
purchased for their expedition had also shuttled volunteers to New Orleans from Veracruz at the 
end of the US-Mexico War.584 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Hempstead to Secretary of State, Sept. 5, 1851, Vol. 1, Despatches from United States 
consuls in Belize, 1847-1906, RG 59, NARA. 
582 Copy of Dabelsteen to Barbachano in Dabelsteen to De la Rosa, Aug. 18, 1849 (No. 15), Exp. 
12, Leg. 30, AEMEUA, SRE. This letter also in Exp. 1, Leg. 4, Fondo de Filibusterismo, SRE. 
583 Barbachano used these reports to continue pushing for increased aid from the supreme 
government, insisting that Yucatán could not fight two enemies at once. At one point he 
suggested that the best intervention would be to request warships from Havana. Barbachano to 
MEDRIE, Aug. 31, Sept. 12 and 14, and Nov. 15, 1849, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY. 1849. 
584 Dabelsteen to de la Rosa, Aug. 18, 1849 (No. 15), Exp. 12, Leg. 30, AEMEUA, SRE; “Army 
Intelligence,” The New York Herald, June 23, 1848. 
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 Mexican officials believed that the adventurers were bound for Mexico, in particular 
Yucatán, although they questioned on whose behalf the men would fight.585 Luis de la Rosa, the 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington, DC, first suspected that the 
force traveled at the behest of the Yucatán government. Later he supposed that Yucatán had 
again declared its independence, and that officials in Mexico City had hired US soldiers to put 
down this revolution.586 De la Rosa and O.L. Dabelsteen, the Mexican consul at New Orleans, 
also reported rumors that the troops intended to fight in Yucatán on the side of the Maya rebels; 
George White, it was said, had promised to have the blancos on the peninsula’s shores begging 
for mercy.587 Meanwhile, officials in Washington, DC concluded that the expedition planned to 
aid independence efforts in Cuba, claims that De la Rosa and Dabelsteen sometimes believed.588  
 The short distance between Yucatán and Cuba made the mutual vulnerability of the two 
places apparent. When mercenary soldiers had first departed New Orleans for Yucatán in 1848, 
the US consul at Havana had reported rumors that Cuban revolutionaries expected American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
585 Dabelsteen to de la Rosa, Aug. 18 and Sept. 8, 1849 (Nos. 15 and 21) with enclosures, Exp. 
12, Leg. 30, AEMEUA, SRE; De la Rosa to Lacunza, Sept. 27, 1849 (No. 107), Exp. 2, Leg. 31, 
AEMEUA, SRE. 
586 De la Rosa to Lacunza, Aug. 28, 1849 (No. 105), AEMEUA, SRE; De la Rosa to Lacunza, 
Aug. 17, 1849 (Res. No. 32), AEMEUA, SRE. The Minister of Interior and Exterior Relations 
assured De la Rosa that Yucatán and Mexico were again on friendly terms; that the Mexican 
government had not been involved in recruiting these soldiers; and that the government in 
Mexico City did not believe that Yucatán would try again to raise an expedition in the United 
States. De la Rosa to Lacunza, Oct. 8, 1849 (Res. No. 45), AEMEUA, SRE.; Lacunza to De la 
Rosa, Sept. 11 and Nov. 12, 1849 (Res. Nos. 21 and 25), Exp. 1, Leg. 31, AEMEUA, SRE.  
587 Copy of Dabelsteen to Logan Hunter, July 31 in Dabelsteen to de la Rosa, Aug. 18, 1849 (No. 
15), Leg. 30, Exp. 12, AEMEUA, SRE. A copy of this letter also appears in Barbachano to 
MDRIE, Sept. 12, 1849, Libro 29, LC, PE, AGEY. 
588 De la Rosa to Lacunza, Aug. 17, 24, and 28, 1849 (No. 105 and Res. Nos. 33 and 39), Exp. 2, 
Leg. 31, and Copy of Dabelsteen to Abogado de Distrito de Louisiana, July 31, 1849 in 
Dabelsteen to de la Rosa, Aug. 18 and 28, 1849 (Nos. 15 and 19), Exp. 12, Leg. 30, AEMEUA, 
SRE. 
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forces to arrive to their aid from Yucatán.589 A year later, as George White’s filibusterers 
prepared at Round Island, De la Rosa speculated that even if these men were bound for Cuba, 
they would likely continue on to other “border or coastal points.”590 When this force in fact 
disbanded in early October, leaving impoverished soldiers wandering the streets of New Orleans, 
Mexican officials prepared to shift their attention to other concerns, but found rumors of US 
meddling in the affairs of the hemisphere difficult to ignore.591 In May of 1850, the Cuban 
revolutionary Narciso López launched an invasion of Cuba from Isla Mujeres off the eastern 
coast of Yucatán.592 He launched a second, more widely publicized expedition in July of 1851. 
Raising money and soldiers at the Banks Arcade and other popular New Orleans rendezvous, 
López traveled first to Florida and then to an isolated shore near Havana, where his troops 
landed, blundering inland until they were stopped by Spanish authorities. Even after López was 
executed in late August of that year, citizens of New Orleans, other northern Gulf cities, and 
ports along the Atlantic seaboard continued their filibustering efforts in order to spread what they 
depicted as the area of liberty toward this eastern border of the Gulf.593  
 
Conclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld, 15. 
590 De la Rosa to Lacunza, Aug. 17, 1849 (Res. No. 32), Exp. 2, Leg. 31, AEMEUA, SRE. “Es 
pues muy probable que el proyecto se frustre y yo temo que una multidud de aventureros que 
estaban ya alistados y armados para la espedición a Cuba se dirijan a Texas o a otros puntos 
fronterizas o literales desde donde puedan invadir a Mexico.” 
591 Political reports of José María Lacunza, Oct. 13 and Nov. 13, 1849, (No. 137 and 143), Exp. 
1, Leg. 31, AEMEUA, SRE; Dabelsteen to de la Rosa, Oct. 5 and 17, 1849, (Nos. 24 and 25), 
Exp. 12, Leg. 30, AEMEUA, SRE; De la Rosa to Lacunza, Oct. 18 and 21, 1849, Res. (Nos. 48 
and 52), Exp. 2, Leg. 31, AEMEUA, SRE. 
592 Governor to MEDRIE, Dec. 9, 1850, and Jan. 16 and March 31, 1851, Libro 29, LC, PE, 
AGEY. May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld, 28. 
593 May, Manifest Destiny’s Underworld, 30-33; Johnson, River of Dark Dreams, 303-394. 
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 Even a New Yorker like J.H. Colton, whose map opened this chapter, could not help but 
place New Orleans at the center of the United States’ geography, for it was the point that seemed 
always to connect the continental nation to its sister states around the Gulf of Mexico. Had the 
map been made in New Orleans, perhaps the monuments around its edges would have differed: 
the remembrances of the Revolutionary War would likely have given way to memorials to 
Andrew Jackson and the Battle of New Orleans. Seeing their city not only as the heart of 
southern slavery but also of an independence won by white volunteer soldiers against British, 
Indian, and black enemies, New Orleans men attempted to bring the gifts of civilization and 
republican independence to countrymen and trade partners at ports in every part of the Gulf. In 
doing so, they acted as agents of US empire, even when these gains were temporary and not 
officially supported by the United States government. 
 As the 1850s progressed, filibustering movements sailed beyond the Gulf of Mexico to 
Nicaragua and other parts of the Caribbean, leaving the United States government and its citizens 
to grapple with how to spread republicanism into territories whose people they did not want as 
citizens. Heirs to deep histories of official and rogue colonialism, and equipped with the 
resources, gained through slavery, to carry this power into foreign nations, New Orleans 
volunteers remained central players in US imperialism through this period. These particular 
dreams of empire would come to a halt in 1861, when the U.S. Civil War would turn attentions 
inward and, ultimately, devastate the slaveholding South. But the United States’ military and 




 In the century following 1763, the peninsulas of Florida and Yucatán marked the 
contested entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, a region connecting North America to the Atlantic 
Oceana and Caribbean Sea. The people of the Gulf had long interacted with one another through 
the regional lines of trade and migration, which crisscrossed the Gulf’s shallow shores. But in 
order for empires and nation-states to share the wealth of the continent in the markets of other 
regions, they needed to retain access to the often turbulent straits between Cuba and Florida, by 
which ships sailed outward past the Bahamas into the Atlantic Ocean, and to the slower route to 
the Caribbean Sea between Cuba and Yucatán. As Spain ceded its claims to North America--first 
to Britain and France, then to the United States, and finally, to Mexico—the body of water once 
known as the Seno Mexicano became a shared sea sought after by agents of revolution and of the 
emerging U.S. empire. The imperial officials, armed citizens and their governments, and rogue 
agents of empire aiming to control the land and waters of the Gulf of Mexico knew that Florida 
and Yucatán held a strategic place in this world. 
 These contests among the official and unofficial representatives of empires and nation-
states provided new political opportunities to indigenous peoples at a time when life was 
becoming more difficult in certain parts of the continent’s interior. Regardless of how the Gulf of 
Mexico appeared on eighteenth-century maps and treaties, many of its rivers and shores 
remained indigenous territory or the havens of pirates, privateers, and maroons. For Lower 
Creeks, Seminoles, and Red Sticks seeking to remain independent from the United States and the 
Creek Nation, and for a group of Maya leaders staging a revolution in order to end the oppressive 
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systems of labor and taxation that they had experienced in the state of Yucatán, the loosely-held 
fortresses and the isolated rivers and bays of Florida and Yucatán offered points of connection to 
the Gulf, and sometimes to its underworld. Serving as makeshift ports, these maritime outlets 
provided these leaders opportunities to obtain the weapons and external relations necessary to 
assert international claims of independence.  
 Official governments did not always endorse the activities of these indigenous leaders or 
of the British American adventurers, merchants, and rogue officials who often partnered with 
them, but these movements were still serious events in the history of North America and of the 
Atlantic world. From the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico and 
Caribbean Sea, trade and diplomacy that flouted imperial policies had long kept empires alive. 
The United States and Mexico, heirs not only to Atlantic empires but also to traditions of rogue 
colonialism, relied on private and illicit networks of exchange as they sought to conquer the 
territories they claimed as their borders by eliminating connections between indigenous worlds 
and the Gulf underworld. The partnerships that Maya revolutionaries and dissident Creek leaders 
established with men bearing loose ties to Great Britain, though fraught, demonstrate the many 
ways that indigenous peoples imagined new futures for themselves in the age of independent 
states.  
 During this transitional century, private and rogue agents also propelled the United States 
into new parts of the Gulf. The triple threat of Indians, Spaniards, and Britons encouraged 
volunteer militias, mercenary soldiers, and filibusterers to occupy and “civilize” foreign 
territories across this region. Meanwhile, lines of trade strengthened connections between New 
Orleans and other Gulf ports. The Gulf of Mexico would never become the “American 
Mediterranean” that some people in the United States imagined, but by the late-1860s it would 
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be a region dominated by the United States. As the century progressed, the United States would 
take sides in civil warfare between liberals and conservatives in Mexico; its businessmen would 
continue to invest in Mexico during the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz in the final decades of the 
century. Likewise, Cuban revolutionaries would find in their independence struggles against 
Spain, avid, if generally self-interested, supporters in the United States. Aiming to remove the 
remaining European empire from the region, these fickle friends would also hope to possess 
Cuba, the “key” to the Gulf.594  
 After U.S. Civil War, indigenous peoples within the borders claimed by the United States 
would confront a U.S. military whose regular troops had increased significantly since the days of 
the Seminole Wars. Pushed inland or removed from the Gulf, they had lost access to the 
international trade partners who might have helped them weather these violent onslaughts. 
Mayas in eastern Yucatán, however, would remain largely independent into the twentieth 
century.595 No longer supported by the rogue alliances of the late-1840s, their autonomous 
communities were, nonetheless, signs of the incomplete advance of Euro-American empire in 
North America. Positioned between a forested interior, British Honduras, and the Straits of 
Yucatán, these communities continued to draw strength from the resistance of the Gulf and 
Caribbean regions to centralized control. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 Muller, Cuban Emigrés, 5. 
595 During the final decades of the century, Hispanics in northwestern Yucatán would profit from 
the exportation of the hemp-like fiber henequen, produced by Maya laborers, for which U.S. 
companies were one of the primary importers. New research suggests that exports for foreign 
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Texas A&M University Press, 2007); Adrienne Kates, “Maya Autonomy and International 
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